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The beginning of the 1990s saw many African countries embarking on the process of drafting 
new constitutions as they abandoned independence constitutions. Most of the independence 
constitutions were perceived as constitutions without constitutionalism and they were 
generally blamed for failure of democracy and the rule of law in Africa. 
 
The study analyses the state of democracy and constitutionalism and the impact that 
colonialism had on the African continent. Apart from the spurt of new constitutions adopted, 
democracy is growing very slowly in most African states with widespread human rights 
violations and disregard for the rule of law and the principle of separation of powers, still 
holding the centre stage. 
 
Judicial independence is an important component of democracy in the modern state. The 
study therefore scrutinizes how the principle of judicial independence can be promoted and 
protected to enhance democracy. One important mechanism which plays a crucial role in 
safeguarding judicial independence is the way judicial officers are appointed. The study 
selects four countries – Swaziland, Kenya, Zimbabwe and South Africa and analyses how 
judicial officers are appointed in these countries in an effort to find an effective and optimal 
approach. 
 
The premise of the study is centred on the role of constitutionalism and the process of 
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1.1. Background   
The appointment of judicial officers often takes centre stage in African countries because of 
the nature of politics and the way in which legislation regulating the process is interpreted or 
perceived by different role players. One interesting case was the appointment of the former 
acting National Director of the Public Prosecutions in South Africa as an acting judge which 
was met with criticism from certain quarters within the South African legal fraternity. 
In response, the Minister of Justice of the Republic of South Africa was quoted as saying: 
 
“I have noted that certain formations in the legal fraternity such as the General Council 
of the Bar (GCB) as a leader of the pack, the Law Society of South Africa (LSSA) and 
the Freedom under Law (FuL) have raised concerns and or objections regarding the 
decision I made to appoint Advocate Mokotedi Mpshe as acting Judge in the North West 
High Court.  
 
They argue that this appointment of a former acting national Director of Public 
Prosecutions as a former employee of the state violates the principle of judicial 
independence and believe is unconstitutional. … 
 
The GCB and of late the LSSA, the latter organization through media statements, urged 
me to withdraw or suspend the appointment as they harbour fears that this undermines 
the independence of the judiciary, ‘either as a perception or in principle’. I disagree with 
this assertion and I will forthrightly demonstrate the basis of my disagreement”.1 
 
This is not a uniquely South African challenge. There are many different cases concerning 
perceived threats to the independence of the judiciary in various African states as reported in 
the media and by other institutions or organizations.  On 8 June 2009 it was reported in a This 
Day newspaper article under the heading: “Nigeria: South East Lawmakers Protest Over 
Appointment of Judges” by Onwuka Nzeshi as follows:  
 
“Abuja — The issue of Federal Character in the appointments being made by President 
Umaru Musa Yar’Adua is again causing ripples in the South-east, as the federal 
lawmakers representing the zone yesterday raised objections on the recent nomination of 
judges from different parts of the country preparatory to their elevation as justices of the 
Court of Appeal”.2 
 
Democracy and the rule of law in Zimbabwe have largely collapsed and the ZANU-PF and 
MDC Government of National Unity are currently working on the adoption of a new 
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 Minister of Justice, J Radebe, RSA “Mpshe’s appointment consistent with the Constitution” available at 
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constitution that will pave the way for fresh elections and restore constitutionalism to 
Zimbabwe. In 1999, President Robert Mugabe, responding to a letter addressed to him by 
four Supreme Court judges seeking clarification on torture charges, is quoted as having said: 
 
 “The judiciary has no right to give instructions to the President on any matter”.3 
 
A number of reports by political parties and civil society organizations on the independence 
of the South African judiciary have appeared recently.
4
 The issue has even caught the 
attention of the International Bar Association (IBA).
5
 The IBA has likewise reported on 
threats to judicial independence in other African states, like Uganda.
6
 These reports show that 





The above synopsis indicates the need to examine the role of constitutionalism, together with 
the process of appointing judicial officers as an expression of this constitutionalism in an 
effort to ensure judicial independence and promote democracy in Africa. 
 
1.2  Research Questions 
A number of questions are raised in this research: 
 What is the role of constitutionalism in ensuring good governance? 
 What is the nexus between the concepts of constitutionalism, judicial 
independence and democracy? 
 What is the role or influence of the international community in the 
development and promotion of constitutionalism in the African continent in 
the era of globalization? 
 What is the role of judicial appointment in the in promoting 
constitutionalism in Africa? 
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 http://www.sokwanele.com/node/74; www.aidsfreeworld.org (accessed 23/07/2010). 
4
  See for example, “The DA’s judicial review: Threats to judicial independence in South Africa” available at 
http://www.da.org.za/docs/621/judicial%20review_document.pdf (accessed 14/11/2012). 
5
 ‘Beyond Polokwane: Safeguarding South Africa’s judicial independence’July 2008, an International Bar 
Association Human Rights Institute Report. 
6
 “Judicial independence undermined: A report on Uganda” September 2007, An International Bar 
Association Human Rights Institute Report. 
7
  See Hyslop J African democracy in the era of globalisation (1999) at 1. The term “new democracies” is 
used here to indicate the states in Africa which have since replaced, or are in the process of replacing, the 
constitutions they inherited from their colonial predecessors on independence, with new constitutions 
reflecting Africa’s move to constitutionalism as discussed in this dissertation. 
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 How can the independence of the judiciary make contribution towards the 
promotion of human rights and democracy in the modern state? 
 Does the process of appointment of judicial officers offer sufficient 
assurance of their independence and impartiality? Are there any more 
advanced models for the appointment of judicial officers, e.g. the 
interference of the legislative authority, by which judicial independence is 
guaranteed? 
 Does the newly adopted constitutions (in the case of South Africa, 
Swaziland and Kenya) and draft constitution in the case of Zimbabwe 
provides a fair and an unambiguous model or way in which judicial officers 
should be appointed? 
 What can be the best state practice? Can these countries learn from one 
another?  
 
1.3  Aim of Study 
An evaluation of these claims requires a closer study and deeper understanding of the 
meaning and importance of judicial independence on the African continent, and its 
relationship with concepts like constitutionalism, the rule of law, and the separation of 
powers. What is needed is a better understanding of the major theories of judicial 
independence.
8
 Such an understanding will include an analysis of international and regional 
legal standards governing the independence of the judiciary.  
 
On the basis of a deeper understanding of the meaning and nature of judicial independence, it 
will then become possible to investigate various constitutional and other general mechanisms 
that contribute toward the independence of the judiciary. 
 
The aim of the study is to establish what mechanisms for the appointment of judges are 
employed in selected “new” African democracies. After a comparative and descriptive 
analysis of paradigmatic examples of the various appointment processes, the study will aim to 
provide a critical evaluation of these processes with a view to the identification of the best 
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 For the need to develop a theoretical perspective on the issue see Russel Peter “Towards a general theory 
of judicial independence” in Russel and O’Brien (eds) Judicial independence in the age of democracy: 




state practice in line with the demands of African constitutional democracy, as explored in 
Chapter 2 of the dissertation. 
 
1.4  Scope and Limitation of Study 
The study examines the state of constitutionalism and judicial independence in the four 
selected African jurisdictions.
9
 The study briefly examines the concept of colonialism and 
covers the period immediately after independence; how things have unfolded since then; and 
in particular the period between 1990 and 2012 which has seen new constitutions adopted and 
existing constitutions amended. Although the study addresses four countries, the case of 
South Africa will dominate the discussion by and large. Where appropriate, reference is made 
to other African countries, while the positions in Germany, Canada and the US are also 
considered.  
 
In examining the issue of judicial independence, a number of factors emerge as relevant. 
These include the strength and length of tenure; the security of conditions of service; the 
scope and nature of judicial training; and the extent of administrative control over case 
management and finances. The present study is, however, in the main, limited to the way in 
which judges are selected for and appointed to their positions.  
 
1.5  Description of Planned Research Methodology 
The way of appointing judicial officers varies widely among different countries in the world. 
The question of judicial independence is a global issue and affects the whole world, and as a 
result reference will be made to various countries of the world, although the focus will be on 
the four selected Anglophone African states. In carrying out this research, a qualitative 
approach will be employed under the following guidance: 
 
Comparative Method: A comparative study of the processes of appointing judges in 
Swaziland, Kenya, Zimbabwe and South Africa. These countries have different experiences 
and political backgrounds, but the reason for choosing them is because of recent 
developments including, among other things, the following: Reports of interference or threats 
by ruling parties’ governments against the judiciary as found in various reports by 
independent institutions, opposition parties, analysts and commentators, as well as reports in 
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 Furthermore, Zimbabwe is in a process of adopting a new constitution in line 
with the principles of constitutionalism and accepted international standards, whereas, Kenya 
on the other hand, adopted a new constitution in 2010, Swaziland in 2005 and South Africa in 
1996.  
 
Most of the discussions are drawn from among other things constitutions, legislation, 
International Instruments such as Covenants and Declarations and other works, textbooks, 
case law, citations from the press and memoranda as well as journal articles and conference 
papers on constitutionalism and judicial matters in Africa and the rest of the world, as well as 
internet sites on related topics. 
 
1.6 Structure of the Study and Outline of the Chapters 
Chapter one, this chapter outlines the general introduction, background, problem statement 
and aim of the study; methodology to be followed in order to arrive to the intended 
objectives; and also provides a brief exposition of the key concepts which will be examined 
in detail in the course of the study. 
 
Chapter two examines the state of constitutionalism in Africa and analyses, among other 
things, the impact of colonialism, the concepts of democracy, separation of powers, and the 
rule of law. The chapter aims to show the nexus between these concepts and their importance 
in ensuring good governance. 
 
Chapter three draws attention to various mechanisms that can be considered by states in order 
to protect judicial independence. It further links the concept of judicial independence to 
human rights and democracy in the contemporary state, with South Africa’s experience and 
the 1996 Constitution dominating the discussion. 
 
Chapter four, which is the core of the study, deals with the appointment process of judicial 
officers in Swaziland, Kenya, Zimbabwe and South Africa.  It analyzes the sections in the 
constitutions of the respective countries which deal with the appointment of judicial officers 
and the role played by the judicial service commissions/councils in each country. 
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Chapter five concludes the study and provides an overview of the preceding chapters and, 
based on this, assesses which of the systems examined can be regarded as “best practice” for 
the appointment of judicial officers which will ensure the independence of the judiciary and 
promote constitutionalism on the African continent.   
 
1.7  Key Concepts 
The key concepts dominating this study are – constitutionalism, democracy, the rule of law, 
the doctrine of separation of powers, and judicial independence. These are concepts which 
interact and influence one another in the drive to achieve a desirable and legitimate 
government for the people, by the people. Human rights, peace, and good governance are of 
global concern and in order to ensure their promotion and protection, it is of utmost 
importance for every contemporary state to adhere to the principles governing these concepts.    
  
1.7.1 Constitutionalism 
Constitutionalism refers to the universally accepted idea that government derives its power 
from a legitimate constitution which reigns supreme and which must be respected by 
everyone. The world has, since the 1990s, become more global and the idea of 
constitutionalism has developed and spread throughout the international community of states. 
Constitutionalism promotes democracy and the rule of law, and requires that government 
conform to the standards set and any limitations imposed by the constitution. According to 
Louis Henkin, constitutionalism requires that government respect and ensure individual 
rights, which generally are those rights recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and further refined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
11
  An essential element in 
the realization of constitutionalism is an independent judiciary that is impartial and which 
conforms, not only to the constitution, but also to other regional and international bodies that 
set minimum standards for the independence of the judiciary in a democratic state.   
 
1.7.2 Democracy 
Democracy is a broad concept that has taken centre stage when it comes to issues of good 
governance. It is a concept that continues to engage the attention of all spheres of society, and 
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 Henkin Louis “New birth of constitutionalism: Genetic influences and genetic defects” (1993) 14/3-4 
Cardozo Law Review at 533-548. 
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is explored by scholars, lawyers, economists, politicians and the populace at large. It is 
indeed a famous and important concept. Mangu argues that: 
 
“democracy is certainly the most popular concept and the most in fashion in both 
political and social scientist discourse. Its popularity results from the fact that over the 
years, democracy has become a very value-laden term.”12 
 
One cannot claim a universal or clear-cut definition of democracy.
13
 According to Robert 
Dahl, “a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the 
government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals”.14 In his effort to 
emphasize the concept of democracy, Dahl introduced what he termed polyarchy – “a 
political order distinguished by the presence of seven institutions, all of which must exist for 
a government to be classified as a polyarchy”.15 He lists elected officials, free and fair 
elections, inclusive suffrage, right to run for office, freedom of expression, alternative 
information, and associational autonomy.
16
 Foster mentions two important things he termed 
“Two Cheers for Democracy” – “one because it admits variety and two because it permits 
criticism”.17 
 
Although popular and regarded as a global symbol of good governance, as compared to most 
countries in the West, it can be argued that in Africa, democracy has, as a system of 
government, not done very well. For example in certain African countries the freedom of 
expression can be curbed; elections are allegedly characterised by violence and coercion, 
therefore not free and fair; and sometimes freedom of association is challenged.
18
  All these 
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  Mangu AMB The road to constitutionalism and democracy in post-colonial Africa: The case of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo LLD Thesis, Pretoria: University of South Africa, 2002 at 173. 
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  See Lijphart A Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration (1977) at 4. 
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  Dahl RA Polyarchy: Participation and opposition (1971) at 1. 
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  Dahl RA Democracy and its Critics (1989) at 221. 
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1.7.3 The Rule of Law 
The South African Constitutional Court regards the rule of law, or the principle of legality, as 
the essence of constitutionalism.
19
 The principle entails that every exercise of public (and 
private) power should be subject to or ruled by law.
20
 The rule of law in this context, does not 
simply refer to the “rule of rules” in the classic formalist sense of the term, but rather means 
that the exercise of power is subject to a process of judicial review.
21
 In addition to meeting 
standards of legality, every exercise of power must be independently measured against 
standards of rationality (and at times reasonableness), that are triggered by the violation of 




The principle of the rule of law implies the existence of an independent judiciary that can 
subject the exercise of power to the test of (formal) legality and (deliberative) rationality. 
Spigelman indicates that  
 
“actual or threatened transgression of civil rights in society, notably but not limited to the 
exercise of the police function of government, are in large measure deterred by the very 
existence of an independent legal profession with access to courts consisting of 
independent judges”.23 
 
The principle of judicial independence is not only closely related to the idea of the rule of 
law, it also emanates from the principle of separation of powers which is regarded as a 
mechanism to promote democracy and constitutionalism.  
 
1.7.4 The Separation of Powers Doctrine 
The doctrine of separation of powers, developed in the 17
th
 century in an effort to ensure 
division of state authority into legislative, executive and judicial functions and the 
performance of such functions by separate branches of government. Among the components 
of separation of powers are the trias politica doctrine and the establishment of checks and 
                                                          
19
 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and 
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 Barnett Hilaire Constitutional and administrative law (2012) at 22. 
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balances on the actions of the various branches of government. Generally regarded as the 
father of the trias politica doctrine, Montesquieu argues that the reason for the separation of 
powers is that there can be no political freedom in a country where one and the same person 
or body of persons makes the laws, implements them, and acts as arbiter when they are 
contravened. 
24
 According to Woolman et al:  
 
 “The articulation of an explicit doctrine of separation of powers as a distinct explicatory 
theory of governance is generally thought to have its origin in the political philosophy of 
the age of Enlightenment in seventeen-century Europe, when political thinkers started to 
challenge the unlimited might and arbitrariness of an absolute monarch. However, its 
basic aim is much older, i.e. to find a structure of government that prevents accumulation 
of too much power in one institution.”25 
 
The doctrine of separation of powers promotes the idea of protection of individual rights by 
way of distribution of political power between different institutions of governance. This is 
affirmed by Seerdof and Sibanda in Woolman et al who also argue that the “separation of 
powers is the basis for an institutional, procedural and structural division of public power to 
create conditions that place human rights at the centre of society”.26 The principle of 
separation of powers is regarded as an instrumental function and an institutional mechanism 
to protect human rights against abuse by the executive or other authorities.  
 
The South African Constitution does not refer to the separation of powers doctrine explicitly 
but makes provision for the different branches of government. Section 43 provides that the 
legislative authority of the Republic is vested in Parliament. Section 85(1) and (2) indicates 
that the executive authority of the Republic is vested in the President and the President 
exercises the executive authority, together with the other members of the Cabinet. Section 
165(1) provides that the judicial authority of the Republic is vested in the courts. 
 




“In our first certification judgment dealing with the 1996 Constitution, In re: 
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, we stated that although 
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 The French political philosopher and classic proponent of constitutional theory Charles-Louis Secondat de 
Montesquieu (1689-1755) developed in his seminal book Del’ esprit de lois (1748) (The spirit of the laws) 
an idea of separation of powers of the state’s governmental institutions. 
25
 Woolman et al Constitutional law of South Africa (2008) (2
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ed) vol 1 at 12-3. 
26
 Id at 12-1. 
27
 De Lange v Smuts 1998 (3) SA 785 CC at par 60. 
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it is clear that pursuant to Constitutional Principle VI the Constitution provides for a 
system of separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of government, 
‘[t]here is ... no universal model of separation of powers, and in democratic systems of 
government in which checks and balances result in the imposition of restraints by one 
branch of government upon another, there is no separation that is absolute.’ I have no 
doubt that over time our courts will develop a distinctively South African model of 
separation of powers, one that fits the particular system of government provided for in 
the Constitution and that reflects a delicate balancing, informed both by South Africa’s 
history and its new dispensation, between the need, on the one hand, to control 
government by separating powers and enforcing checks and balances, and, on the other, 
to avoid diffusing power so completely that the government is unable to take timely 
measures in the public interest.”  
 
1.7.5 Judicial Independence 
The independence of the judiciary emanates from the principle of separation of powers and is 
generally accepted across the globe as a vital ingredient of the constitutional state. The 
principle of judicial independence is firmly stated in a number of documents and sets of 
guidelines, to which countries around the world subscribe. Judicial independence means that 
the courts shall be subject only to the law and that no person, institution or organ of the state 
may interfere with the functioning of the courts. There can be no doubt that an independent 
judiciary is an indispensable condition for constitutional democracy.
28
 In South Africa the 
independence of the judiciary is firmly entrenched in the Constitution.
29
 The Constitution 
contains a general provision which guarantees the principles of judicial independence and 




In an effort to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, Commonwealth countries 
provide some key guidelines in what has become known as the “Latimer House Guidelines”. 
According to the Latimer House Guidelines: 
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 See Justice RR Mzikamanda “The place of the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law in 
democratic sub-Saharan Africa” at 2. Paper presented on 14 November 2007 at the South African Institute 
for Advanced Constitutional, Public, Human Rights and International Law (SAIFAC), Johannesburg, 
South Africa. Available at http://www.saifac.org.za/docs/2007/mzikamanda_paper.pdf. See also De Lange 
v Smuts 1998 (3) SA 785 CC at par 59. 
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 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
30  Section 165 of the South African Constitution provides as follows: 
(1) The judicial authority of the Republic is vested in the courts. 
(2) The courts are independent and subject only to the constitution and the law, which they must apply impartially 
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“An independent, impartial, honest and competent judiciary is integral to upholding the 
rule of law, engendering public confidence and dispensing justice. The function of the 
judiciary is to interpret and apply national constitutions and legislation, consistent with 
international human rights conventions and international law, to the extent permitted by 
the domestic law of each Commonwealth country. An independent, effective and 
competent legal profession is fundamental to the upholding of the rule of law and the 
independence of the judiciary.”31 
 
1.7.5.1 Functional and Personal Independence 
Rautenbach and Malherbe distinguish between the personal independence and functional 
independence of the courts.
32
 The functional independence of the judiciary is concerned with 
the way in which the courts exercise their powers within the blueprint of the constitution 
which reigns supreme in a constitutional state. This is very important for the purposes of 
ensuring the independence, objectivity as well as impartiality of courts. Section 165(2) of the 
South African Constitution explicitly recognizes the functional independence of courts by 
providing that the courts are independent and subject only to the constitution and the law, 
which they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice. 
 
Personal independence is sometimes referred to institutional independence. In order to uphold 
personal independence it is important to ensure that judicial officers are comfortable in 
carrying out their functions and there is no arbitrarily control or conditions imposed by other 
government bodies. There are various factors which determine institutional independence 
including among others the manner in which judicial officers are appointed, their term of 
office, their security of tenure and their conditions of service.   
 
1.7.5.2 Appointment Process of Judicial Officers in Comparative  
Perspective  
There are various options that different countries use in the process of appointing judicial 
officers across the globe which include, inter alia, judicial service commissions or councils, 
voting, the President as head of executive, as well as the role played by the Parliament or 
Senate in the process. This study will look at four selected Anglophone African states namely 
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South Africa, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Swaziland and the provisions in these countries’ 
constitutions governing the process of appointing judicial officers. Since the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 came into effect it has received various comments from 
different sectors of the international community and some analysts, both constitutional and 
political, argue that the Judicial Service Commission as a body used in South Africa for the 
appointment of judicial officers, is one the best practices because it enables different 
independent stakeholders ranging from lawyers, academics and representatives of different 
political parties to participate in the process thereby eliminating any chances of interference 
by the legislature and the executive.
33
  The case of South Africa so far presents an interesting 
example that will form the bedrock of this research against which the other states examined 
will be contrasted. 
 
There are various issues that need to be considered in order to contribute to the independence 
of the judiciary pertaining to, inter alia, the appointment, salaries and tenure of judicial 
officers. In Zimbabwe the Constitution
34
 provides in section 79(1) that judicial authority is 
vested in the Supreme Court, the High Court, and other subordinate courts. The Declaration 
of Rights as entrenched in section 18 of the Zimbabwe Constitution, makes provision for the 
right to the protection of the law and a right of everyone to be accorded a fair hearing before 
an impartial tribunal. However, the same Constitution makes another provision for an Act of 
Parliament to vest judicial authority in a person or authority other than a court referred to 
initially, and also to vest the judiciary or an individual judge with functions other than 
judicial functions. These, as Saller puts it, “cast some doubt on the integrity of the separation 
of powers provided for in the constitutional text”.35 
 
The way in which judicial officers are appointed in different countries across the globe is 
entrenched in their respective constitutions. For example: 
 
In South Africa, Section 174(3) provides that: 
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 Constitution of Zimbabwe, 1980. 
35
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“The President as head of national executive, after consulting the Judicial Service 
Commission and the leaders of parties represented in the National Assembly, appoints 
the Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice, and after consulting the Judicial Service 
Commission, appoints the President and Deputy President of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal”. 
 
In Zimbabwe, Section 84(1) provides: “the Chief Justice and other judges of the Supreme 
Court and the High Court shall be appointed by the President, after consultation with the 
Judicial Service Commission”. According to Lovemore Madhuku,36 from cases in both 
Zimbabwe and Mozambique,
37
 the expression “after consultation with” has a clear meaning, 
i.e. the President is not bound by the views of the body he or she is required to consult.
38
 
Kenya adopted a new constitution on 27 August 2010, after it had been overwhelmingly 
approved in a national referendum. This Constitution makes provision for new constitutional 
changes including among other things the creation of a “convincingly inclusive” judicial 
service commission which makes recommendations to the President on the appointment of 
judges. The clause on the appointment of judicial officers provides that, the President shall 
appoint –  
 
(a) The Chief Justice and the Deputy Justice, in accordance with the 
recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission, and subject to the 
approval of the National Assembly; and 





Although Swaziland is a Monarchy, in 2005 the Kingdom adopted a constitution which 
proclaims that Swaziland is unitary, sovereign and a democratic Kingdom.
40
 The Constitution 
makes a provision for the establishment of an independent judicial service commission which 
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2.1  Introduction  
This chapter examines the concepts of constitutionalism, democracy, separation of powers 
and the rule of law. It is argued that the period starting the 1990s saw changes as most 
African countries adopted new constitutions in a quest to ensure constitutionalism and 
democracy. The concept of colonization is discussed as it is regarded as the foundation to 
failure to constitutionalism and democracy in most African states. The chapter further 
illustrates the relationship and connection between the concepts of constitutionalism, 
democracy, separation of powers and the rule of law, and stresses their integration towards 
the common goals of peace and good governance in the modern state. 
 
The past two decades, i.e. between 1990 and 2010, have seen many changes on the African 
continent and there is suddenly an intensifying interest in African democracy, 
constitutionalism and the rule of law in Africa among scholars, political scientists, politicians 
and lawyers from both Africa and the rest of the international community. With scholars 
already referring to this period as the “second independence” of Africa after colonialism,  
 
“ever since 1990 there has been a new spurt of constitution writing in many African 
states in an effort to create and implement legitimate constitutions and move away from 
the notion that constitutions are legitimately grounded in domestic law and the unique 
will of a state, into the modern notion that constitutional legitimacy requires conformity 
with a system of universal norms grounded in an elaboration of the mores of the 
international community of nations”.42 
 
As Oloka-Onyango puts it, with “the commencement of the twenty-first century; issues of 
constitutionalism in Africa have gained considerable prominence”. This, he claims, is a 
coming-together unprecedented since Africa’s “heady early days of independence”, and can 
with reasonable confidence be termed the African “rebirth of constitutionalism”.43 
 
However, it remains a pressing question whether these new written constitutions will be able 
to produce and preserve constitutionalism in certain states because of the nature of politics 
dating from colonialism and oppression, as well as constant poverty and underdevelopment 
since independence from colonial masters. Furthermore, internal power struggles have been a 
thorny issue and hampered the progress of democracy and constitutionalism in a number of 
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 Cata Backer Larry “From constitution to constitutionalism: A global framework for legitimate public 
power systems” (2009) 113/3 (Winter) Penn State Law Review at 672. 
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African states. On the other hand, corruption by some bureaucrats has always been a threat to 
the prosperity of constitutionalism on the African continent. Some people have laid the blame 
for modern African challenges at the door of colonialism, and argue that colonial masters 




It goes without saying that the independence of the judiciary is vital in order to achieve or 
sustain constitutionalism, but this can only be realized through a transparent appointment 
process of the judicial officials free from executive interference. An independent judiciary is 
one of the foundational elements for democracy and a safeguard in support of the rule of law. 
However, in some instances the independence of the judiciary raises more questions than 
answers as allegations of interference by the executive emerge together with allegations of 
certain presidents appointing their cronies who will protect their interests.
45
 In many African 
countries the appointment of judicial officers is accompanied by a public outcry,
46
 with 
opposition parties, jurists, members of the public and others, regularly accusing the executive 
of interfering in the process and appointing individuals loyal to the president rather than 
being impartial and ready to espouse justice. The idea of constitutionalism is globally 
acknowledged and accepted by the international community as a means by which to enhance 
the rule of law and promote democracy and the promotion and respect for human rights.
47
 
The role of the constitution for a democratic state is arguably very important, but as Backer
48
 
puts it,  
 
“Constitutions without legitimacy are no constitution at all, and legitimacy is a function 
of values which in turn serve as the foundation of constitutionalism and furthermore, it is 
through the construction of those value frameworks that international law has come to 
play an increasingly important role”.  
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 See footnote 59 below and also Meredith Martin The fate of Africa. From the hopes of freedom to the heart 
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It has become important in the modern-day for the countries of the world to come together 
and form part of the global community. There is no single country that would wish to be 
isolated from other countries. International law does not impose on countries how they should 
operate or the form of democracy countries should follow, but there are international 
generally accepted standards of democracy that countries should respect to which they are 
expected to adhere.  
 
According to Dugard, both the League of Nations and the United Nations “provided a new 
mechanism for the collective admission of states to the international community”.49 He 
further espouses the traditional criteria for statehood as described in the Montevideo 
Convention of 1933 which provides that the “the state as a person of international law should 
poses certain qualifications including ‒ a permanent population; a defined territory; 
government and capacity to enter into relations with other states”.50 Governments are urged 
to assume authority through democratic means. A government that comes to power through 
unconstitutional and undemocratic means is likely to be isolated and sanctioned by other 
members of the international community.
51
  The African Union Constitutive Act makes 
provision that any government which shall come to power through unconstitutional means 




2.2 The Impact of Colonialism on Constitutionalism in Africa  
2.2.1  Defining Colonialism 
The Concise Oxford English Dictionary
53
 describes Colonialism as “the policy or practice of 
acquiring political control over another country, occupying it with settlers and exploiting it 
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 Dugard John International law: A South African perspective (2011) (4
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ed)  at 81. 
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 The Concise Oxford English Dictionary (2002)(10
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economically”.  In his work “A definition of colonialism”, Horvath54 defines colonialism as 
follows:  
“It seems generally, if not universally agreed that colonialism is a form of domination - 
the control by individuals or groups over territory and/or behavior of other individuals or 
groups. Colonialism has also been seen as a form of exploitation, with emphasis on 




It was during the 19
th
 century that European countries came to Africa and started colonizing 
it. European superpowers – Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, and Spain 
conquered and shared Africa among themselves, mostly for the purposes of boosting their 
economic interests. This colonization was described as a remarkable process of territorial 
expansion with an imperialistic tendency by the European countries.
55
 Britain being the 
strongest imperial power in Africa, owned vast of land and at some stage “its territories 
accounted for four-fifths of African trade south of the Sahara”.56 Until then, life for African 
people differed greatly from that of those in Europe. Gailey writes: “further conventional 
wisdom creates an idyllic past where Africans lived in peace and harmony with one another 
until the arrival of white imperialists who for their own selfish interests created arbitrary 
divisions among African populations”.57 He further argues that “each European power 
imposed its own economic system and imperial presuppositions upon Africans under their 
control, and gradually, Africans altered their economic and social systems to conform to the 
new economic realities” imposed by the colonizers.58 
 
It has been over three centuries since Europeans set foot on the African continent but all 
countries are still classified as underdeveloped and some characterized by continuous conflict 
and failure of democracy because of the “foundation” laid by and the impact that colonialism 
has had on the continent. Colonialists did not care about how power can be shared to ensure 
peaceful and good governance of the countries they conquered. Donald Gordon argues that 
“imperial rule from the beginning expropriated political power; unconcerned with the needs 
and wishes of the indigenous population, the colonial powers created governing apparatuses 
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55
 Harris Norman Dwight Intervention and colonization in Africa (1914) at 1. 
56
 Roberts Andrew The colonial moment in Africa (1990) at 3. 
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 Gauley Harry A Africa troubled continent: A problems approach (1983) at 33, 78-79.  
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primarily intended to control the territorial population, to implement exploitation of natural 
resources and to maintain themselves and the European population”.59 
 
As the result of all this negative perception against colonialism generally, today most people 
in Africa perceive colonialism as a system that was brought to Africa by European 
imperialists in order to conquer and take away or take control of the continent’s natural 
resources to boost their economies without much care about the locals. When we look at the 
centre of conflict today in Africa one can argue that the issue of resources is at the core with 
its roots emanating from colonialism. This could be attributed to a number of factors, 
including, among other things, that most leaders took lessons in self-enrichment from 
colonial rulers and the fact that colonialism advanced authoritarianism. It is necessary 
therefore, in the following section, to assess the state of Africa post-the Colonial experience. 
  
2.2.2  The State of Africa after Colonialism  
It is arguable that after obtaining independence from the colonial masters from the late 1950s 
onwards, the continent of Africa failed dismally to govern itself. According to Taiwo, “many 
problems that affect various African countries at the present time with different degrees of 
intensity are frequently traced to the lingering effects of colonialism”.60 In the post-
independence era, African states on the whole have been characterized by discriminatory, 
racial and unacceptable and violent undemocratic methods of governance, including, among 





 argues that after colonialism, new elites, often in the form of 
dictators, frequently rose and still rise to power in certain of the African post-colonial 
countries. 
 
The influence of colonialism on African leaders immediately after achieving independence 
from colonial masters was perceptible through the actions of well-known leaders in some 
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 Gordon April A and Gordon Donald L Understanding contemporary Africa (1996) (2
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 ed) at 57. 
60
 Olufemi Taiwo How colonialism preempted modernity in Africa (2010) at 3.  
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African states. For example, as described by Meredith, “as founding fathers, the first 
generation of nationalist leaders – Nkrumah, Nasser, Senghor, Houphouet-Boigny, Sejou 
Toure, Keita, Olympio, Kenyatta, Nyerere, Kaunda and Banda, all enjoyed great prestige and 
high honour; they were seen to personify the states they led and swiftly took advantage to 
consolidate their control”.63 The post-colonial background of African constitutions without 
constitutionalism has continued to bedevil African hopes for constitutional democracy and 
the rule of law. Many people perceive most constitutions adopted immediately after gaining 
independence as imposed by the former colonizers to continue to protect and serve their 
interests in Africa while ignoring the principles of constitutionalism.
64
 As a result of the lack 
of basic principles of constitutionalism in those constitutions, many leaders have used that 
loophole to abuse their power by violating human rights and resorting to undemocratic 
tactics.
65
 Perhaps it is true that the problem with African leaders is that they were never 
exposed to good governance by their colonizers, which in turn gives value to the allegations 
by Africans that the Europeans colonized Africa only to exploit its rich resources. 
  
Colonialism and exposure to Western culture has brought about many changes in African 
culture and traditions, and most leaders who took over the reigns after colonialism cared less 
about democracy or working hard at bringing about transformation and development, than 
about clinging to power for as long as possible and enriching themselves and friends. 
Because of the Western culture imposed by colonial masters, African people were thrust into 
new experiences which they could not comprehend with the guidance of the old African 
traditions. Poor leadership and autocratic rule by some African leaders as a result of colonial 
inheritance has hampered Africa’s growth path, and peace initiatives and development efforts 
have been moving at a snail’s pace. 
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Perhaps Gordon has a point when he indicates that the process of granting independence was 
very quick and never carefully developed by the colonial masters to enable Africans to 
govern themselves in a democratic, progressive and peaceful manner.
66
 He argues that  
 
“the democratic governmental models developed by the French and British for their 
colonies were essentially alien structures hastily superimposed over the deeply ingrained 
political legacies of imperial rule and; that the real political inheritances of African states 
at independence were the authoritarian structures of the colonial state, an accompanying 
political culture and an environment of politically relevant circumstances tied heavily to 
the nature of colonial rule”.67 
 
Without a doubt, colonialism has had a very negative impact in the political, economic, 
cultural and social spheres of contemporary Africa. The exploitation of natural resources by 
colonial masters has left the continent crippled and also laid the foundation for never ending 
crisis in most African countries. Judging by the level of development and democracy between 
the former colonial masters and the colonized, one can agree with Gordon who argues that 
“African colonies were made politically and economically subordinate to European needs, 
while the exploitation of its resources was characterized by low investment and brutality”.68 
The issue of natural resources can be hardly separated from the question of political unrest 
and the failure or collapse of democracy in most African states. Some people claim that 
Western countries continue to interfere in African issues because they have unfinished 
business dating back to colonial rule.
69
 Resources of each and every state form the economic 
backbone of that particular state. They should be under the guardianship of a legitimate 
government which should be able to protect them and ensure fair distribution of such 
resources to its citizens. If state resources are not in the hands of a legitimate government 
how can one lay a strong foundation for democracy and constitutionalism and the rule of law 
in a state? Since independence the question of power and state resources in most African 
countries can be identified as among the major problems that have delayed the progress of the 
continent as a whole. 
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 For example, the issue of blood diamonds among other things, which prompted the Kimberley Process – 
the international group formed to clamp down on trade in diamonds used to fund conflict. In some 
countries you find rebels fighting the sitting government with the assistance of some western countries, for 
instance Outtara was assisted by French special forces to oust Gbagbo (see footnote 44), while in Libya the 
rebels killed and ousted Ghadaffi’s government with the help of  NATO. 
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Although different views on the impact of colonialism on the African continent continue to 
emerge such as the failure of democracy in most African states, and the equality
70
 of nations 
seems impossible in real terms, or the divide between the developed and developing countries 
appears to remain elusive for the foreseeable future, one important thing is the growing inter-
dependence of the world community as almost all countries strive to forge relations and 
friendship as members of the international community. The importance of the inter-
dependence of the world community is also demonstrated by Professor Richardson III
71
 who 
argues that:  
“One point of context is the growing interdependence of the world community, indeed, in 
Professor Reisman’s words into conditions of global simultaneity. In the international 
community, the distance between ‘global independence’ and economic and corporate 
‘globalization’ mirrors the distance to be bridged on the local level in national states by 
the successful resolution of questions of race and class equity. This reality of 
interdependence is increasingly accompanied by a new wave of nationalists’ sentiments 
from governments and populations, rich and poor countries alike, including African 
states.”72 
 
Even though most political and economic analysts and commentators emphasize the 
importance of the interdependence of world communities, it is clear that underdeveloped 
countries like Africa are still oppressed and undermined by world superpowers who 
formulate policies and make major decisions that continue to place them in stronger positions 
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Having considered the interplay between colonialism and constitutionalism, and examined 
the state of Africa after the ‘Colonial enterprise’, we need now to turn our attention more 
closely to exactly what is intended under the concept of constitutionalism. 
 
2.3  Explaining the Concept of Constitutionalism 
The Collins English Dictionary describes constitutionalism as “the principles, spirit or system 
of government in accord with a constitution, especially a written constitution”.74 Michel 
Rosenfeld perceives constitutionalism as follows:  
 
“in broadest terms, modern constitutionalism requires imposing limits on the powers of 
government, adherence to the rule of law and the protection of fundamental rights. 
Moreover, although not all constitutions conform to the demands of constitutionalism 
and although constitutionalism is not dependent on the existence of a written 
constitution, the realization of the spirit of constitutionalism generally goes hand in hand 
with the implementation of a written constitution.”75 
 
Constitutionalism means that government power or the governing power in a state is 
distributed and limited by a system of norms, values and principles entrenched in a 
constitution which must be obeyed by everyone including the executive, legislature and the 
judiciary. 
 
In his work, “Teaching about democratic constitutionalism”, John Patrick describes 
constitutionalism as follows:   
 
“Constitutionalism means limited government and the rule of law to prevent the 
arbitrary, abusive use of power, to protect human rights, to support democratic 
procedures in elections and public policy making, and to achieve a community's shared 
purposes. Constitutionalism in a democracy, therefore, both limits and empowers 
government of, by, and for the people. Through the constitution, the people grant power 
to the government to act effectively for the public good. The people also set 
constitutional limits on the power of the democratic government in order to prevent 
tyranny and to protect human rights (Holmes (1995) at 299).”76 
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“Constitutionalism is descriptive of a complicated concept, deeply imbedded in historical 
experience, which subjects the officials who exercise governmental powers to the 
limitations of higher law. Constitutionalism proclaims the desirability of the rule of law 
as opposed to the rule by the arbitrary judgment or mere fiat of public officials. 
Throughout the literature dealing with modern public law and the foundations of 
statecraft the central element of the concept of constitutionalism is that in political 
society government officials are not free to do anything they please in any manner they 
choose; they are bound to observe both the limitations on power and the procedures 
which are set out in the supreme constitutional law of the community. It may therefore be 
said that the touchstone of constitutionalism is the concept of limited government under a 
higher law.”  
 
Perhaps the greatest modern proponent of constitutionalism is Louis Henkin.
78
 For him, 
constitutionalism and “popular sovereignty” cannot be divorced. It is from the people that the 
authority of a legitimate government is drawn. Only the people can establish a legitimate 
system of government, and conversely, it is the people who must answer for this system.
79
 





From these truisms, Henkin draws certain principles which form the basis of 
constitutionalism: “government ruled by the law and democratic principles”, which in turn 
implies political democracy and representative government and excludes the possibility of 
“government by decree” unless authorized by the constitution and controlled by “democratic 
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political institutions”.81 A democratic government must be limited; must commit to the 
principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances; the military should 
be subject to civilian control and the police be “governed by law and judicial control”.82 Most 
important for present purposes, however, is that the state must have an independent judiciary. 
These principal elements of constitutionalism identified by Henkin and the other authors 
above provide a good platform from which to explore the concept of constitutionalism which 
has become a universal order of the global world in an effort to harness the principle of 
democracy and the rule of law. The elements are formulated by Henkin in a wide ranging 
methodology in an effort to ensure that if the principle of constitutionalism is adhered to, 
prosperous and peaceful governance will be attained by all states across the globe. 
 
Henkin’s argument that “the people” are the locus of sovereignty, and that the will of the 
people is the source of authority and the basis of legitimate government, has been evident and 
proven in various instances where the people have turned against a government that they felt 
oppressed them. For example, the cases of Benin in February 1990
83
 and the 2010/2011 
uprisings in certain northern parts of the African continent, where an intensive campaign of 
civil resistance and demonstrations against longtime leaders and governments in some Arab 
states took place,
84
 serve as a clear indication that the will of the people is the source of 
authority and the basis of legitimate government. For a government to be legitimate and 
respected it must reflect the will of the people it seeks to regulate, and strive to adhere to and 
uphold the rule of law, and promote and protect human rights and the wellbeing of its people. 
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 “In February 1990, protracted strikes and popular protests finally forced Mathieu Kérékou, the long-
serving dictator of the small West African country of Benin, to convene a ‘National Conference’. A 
broadly representative, albeit extra-parliamentary, assemblage of influential political, civic and 
occupational groups and elites, the National Conference drawing inspiration from the étatsgénéraux of 
18
th
century revolutionary France, declared itself sovereign and proceeded to enact far-reaching changes to 
the country’s constitutional order. It stripped Kérékou of all executive power, abolished the one-party 
system, installed an interim prime minister and legislature and authorized the drafting of a new constitution 
that won popular approval as the basis for a democratic reconstitution of civil authority.” Prempeh H 
Kwasi “Africa’s ‘constitutionalism revival’: False start or new dawn?” (2007) 5/469 International Journal 
of Constitutional Law at 469. 
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2.4  Explaining the relationship and connection between the concepts of 
Constitution(s), Constitutionalism, Democracy, and Elections 
A written constitution is never a guarantee of constitutionalism or democracy.
85
 On the other 
hand, however, it has proved to be one of the most important tools in helping to sustain 
constitutionalism in the modern world. According to Ackerman, “the enlightenment hope in 
written constitutions is sweeping the world”.86 Ever since the start of the 1990s many African 
states have been involved in the process of drafting and adopting new constitutions and 
ensuring the entrenchment of the principles of democracy and constitutionalism in these 
constitutions in the hope of bringing a solution to the troubles that have bedeviled the 
continent since independence from its colonial masters. 
 
Many African countries have written constitutions, but on a number of occasions those 
constitutions have failed to protect civilians from leaders who disregard the rule of law and 
abuse their powers. For instance, article 1(1) of the Swaziland Constitution
87
 provides that 
“Swaziland is a unitary, sovereign, democratic Kingdom”, while article 2(1) provides, “this 
Constitution is the supreme law of Swaziland and if any law is inconsistent with this 
constitution, that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void”. Despite these 
provisions clearly stipulating that the foundation of the Kingdom of Swaziland is laid in 
democracy and indicating that the Constitution is the supreme law of Swaziland, the 
Kingdom remains, in practice, the last absolute monarchy in Africa, and there has been a 
consistent cry from the people of the Kingdom and the international community for 
democracy to prevail in that country.
88
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 See  Okoth-Ogendo HWO “Constitutions without constitutionalism: Reflections on an African political 
paradox” in Greenberg, Douglas et al Constitutionalism and democracy: Transitions in the contemporary 
world: The American Council of Learned Societies comparative constitutionalism papers (1993) 65-84. 
86
 Ackerman Bruce “The rise of world constitutionalism” (1997) 83 Virginia Law Review at 772. 
 By the “enlightenment hope in written constitutions” can be perceived as a “secondment” to the conviction 
that many countries of the word has put in written constitutions. For instance, superpowers like the US 
have shown stability and led by example ever since the adoption of its written constitution in 1787. Lately, 
prior 1994, South  Africa was in a huge crisis because of apartheid and there were even fears of a civil war 
outbreak, but a well negotiated constitution stabilized the country and laid a solid foundation for 
democracy and constitutionalism in the country.  
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 The Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland, 2005 
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 The people of Swaziland, under the umbrella body called Swaziland Democracy Campaign, have for a 
number of years been embroiled in a struggle for multiparty democracy in their country. They have 
described democracy as “an indispensable pillar of modern socio-economic and political governance”.  
South Africa’s well-known trade union Cosatu, has on a number of occasions criticized and voiced their 
support for change to Swaziland’s “oppressive rule” under King Mswati III, maintaining that Cosatu 
support “the idea of a speedy transition to a new and democratic system in Swaziland and encouraging an 
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In Zimbabwe, President Robert Mugabe, who has been in power since independence, lately 
has been accused of manipulating the process of drafting a new constitution in order to 
protect his government against the will of the majority of the people of Zimbabwe.
89
 It has 
been over ten years now since there was an outcry about the collapse of democracy and the 
rule of law in Zimbabwe. This has not only affected the country’s political stability, but has 
hit hard on the economic and social levels as well as with regard to relations with other 
countries of the world which have imposed sanctions against that country. There have been 
many reports involving gross violation of human rights by the government of Zimbabwe.
90
 
In the case of South Africa, the country had its first taste of democracy in 1994 when 
democratic elections were held for the very first time. As appears to be the case in many 
African countries during elections, there was fear as to what was going to happen given 
where the country was coming from under an apartheid government. There were mixed 
feelings and mistrust among the people and the possibility of civil uprising was even mooted. 
It can be argued that, that was a turning point in the history of the country’s politics. The 
Interim Constitution,
91
  and more recently the Final Constitution,
92
 played a major role in 
stabilizing the situation in South Africa. However, South Africa’s “success” can be ascribed 
to the multiparty negotiations and the principle of tolerance and compromise between 1990 
and 1993 among the leaders of various political parties, including the role played by what has 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
all inclusive process” available at www.cosatu.org.za; http://www.swazidemocracy.org (accessed 
06/06/2011). 





 of August 2008 the conference declared that “the continued denial of political space, 
particularly the ban of multiparty politics and the right to participate in public institutions of decision 
making remain a denial of a core tenet of democracy” available at www.cosatu.org.za (accessed 
06/06/2011). 
89
 On 15-18 September 2010 the author attended a regional conference held by the National Democratic 
Institute on Civil Society and Constitutional Reform at Burgers Park Hotel, Pretoria, South Africa with the 
purpose of “strengthening civil society’s capacity to make meaningful contributions to current and future 
constitutional reforms processes in Southern and East African region”. Among the participants in that 
conference were representatives from Zimbabwe who alleged that the government did not fully allow free 
public consultation and participation in the processes, as the country prepares for the drafting of a new 
constitution. It was reported during the proceedings that people were allegedly beaten and threatened by 
state organs such as the police to prevent them from attending such gatherings.    
90 A Roman Catholic human rights group called Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace claimed that 
“perpetrators of violence” were “shipped” into the townships to create no-go zones for rival political party’s 
supporters in Zimbabwe’s capital Harare and that some militants and security forces loyal to Mugabe led 
political violence at some stage.See http://m.news24.com/news24/Africa/Zimbabwe/Surge-in-Zim-violence-
20110703 (accessed 07/07/2011). 
91
 South African Interim Constitution (Act 200 of 1993). 
92
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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come to be popularly known as CODESA
93
 and the MPNP94 in the democratic history of the 
country. 
 
Perhaps tolerance and compromise is one lesson that needs to be spread across Africa for 
leaders of different countries to understand democracy and constitutionalism as well as the 
role and responsibility that comes with leadership. One can say that the open process of 
negotiation and the sacrifices made by the participants during the negotiation process in 
South Africa, paved the way for what the constitution of the country is today. There has been 
praise for the South African constitution across the globe. Though sometimes there are 
challenges, it is safe to say that the South African constitution has so far managed to stand the 
“test of time” and this could be a lesson for other African countries.95 
 
2.4.1 The state of democracy and constitutional sovereignty in South 
Africa since the adoption of the 1993 Interim Constitution (and 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996) and the first 
democratic elections of 1994: Are there lessons for other African 
countries? 
Prior 1994 South Africa was not a democratic state and it followed a system of parliamentary 
sovereignty.
96
 After lengthy negotiations in the 1990s the Interim Constitution was adopted in 
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 CODESA is the Convention for a Democratic South Africa where formal constitutional negotiations and 
transition in the South African political landscape began on 20 December 1991. Although it was never a 
success, CODESA played a significant role in laying the foundation for multi-racial/party discussions.  
94
 MPNP means Multi-Party Negotiating Process. “In March 1993 full negotiations began at the World Trade 
Centre. The parties present decided to use the name MPNP ‒ instead of CODESA. There were twenty-six 
parties taking part in the MPNP. The MPNP had to write and adopt an interim Constitution to say how the 
government would govern after the elections on 27 April 1994. The MPNP drew up the Interim 
Constitution which was to last for two years. The MPNP also drew up and adopted the 34 Constitutional 
Principles. These principles would guide the Constitutional Assembly (CA) which had to draw up the final 
Constitution”. Available athttp://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/governence-projects/constitution/drafting 
.htm (accessed 23/03/2011). 
95
 For instance there was a lot of criticism and allegations of interference and threat to the Constitution by 
opposition parties, scholars, media and ordinary citizens in 2008 when the then Acting Head of the NPA in 
South Africa withdrew charges of corruption against the president of the ruling ANC and then prospective 
state president Jacob Zuma. 
96
 Parliamentary sovereignty, also known as parliamentary supremacy, is a concept of constitutional law in 
which all powers are vested in parliament. This means that the legislature reigns supreme, i.e. it can adopt 
any law without the validity of such law being tested or reviewed by a court of law. Although many 
scholars and lawyers across the globe criticize this system, it does not mean that democracy is impossible 
under parliamentary sovereignty. Countries like Britain, Finland, New Zealand and others subscribe to this 
system and have continued to sustain their democracy. However in the case of South Africa under the 
apartheid government, “parliament commanded law and there was little scope for individuals or groups to 
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1993 and this subsequently paved a way for the first democratic elections in 1994. After that, 
the country moved from the system of parliamentary sovereignty to constitutional 
sovereignty and the constitution was declared the supreme law of South Africa and vested the 
judicial authority in the courts.
97
 The Constitutional Court was established and vested with 
authority to deal with constitutional matters and ensure the protection and promotion of 
human rights and democracy in the Republic of South Africa. 
 
The coming into being of the new constitution and the Constitutional Court in the new 
democratic South Africa brought a huge change in the political landscape of the country. The 
Constitutional Court has played a very active and important role in safeguarding good 
governance by making important rulings on different cases on constitutional matters. Since 
its first sitting on the 15
th
 of February 1995, the court has faced many challenging cases and 
unprecedented situations in the legal history of the country, but it has proudly stood the test 
of time.  In Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly the court held: 
 
“The formal purpose of this judgment is to pronounce whether or not Court certifies that 
all the provisions of South Africa’s proposed new constitution comply with certain 
principles contained in the country’s current constitution. But is underlying purpose and 
scope are much wider. Judicial ‘certification’ of a constitution is unprecedented and the 
very nature of the undertaking has to be explained. To do that, one must place the 
undertaking in its proper historical, political and legal context; and, in doing so, the 
essence of the country’s constitutional transition, the respective roles of the political 
entities involved and the applicable legal principles and terminology must be identified 
and described. It is also necessary to explain the scope of the court’s certification task 
and the effect of this judgment, not only the extent and significance of the court’s 




The Constitutional Court has proven its readiness to uphold justice and the rule of law as well 
as to ensure that human rights are respected within the private sphere and also respected and 
protected by the law and the government. It has since handed down several landmark 
judgments that have had a profound impact on South African law and also influenced the law 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
challenge government action; it could adopt any law no matter how unfair and discriminatory, and the 
validity of such law could not be challenged in court”. Constitutional law: Only study guide for CSL 101-J 
University of South Africa at 9.  
97
 Section 2 and section 165 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Also section 1 provides that 
the Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values: (c) 
supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law. 
98
 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) at par 1. 
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of other countries across the globe.
99
 Before 1994 only a minority of South Africans enjoyed 
human rights. With the dawn of democracy, the Bill of Rights is entrenched in the 
Constitution as a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa.
100
 Various cases decided by the 
Constitutional Court reflect a new era for human rights. The Makwanyane
101
 case brought an 
end to the death penalty in line with the right to life in the constitution and in another case the 
court ruled in favour of a certain Hoffmann
102
 for being unfairly discriminated against by the 
SAA because of his HIV status. 
 
South Africa’s history of democracy draws a unique picture that can be modelled by other 
African states to lay a strong foundation on constitutionalism and democracy and thus put an 
end to the instability that has ravaged these states ever since. In 1995 the parliament of South 
Africa passed an Act on the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation (Act no 34 of 
1995) and also established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in order to deal with the 
social ills of the past, reconcile and heal as a nation and move forward in accordance with the 
Constitution (1993) which provided an “historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided 
society characterized by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded 
on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and development 
opportunities for all South Africans irrespective of colour, race, belief or sex”.103 
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100
 Section 7(1), (2) of the South African constitution provides that (1) the Bill of Rights is the cornerstone of 
democracy in South Africa. It enshrines the rights of all people the country and affirms the democratic 
values of human dignity, equality and freedom; and (2) that the state must respect, protect, promote and 
fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. 
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 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC). 
102
 Hoffmann v South African Airways (SAA) [2000] 12 BLLR 1365 (CC), was a case that ended in the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa which involved violation of section 9 of the constitution that makes 
provision for equality. Section 9 provides among other things that:  
(1)  Everyone is equal before the law and has a right to equal protection and benefit of the law;  
(2)  Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms ...;  
(3)  The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including 
race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, 
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth;  
(4)  No one may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of 
subsection (3) ... 
 Hoffmann appealed to the Constitutional Court from the High Court challenging the constitutionality of 
South African Airways’ employment policy or practice for refusing to employ people living with HIV as 
cabin attendants. The court held that South African Airways had infringed Hoffmann’s constitutional right 
not to be unfairly discriminated against and that there is no place for stereotyping and prejudice under 
South Africa’s new “era of respect for human dignity, compassion and understanding of ubuntu”. The 
Constitutional Court ordered South African Airways make an offer of employment immediately to 
Hoffmann and that SAA pay the costs of the application in both the High Court and the Constitutional 
Court. 
103
 Quoted at par 7 in S v Makwanyane, see footnote 101 above. 
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However, South Africa’s state of affairs is not free from the challenges that have faced other 
African states. However, with the help of a well drafted and legitimate constitution, the 
country has so far managed its democracy, promoted good and peaceful governance, and 
upheld the rule of law.
104
 Chapter 9 of the country’s constitution makes an important 
provision for state institutions supporting constitutional democracy including among others, 
the Public Protector, the South African Human Rights Commission, Auditor–General, the 
Electoral Commission, and others.
105
 Further, the constitution makes it clear that these 
institutions are independent and subject only to the constitution and the law, and that they 





The rule of law is being upheld by different state organs in the country as provided by the 
constitution. For instance, unlike during the apartheid era where police could violate human 
rights without prosecution, under the new democratic dispensation there is an effective police 




2.4.2  Overview of Elections v Democracy in Africa 
On the African continent, the issues of constitutionalism, elections and democracy have 
always been topical amid allegations of hijack by compradors and other outside influences. 
Mangu points out that “Africa is widely acclaimed in the Western media and literature as a 
continent of virtually unrelieved tyranny, dictatorship, economic bankruptcy, administrative 
incompetence and violence”.108 
 
He also rightly argues that elections in Africa are not new, but that the typical African 
elections are not free and fair.
109
 The challenge is that in most countries “elections have not 
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 The Constitution was drafted by a democratically elected Constitutional Assembly well represented by 
different people of South Africa.  
105
 Section 181(1)(a-f). 
106
 Section 181(2). 
107
 The ICD is a government department that was established in April 1997 to investigate complaints of 
brutality, criminality and misconduct against members of the South African Police Service (SAPS), and the 
Municipal Police Service (MPS). It operates independently from the SAPS in the effective and efficient 
investigation of alleged misconduct and criminality by SAPS members. Available at http://www.icd 
.gov.za/about%20us/legislation.asp (accessed 26/08/2011). 
108
 Mangu André Mbata B “Challenges to constitutionalism and democratic consolidation in Africa” (2005) 
24/3 Politea at 316. 




resulted in consolidation of democracy”.110 The problem is that some leaders do not hold 
elections to establish legitimate governments, but rather to consolidate their hold on power. 
One could not find a better way of expressing this than Mangu’s sentiment that “one does not 
organise an election to lose it”.111 
 
According to Olukoshi, “the feeling is that all things are falling apart, nothing good is directly 
or potentially coming out of Africa and democracy is unworkable on the continent”.112 
 
“Yet [says Mangu] African heads of state and government made it clear in the Preamble 
to the Constitutive Act of the African Union that they were committed to promoting and 
protecting human and people’s rights, consolidating democratic institutions and culture, 
and to ensuring good governance and the rule of law, which are critical for the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Renaissance”.113 
 
 
 Although a number of African countries have held regular elections which have been 
monitored by both regional and international bodies, this has never been a guarantee of 
democracy or constitutionalism for most African states. The common political turmoil, 
corruption, and poor economic conditions in most of these countries, have continued to create 
an enormous challenge as well as to threaten the aspirations of peace and the ensuing 
development of constitutionalism on the African continent. 
 
Adelman writes:  
“if, with post (1991:36), we understand democracy to mean the ‘ineffable right of all of 
us as human beings, without distinction of gender, race, nation or class to control the 
decisions that determine our daily lives and future prospects’,114 it is apparent that there 
is a large democratic deficit in Africa”.115 
 
 
African leaders have in many instances disregarded the fact that being in power must come 
with legitimacy. Legitimacy, in this sense, means that people must peacefully and 
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 Olukoshi A State, conflict and democracy in Africa: The complex process of renewal (1999) at 451-465. 
113
 See Mangu footnote 109 above. 
114
 He argues that Post’s definition of democracy is not dissimilar to Green’s (1989: 45) description of the role 
of pluralism as being “to increase the probability that persons – especially poor persons – will be able to 
organize themselves to act, to influence the actions of others and to hold other major actors to account” 
(see footnote 60 above).  
115
 Adelman Sammy “Constitutionalism, pluralism and democracy in Africa” (1998) 42 Journal of Legal 
Pluralism and Unofficial Law at 74. 
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democratically elect leaders who should lead them. Leaders should not turn being in power 
into a circus or competition between a few individuals as seems to have become the habit in 
Africa.  People are forced to engage in war in order to protect or promote the interests of 
individuals. The “worship” of individual leaders has continued to haunt peace and trans-
formation in Africa. It has since become a habit that every time elections are held and a 
person is announced as the victor in most African countries, one or more of the other 
candidates refuse to accept the outcome of the elections. In most cases this results in the 
outbreak of a civil war or some civilians losing their lives. This tendency has, in recent times, 
been seen most notably in Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya, Democratic Republic of Congo, and 
Ivory Coast, to mention but a few.
116
 
The importance and reach of democracy is not limited to the political sphere. It extends to 
different spheres including the social, economic and cultural. It is a well-known fact across 
the globe that democracy has become an essential tower of strength in the modern world, 
where all countries strive to forge friendships and relations and also abide by the general 
standards of international law and international relations. 
 
2.4.2.1  The African Union (AU) and the African Charter on Democracy, 
Elections and Governance (ACDEG) 
The AU was established in order to, among other things, unite the African continent and 
promote democratic principles; promote and protect human rights; and promote peace, 
security and stability on the African continent.
117
 With the vision of strengthening the objects 
of the Constitutive Act, the AU adopted the ACDEG in 2007 in the hope of enhancing good 
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 Nigeria held its Presidential elections on 16 April 2011. John Campbell of the Council on Foreign 
Relations – a Center for Preventive Action in the US, but an independent, nonpartisan membership 
organization, think tank, and publisher – issued a report in September 2010 titled “Electoral Violence in 
Nigeria” raising fears on imminent post-elections violence in Nigeria based on the country’s overlapping 
regional, religious and ethnic divisions. Immediately after the announcement of Goodluck Jonathan as the 
winner, allegations of organized violence and arson in parts of the north as a show of disapproval of 
Jonathan were reported. See  http://www.saharareporters.com/press-release/post-election-violence-huriwa-
canvasses-national-conference andwww.cfr.org (accessed 21/04/2011). 
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 See article 3 (objectives of the Union) of the AU Constitutive Act. 
118
 See preamble to the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. 
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However, it could be said that so far the AU has not done well in ensuring that its objects are 
realized as the continent continues to experience challenges in governance due to conflict, 
allegations of elections which are not free and fair, or are accompanied by violence, 
corruption and many other challenges.
119
 There are many treaties and declarations in Africa, 
yet many people continue to suffer at the hands of the same leaders who created these 
documents only to disregard them to serve and protect their personal interests. Surely there is 
a need to revisit the composition of the AU and its powers and functions if this problem is to 
be addressed? 
 
2.5  The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and the Rule of Law in Africa 
The philosophy of constitutionalism and the doctrine of separation of powers in Africa are 
foreign modes of governance adopted from the West during the late 20
th
 century by different 
African countries as they become independent from colonialism. During colonial rule, the 
settlers did not practice or introduce democratic governance in Africa or to the people of 
Africa. They generally followed an autocratic system which enabled them to control the 
people, while depleting local resources and, in some instances, practicing slavery. Since 
independence most African states have been struggling to transform traditional governance 
which included despotism and monarchies, to adopt democracy which is characterized and 
dominated by constitutionalism and the principle of the separation of powers. Although the 
rule of law has always existed, the traditional mode of governance in ancient Africa was that 
of kingship or chieftaincy and little or nothing was known about the theory of 
constitutionalism or the doctrine of separation of powers in Africa.
120
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 For example, the recent “Arab spring” in the north of Africa, the problems that led to the Global Political 
Agreement in Zimbabwe. 
120
 Before colonialism was introduced in Africa, traditional kings and chiefs ruled communities. Democracy 
in the modern sense was not known and there was no separation of powers. For instance, Wallace gives a 
description of history of African chieftaincy under the Zulu Kingdom as follows ‒ “In theory, the chief had 
total power over his people; the chief owned all land; he controlled the court system and his court was the 
highest and final court of appeal; as chief judge he could ‘eat people up’ (i.e. confiscate their property, 
especially cattle) and even had the power of life and death; he was the national religious leader. In practice, 
most chiefs were much more like constitutional monarchs with many checks on their power. The chief was 
the chief justice; everyone had a right of appeal to the chief, including from the decisions of headmen or 
sub-chiefs. Thus, he was the final court of appeal – the Supreme Court. It was the chief who made the 
decisions. Court cases were handled very extensively” Mills Wallace G History 316 9 Zuluhttp://husky1 
.stmarys.ca/~wmills/course316/9Zulu_Shaka.html (accessed 18/11/2010). 
 Ojwang explains “pre-colonial times” as follows – “From anthropological studies, it is clear that African 
ethnic groups, before the advent of European colonialism in the nineteenth century, lived as autonomous 




As indicated at the outset of this work, after independence from their colonial masters there 
were a high hopes among African societies, that the new African leaders, given their calls to 
patriotism and the fact that they had witnessed the sufferings of their people under colonial 
rule, as well as the poverty and underdevelopment rampant in the communities, would work 
in harmony, engaging the people in an attempt to bring balance within the communities. 
However, in most instances these leaders soon lost touch with the peoples’ mandate and, as 
Meredith argues, they “were seen to personify the states they led and swiftly took advantage 
to consolidate their control”.121 
 
The issue of poor leadership, arrogance, dictatorship, cronyism and corruption among many 
African leaders had a very negative impact on the development of constitutionalism and 
democracy in the African continent.
122
 Although most challenges are associated with the 
ineffectual constitutions adopted upon independence,
123
 the abovementioned issues derailed 
progress in Africa until the beginning of the 1990s when almost all African countries 
embarked on a mission of drafting and adopting new constitutions with clear provisions on 
sensitive issues identified as a major source of African problems. These were, most notably, 
constitutional sovereignty, separation of powers, a limit on the presidential term of office, 
Bills of Fundamental Rights, and so on.
124
 It can be argued that the period from the early 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
analyzed in two broad categories. The first category comprised tribal groups with a centralized authority, 
organized administrative machinery and formal judicial institutions; while the second consisted of those 
societies which lacked centralized authority, hierarchical administration, or organized judicial 
arrangement.” –Ojwang JB “Constitutional trends in Africa – the Kenya case” (2000) 10/2 Transnational 
Law and Contemporary Problems at 519. 
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 Meredith Martin The state of Africa: A history of fifty years of independence (2005) at 162. 
122
 The abovementioned shortcomings have always been a problem and continue to torment the African 
continent and also pose as a threat to initiations of peace and prosperity all over the continent and even to 
promising democracies such as South Africa. For example, in South Africa, the was a huge outcry from the 
media, opposition parties and some members of the public when Mo Shaik was appointed as head of the 
South African Secret Service in 2009. It was alleged that because of his closeness to President Zuma his 
loyalty would be to Zuma rather than the state. Before Zuma became President he was facing corruption 
charges which were controversially dropped shortly before the elections and Mo Shaik became popular 
after he told a gathering at the University of Pretoria that the corruption charges against Zuma were going 
to be withdrawn as later happened. 
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 As discussed in paragraph 2.1 above the beginning of 1990 saw a spurt of new constitutions (from 
independence constitutions) by different African countries, with the period coined “second independence” 
of Africa after colonialism. 
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 Recently the new constitution of Angola (Constitution of the Republic of Angola, 2010) has appeared 
prominently with a reflection of stability, hope and prospect for the once war-torn African country. Part of 
the preamble of the Angolan constitution reads: “Reaffirming our commitment to the values and 
fundamental principles of the independence, sovereignty and the unity of a democratic state based on the 
rule of law, pluralism of political expression and organization, the separation and balance between the 
powers of bodies that exercise sovereign power, the market economy and respect and guarantees for 
fundamental human rights and freedoms, which constitute the essential pillars supporting and structuring 
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1990s was a turning point on issues of constitutionalism, the rule of law, and the entire 




2.5.1  Explaining the Doctrine of Separation of Powers 
Arguably, one of the leading works on constitutionalism and separation of powers across the 
globe is by Professor Vile who published the first edition of his work titled Constitutionalism 
and the separation of powers in 1967. He defines the separation of powers in the following 
terms:  
“A ‘pure doctrine’ of the separation of powers might be formulated in the following way: 
It is essential for the establishment and maintenance of political liberty that the 
government be divided into three branches or departments, the legislature, the executive 
and the judiciary. To each of these three branches there is a corresponding identifiable 
function of government, legislative, executive and judicial. Each branch of government 
must be confined to the exercise of its own function and not allowed to encroach upon 
the functions of other branches. Furthermore, the persons who compose these three 
agencies of government must be kept separate and distinct, no individual being allowed 
to be at the same time a member of more than one branch.”126 
 
 
From Vile’s explanation of separation of powers ‒ and those of other philosophers127 ‒ it may 
be concluded that the objective of the doctrine is to ensure good governance and to restore 
and maintain peace and the rule of law in a state. The separation of powers guarantees 
fairness and justice within the state and its society which cannot be achieved where power is 
concentrated in the hands of a single body. The doctrine can be better demonstrated by the 
example of a soccer game where there are different role players including the referee, the 
coach, spectators and the players. In this game each of the abovementioned persons plays 
different roles to make the game exciting and enjoyable. There is no way in which one can be 
a player and a referee, or a coach and a spectator simultaneously, as that will be a recipe for 
bringing the beautiful game into disrepute and eventually lead to conflict. So is the doctrine 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
this Constitution”, and this indeed is an indication of a commitment by the Angolan people who have been 
striving for a better future and democracy since independence more than three decades ago.  
125
 This was indeed a turning point as the new constitutions, for instance, now provided term limits for 
presidents and this could mean some presidents who had been in power for lengthy periods could be 
expected to vacate office to allow new leaders to ascend to power. Also new constitutions, for instance in 
countries like South Africa, brought about major transition and improvement to the lives of the majority of 
people in that the new constitution provided for among other thing universal suffrage and human rights for 
all.  
126
 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the separation of powers (1967) at 13. 
127
 Philosophers like Montesquieu and John Locke. 
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of separation of powers in a state, for the purposes of ensuring peace and avoiding conflict, 
the same people cannot afford to hold power in the three branches of government.  
 
The history of the separation of powers dates back to the 17
th
 century when it was realized 
that for purposes of good governance, peace and progress in a state, there was a need for 
government powers or functions to be separated into legislative, executive and judicial 
branches. Montesquieu is regarded as an “architect” of the doctrine of separation of powers. 
Since then (17
th
 century) many philosophers and scholars have written various works about 
the doctrine and it has been followed, developed and adopted by many countries of the world 
in an effort to achieve peaceful governance. Peace and justice take centre stage in 
international, regional and domestic law. For the rule of law to prevail there must be peace.
128
 
The doctrine of separation of powers in the modern state has developed gradually to play a 
vital role in balancing relations, enhancing democracy and also creating a better environment 




According to Montesquieu “constant experience shows that every man invested with power is 
apt to abuse it and to carry his authority as far as it will go, but to prevent this abuse, it is 
necessary from the very nature of things that power should be a check to power”.130 If there is 
no limit for the people vested with power, they will do as they please. It is important to limit 
powers as this will ensure that a person does not act outside the law or his limitations. This is 
how the doctrine of separation of powers came about and begins to shed some light as to how 
important it is that the legislative, executive and judicial authority must be separated in order 
to guarantee checks and balances in a constitutional state. 
 
It is very important clearly to understand the idea of separation of powers and checks and 
balances as well as how state authority is shared.
131
 Montesquieu further indicates that “there 
would be an end of everything were the same manor the same body, whether of the nobles or 
of the people, to exercise those three power, that of enacting laws, that of executing the 
public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals”.132 According to Mangu “power 
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corrupts and separation of powers is essential to liberty and democracy”,133 hence the 
doctrine has spread all over the world today in an effort to balance government powers and 
good governance. 
 
2.5.2  Implementation of the Idea of Constitutionalism and the Doctrine of 
Separation of Powers in Selected African States in Contrast with the 
US and Germany 
It is evident, from the way in which most countries of the West run their political and 
economic affairs compared to the challenges in most African countries, that the doctrine of 
separation of powers has stabilized those countries over the years and that it is well 
established and practiced.
134
 Perhaps this success can be traced to popular participation and 




In Africa there are only a few instances where we can claim that the doctrine is prevailing 
and peace and prosperity are maintained. In most instances, even in countries with 
constitutions that clearly differentiate between the three branches, some leaders in their 
capacity as presidents try to manipulate the process of governance by putting cronies in 
different levels of government in order to serve or protect their interests or “hidden agendas”. 
For example, the 2001 appointment of Godfrey Chidyausiku as Chief Justice in the 
Zimbabwe Supreme Court was criticized by many as they perceive it as a deployment by the 
ZANU-PF of someone who would protect the interests of the government because of his 
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“close association with the ruling party and his previous statements endorsing the 
government’s land policy”.136 
 
This is the major challenge in the politics and governance of different African states. It is 
important for African leaders to know, understand and accept the responsibility that comes with 
holding public office as well as the respect for the rule of law. The application or practice of the 
principle of separation of powers is not a “universal model”,137 it differs from state to state, but 
it can be argued that the US model has influenced and inspired many countries throughout the 
world. 
 
2.5.2.1  Checks and Balances 
The role played by the system of checks and balances is a very important one in a democratic 
state as it guarantees that no single branch of government can become too powerful and end 
up usurping the functions or powers of the other branches. However, by the same token, no 
single branch of government can function in complete independence – what is required is a 
healthy relationship between the three branches. In other words, an “absolute” theory of 
separation of powers in which one branch functions in complete isolation is not viable.  
 
2.5.2.2  The System of Checks and Balances and Separation of Powers 
under the US Constitution 
The United States of America is a constitutional state based on constitutional sovereignty. 
The Americans also subscribe to the principle and idea of separation of powers.
138
 According 
to this principle in the US, the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government are 
created and power is shared among all of them.
139
 The most interesting aspect of this system 
is that the powers of one branch can be challenged by another branch and this is what the 
system of checks and balances is all about, ie one branch serves as a watchdog or safeguard 
against any form of irregularity by the other branch(es).
140
 According to Gerangelos, the 
“view of the separation of powers as a continuing safeguard of decisional independence, in 
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particular, remains at the forefront of United States constitutional jurisprudence to a far 




 gives a detailed explanation of the role of the three branches of government in the 




Among other functions the legislative branch is vested with the powers to make laws. It 
may perform checks and balances over the executive in various ways. For instance, it 
may override presidential vetoes with a two-thirds vote and may remove the president 
through impeachment. It also has the power over the budget to fund any actions by the 
executive. It approves treaties and presidential appointments. 
 
On the other side it keeps checks over the judicial branch by, for example, the creation of 







The function of the executive is to execute the laws of the US. It exercises checks on the 
legislature in a number of ways including a veto power; it has the ability to call special 
sessions of congress. It also has powers to recommend legislation. 
 
Over the judicial branch, the president as head of the executive is vested with the powers 




The Judicial Branch 
 
The function of the judiciary is to interpret laws of the US. The judiciary may exercise 
checks and balances on the executive through courts by, for example, judging some 
executive actions to be unconstitutional through the power of judicial review. 
 
On checking over the legislature, courts are vested with powers to rule on the 
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2.5.2.3  Constitutionalism and Separation of Powers in the Federal 
Republic of Germany 
Unlike other countries in the rest of the world which use the term “constitution”, the Germans 
have what has become popularly known as the “Basic Law for the Federal Republic of 
Germany” (Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland).146 According to David Currie, 
“the German Basic Law is one of the great constitutions of the world”.147 Kommers points 
out that “it was called a ‘basic law’ because the Parliamentary Council did not want to bestow 
the dignified term ‘constitution’ (Verfassung) on a document drafted to govern a part of 
Germany for a transitional period that would only last until national reunification”.148 After 
reunification in 1990, the Basic Law became the constitutional law for all of Germany. What 
is interesting about Germany and its constitutionalism, and perhaps a lesson that some 
African countries can learn, is the way in which the situation unfolded without violence. The 
two parts of Germany were separated for a period of forty years but they managed to uphold 
the constitutional order. Twelve national elections were successfully held within this period 
under the guardianship of the Grundgesetz. 
 
When West and East Germany finally reunited in 1990, they unanimously decided to retain 
the Basic Law as an all-German constitution and to continue its designation as the 
Grundgesetz.
149
 However, there were questions and issues that needed to be addressed 
regarding amendments to the Basic Law raised by unification. One big question was the 
legitimacy of Basic Law as to whether it should be ratified in a popular referendum.
150
 And a 
referendum would apparently confer on it the popular legitimacy it arguably lacked.
151
 In 
1991 a parliamentary commission on constitutional revision was established but it did not 
support the idea of a popular referendum.
152
 According to Kommers “the commission 
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appeared to accept the prevailing view among Germany’s constitutional lawyers that twelve 
national elections in forty years expressed overwhelming popular support for the existing 
constitutional order and established the Basic Law’s fundamental legitimacy”.153 
 
The Basic Law is clear on the issues of the term of office for the president and possible 
removal from the office. The term of office for the president in Germany is five years but 
he/she is eligible to be reelected for another term but is not permitted to serve more than two 
terms.
154
 The president may be removed from office on the basis of serious misconduct by a 
two-thirds vote of either the Bundestag or the Bundesrat if the Federal Constitutional Court 
finds him/her guilty of deliberate violations of the Basic Law or other federal law.
155
 
However, the president is protected by the law, for example by enjoying immunities from 




It is clear that the Basic Law was laid on a strong constitutional foundation and this was one 
of the reasons why there were no major amendments or a need to develop a new constitution 
upon reunification. The Federal Constitutional Court also had stood firm as guardian of the 
constitutional order. This could mean that a well-developed document can help to consolidate 
different views and ensure peaceful and good governance in a country. Germany is one 
country that was defeated and penalized in both the First World War and Second World War, 
had its resources controlled or taken away to pay for its debts, yet managed to recover well 
both in the political and economic spheres. Today the country is among the world 
superpowers and has a major influence both political and economically. 
 
Like many other countries in the world, Germany also subscribes to the principle of 
separation of powers and democracy. This principle is explicitly expressed in the Basic 
Law.
157
 Kommers argues that “German constitution makers believed that they could secure 
liberty and avoid oppressive government by setting up a system of shared powers similar to 
constitutional arrangements in the United States, however, separation of powers in the 




 Article 54(2) of the Basic Law. 
155
 Article 61. 
156
 Article 60(4) 
157
 Article 20 of the Basic Law makes the following provision: 
(1) The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state. 
(2) All state authority emanates from the people. It shall be exercised by the people by means of elections and voting 
and by specific legislative, executive and judicial organs. 




Federal Republic of Germany differs from the division of authority among the branches of 
the United States government”.158 The US follows the presidential system as opposed to the 
German’s parliamentary system. The legislature chooses the head of government who is also 
responsible to the legislature;
159
 and “federal ministers serve at the pleasure of the 
legislature”.160 
 
Accordingly, this creates a unique way with less structural separation between the legislature 
and the executive. The judicial power is vested in the judges.
161
 Judges are free from any 
influence or interference from the executive and legislative organs. This provides significant 
structural and functional limits to the concentration of power as well as significant safeguards 
against arbitrary governmental action.
162
 The German structure of the principle is correlated 
to issues of federalism while in turn relating to “the federation’s preeminence in the field of 
legislation and the states’ preeminence in the field of public administration”.163 Because of 
this, “executive-legislative conflicts often resolve themselves into disputes between federal 
lawmakers and state bureaucracies”164 which clarifies the principle of separation of powers. 
The executive branch is constituted by the Federal president as head of state and the Federal 
chancellor as head of cabinet and government. The legislative authority is vested in the 
legislature (Bundestag), elected directly through proportional representation
165
 and the 
Länder through the Bundesrat in terms of their federal structure. The president, chancellor 
and the cabinet, Bundestag and the Bundesrat together with Federal Constitutional Court, are 
said to constitute the highest constitutional organs of the Federal Republic.
166
 Kommers 
further indicates that “the constitutional court is primus inter pares167 among the other federal 
organs because it has the authority to define their institutional rights and duties when 
resolving conflicts between them”.168 
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2.5.2.4  Constitutionalism and Separation of Powers under the South 
African Constitution 
Section (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides that the 
Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values: 
 
a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and advancement of human rights and 
freedoms. 
b) Non-racialism and non-sexism. 
c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law. 
d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voter’s roll, regular elections, and a 
multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, 
responsiveness and openness. 
 
It is, among other things, this section in which the foundation of South Africa’s democracy, 
constitutionalism, and the rule of law is laid. The South African Constitution is one of the 
best in the spurt of constitutions produced in Africa (or perhaps in the world) since the 
beginning of the 1990s.
169
 However, the constitution did not come about without a struggle. 
In the words of Devenish,
170
 the 1996 Constitution is a “product of compromise of which it’s 
making involved significant and innovative compromises flowing from arduous and 
penetrating negotiations over a period of five years”.171 South Africa’s political struggle 
under minority rule (apartheid) was different from other struggles in other African states 
which degenerated into armed conflict that resulted in the loss of many lives.
172
 Although 
there was no direct war in the country, many activists and their families were tortured and 
murdered by “apartheid agents” and the “notorious security police of apartheid” in the 
country, or were compelled to flee into exile.
173
 As the result of the past experience, there 
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was considerable tension in the country which set a difficult platform for the parties 
negotiating a new transformative constitution. Compromise was the only way round these 
problems. 
 
The Constitution is built on the strong foundation laid by the Interim Constitution and the 34 
Constitutional Principles (CPs).
174
 The constitutional principles established that South Africa 
shall be a sovereign state that subscribes to a democratic system of governance and is 
committed to achieving equality of all people without discrimination on the basis of sex, 
gender or race.
175
 For the first time, human rights for all were recognized together with 
freedoms and civil liberties.
176
 Most importantly, the principles provided that the constitution 
shall be the supreme law of the land and bind everyone ‒ including organs of state at all 
levels of government.
177
 In this approach the rule of law shall reign supreme and justice 
prevail in society. 
 
The adoption of a new constitution meant the end to parliamentary sovereignty and gave birth 
to constitutional sovereignty. This also symbolized the new dawn of constitutionalism in 
South Africa. In other words, the idea of a limited government which means that every state 
action complies with the provisions of the Constitution was accomplished. The constitution 
embodies a code of values, principles and norms that are generally accepted by the society 
and respected by the state. Furthermore, unlike in the past where only minority groups 
(generally whites) were allowed to vote, the constitution now makes provision for a universal 
adult suffrage, regular elections, and a multi-party system of democratic government.
178
 This 
could also be perceived to be in line with Henkin’s argument that constitutionalism is based 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
then be arrested with the objective of using such persons for evidence in court against other former members as 
well as the recruitment of certain of such persons which meant that after the time they would come and work at 
Vlakplaas. The covert aspect involved cross-border operations where such members, such ANC or PAC 
members were killed in cross border situations”.  
 In 1988 the former human rights and apartheid activists and later justice in the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa (1994-2009), Albie Sachs, was in exile in Mozambique and escaped death after secret agents of the 
apartheid government placed a bomb in his car in Maputo. As a result of the explosion he lost his arm and the 
sight in one eye.  





 The 34 constitutional principles were agreed upon by the participating parties and negotiators in order to 
ensure that the new constitution complied with them. 
175
 Constitutional Principle I.  
176
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on popular sovereignty. People are afforded the opportunity to choose their own government 




The principle of constitutionalism places an obligation on all branches of government (ie the 
legislature, executive and judiciary) and its representatives to carry out their functions and 
duties in a manner that demonstrates respect for the rule of law, human dignity, 
accountability, openness and in concordance, in the words of Finn, with “publicly articulated 
prospective rules that enable citizens to access the legitimacy and propriety of public 
policies”.180 If a government is imposed on the people, it will not command respect and will 
never be legitimate.  
 
Devenish argues that “a commitment to both reason in public affairs and to the protection and 
promotion of human dignity is indispensable to constitutionalism”.181 State officials are duty-
bound to conduct themselves in a manner that is in line with the law of the country and does 
not compromise their eligibility to hold public office.  
 
Another interesting constitutional principle worth mentioning is CP VI which provides that – 
there shall be a separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary with 
appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness. The 
principle of separation of powers is implied in the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa. It provides that the executive authority of the Republic is vested in the President who 
exercises it together with the other members of the cabinet.
182
 The legislative authority is 
vested in Parliament,
183
 while the judicial authority is vested in the courts.
184
 As custodian of 
the judicial branch of government, the courts are required to be independent and subject only 
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Nonetheless, the doctrine of separation of powers has been subject to a lot of criticism by 
politicians, lawyers and scholars across the globe, yet “it remains an integral part of the 
theory and philosophy of constitutionalism or limited government”.186 Mathews raises an 
interesting argument when he refers to the doctrine of separation of powers as “a government 
(system) of separated institutions sharing power”.187 All the three branches of government in 
South Africa are required to observe and adhere to the provisions of the constitution when 
exercising their powers and one branch should not encroach on or usurp the functions of 
another. Rather, the branches must maintain a healthy relationship and are expected to work 
in cooperation, though independently, with one another towards building a united, peaceful, 
prosperous and democratic country. 
 
As indicated above (in the case of the US and Germany), one cannot single out a model of 
separation of powers, countries normally practice this principle in a manner that reflects their 
systems. In In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
188
 the 
Constitutional Court held that “as the separation of powers doctrine is not a fixed or rigid 
constitutional doctrine, it is given expression in many different forms and made subject to 
checks and balances of many kinds”.189 The Constitutional Court declared that: 
 
“There is, however, no universal model of separation of powers and in democratic 
systems of government in which checks and balances result in the imposition of restraints 
by one branch of government upon another, there is no separation that is absolute. This is 
apparent from the objector’s own examples. While in the USA, France and the 
Netherlands members of the executive may not continue to be members of the 
legislature, this is not a requirement of the German system of separation of powers. 
Moreover, because of the different systems of checks and balances that exist in these 
countries, the relationship between the different branches of government differs from one 
country to another. The principle of separation of powers, on the one hand recognizes the 
functional independence of branches of government. On the other hand, the principle of 
checks and balances focuses on the desirability of ensuring that constitutional order, as 
totality, prevents the branches of government from usurping power from one another. In 
this sense it anticipates the necessary or unavoidable intrusion of one branch on the 
terrain of another. No constitutional scheme can reflect a complete separation of powers: 
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the scheme is always one of partial separation. In Justice Frankfurter’s words, ‘[t]he 
areas are partly interacting, not wholly disjoined’.”190 
 
Addressing the annual human rights lecture at Stellenbosch University, then Chief Justice 
Ngcobo indicated that the doctrine of separation of powers is still developing in South Africa 
and stressed that all three branches of government are required to cooperate with one another 
in upholding the constitution. It was necessary, he urged, “to move away from the perception 
that the courts were engaged in a tough battle with other levels of government”.191 The South 
African system of separation of powers and checks and balances promotes both independence 
and interdependence of the three government branches. In his keynote address to the 3
rd
 
conference on Access to Justice in South Africa, organized by the judicial branch and 
attended by some members of the executive and legislature, the President, Zuma said:  
 
“This is an affirmation of our constitutional value of cooperative governance, on which 
our model of separation of powers is premised. The separation of the three branches of 
the state forms a critical basis of our open and democratic society founded on equality 
and human dignity. Our greatest achievement as a new nation in the 1990s was the 
adoption of a constitution which enshrines human dignity, equality and the advancement 
of human rights and freedoms”.192 
 
Although, since the first democratic elections and a new constitution, South Africa has been 
doing well “constitutionally speaking”, there have been a lot of arguments from different 
structures in the country, including the ruling party itself (the ANC), alleging that “opposition 
forces are trying to use courts to co-govern”;193 oppositions;194 civil society groups; lawyers, 
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 Sincerely one must be worried when the President and the Secretary General of the powerful ruling party 
make public statements alleging encroachment by the judicial branch on the affairs of the other two 
branches of government as a result of opposition parties trying to co-govern with the ruling party. Does not 
this pose a threat to judicial independence? Is this not some of the things which contributed to the collapse 
of constitutions and the failure of constitutionalism in other African states? With the ANC policy of cadre 
deployment, does not this poses a threat to South Africa’s young but symbolic democracy, considering the 
fact that the constitution gives the President of the country more powers in the appointment of heads of 
strategic institutions such as the National Director of Public Prosecution, the Chief Justice, Deputy Chief 
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scholars, researchers, commentators and the general public criticizing the ruling party and its 





The Constitution of South Africa protects freedom of expression which is important for a 
healthy democracy.
196
 The arguments, debates and criticisms by the different structures 
mentioned above also form part of constitutional democracy. The failure or collapse of 
constitutions and constitutionalism in other countries is due to “silence” from opposition 
parties and other civil society groups while the law of the country is disregarded or flouted by 
the state. 
 
As Devenish puts it, “the mere existence of a constitution, even if it contains an eloquent 
exposition of human rights, does not in itself suffice to ensure constitutionalism”.197 There 
are many countries in Africa with constitutions, but just as many of these constitutions have 
failed to ensure the upholding of the principle of constitutionalism.
198
 In his blog 
“Constitutionally Speaking”, Professor de Vos wrote: 
“I think it is healthy for our democracy that people debate and argue and shout and 
scream when they disagree with one another – as long as they are also prepared to listen 
and to engage with the arguments of opponents and are prepared to reconsider the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Justice and other judicial officers? Only time will tell, but surely it is important to have the freedom of 
expression protected by the constitution as this affords different interested parties like, commentators, 
researchers, media, civil society groups and everyone to scrutinize government action as expected in a 
constitutional democracy. 
194
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correctness of their own positions when necessary. In a constitutional democracy, no one 
should be above criticism”.199 
Freedom of speech or expression is undoubtedly important in a democratic country. Free 
expression has the potential to contribute to accountability and openness in a democratic 
state. Citizens and civil society groups must be free to debate, criticize and scrutinize any 
matter of interest without fear of being persecuted by the government.  
Recently, Choudohry referred to South Africa’s current state of affairs as a dominant party 
democracy and indicated that “one of the pathologies of a dominant party democracy is the 
colonization of independent institutions meant to check the exercise of political power by the 
dominant party, enmeshing them in webs of patronage”.200 The ANC has dominated South 
Africa’s politics as the ruling party since the first democratic elections in 1994 (now 17 
years) and “with no sign of a credible electoral competitor on the horizon”201 and, he argues, 
it will continue to dominate for the long time. This can only lead to a threat to the principle of 
constitutionalism and democracy. The fear about this type of dominance, as history has 
taught us in countries like our neighbour Zimbabwe, is ‘comfort’ of the dominating party 
which ends up resting on its laurels and deviating from the constitution to satisfy its own 
agenda and benefit political elites. The big question raised by Choudohry, and many other 
critics, is how South Africa’s constitutional order will respond if (perhaps, when) it is 
threatened? Of course, only time will tell. 
2.5.2.5  Constitutionalism and Separation of Powers in Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe has an interesting history on its way to independence from colonial domination.
202
 
Upon independence in 1980, Zimbabwe adopted a new constitution which symbolized the 
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 Zimbabwe was engaged in a liberation struggle with colonial rulers from 1965 to 1980. The people of 
Zimbabwe were tired of oppression and wanted change that would bring about democracy and economic 
opportunities for everyone. An excerpt taken from the site Zimbabwe Government Online reads: “The 
escalating cost of the war, the breakdown of civil administration, a collapsing economy, a failed Internal 
Settlement and increased pressure from allies all forced Smith to concede to the general elections that 
brought about majority rule. On the other hand, the nationalist leaders were also desperate to end a war that 
claimed thousands of lives in wanton bombings of refugees in neighbouring countries by the Rhodesian 
forces. The guerrilla armies were also confronted by strained logistics. Further to this, pressure from 
leaders of African countries, particularly the Frontline States, whose economies were also suffering the 
brunt of the war, also contributed to the nationalists conceding to unsatisfactory ceasefire arrangements 
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end of colonial rule and the dawn of democracy in the country. However, like many other 
constitutions of independence (in other African states), the Zimbabwean one was also 
“imposed upon it by the British (colonizer) during the 1979 Lancaster House Conference 
which eventually led to its independence”.203 In 1991 the eleventh Constitutional Amendment 
Act was passed in order to provide among other things “safeguards on the exercise of 
presidential power and to avoid unnecessary conflict and division between the various 
branches of government”.204 Zimbabwe was hopefully on the right track and had a vision of 





However, according to Makumbe, despite the several amendments to the constitution to date, 
“it (the constitution) remains essentially a non-Zimbabwean, colonial relic, which is a source 
of much political contention and dissatisfaction”.206 He further argues that “in a neo-colonial 
setting, political liberalization and democratic development cannot be realized before the 
people themselves write their own constitution i.e. a constitutional conference is a sine qua 
non for a meaningful democratic development in any liberalizing postcolonial society”.207 
Currently Zimbabwe is in a process of adopting a new constitution to create a new 
constitutional order in the country and restore constitutionalism. 
 
It has been more than a decade since the collapse of constitutionalism in Zimbabwe.
208
 The 
ZANU-PF has been at the helm of government since the country gained independence more 
than thirty years ago, with a single president in the person of Mugabe.
209
 What could possibly 
have been a turning point and eventually the collapse of the constitutional order to one of the 
promising democracies of the developing African continent? 
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Two issues are detected in the Zimbabwe situation which appears to be among the 
contributory factors to the collapse of constitutionalism in that country. As indicated earlier, 
Zimbabwe is currently in the process of adopting a new constitution. However, the country is 
currently run under the “flawed” constitution which they seek to replace. First, the “given or 
imposed” constitution, and later the amendments made to protect the president and his ruling 
party without legitimacy, could also be perceived as the root of the problem in Zimbabwe’s 
current constitutional and political affairs. Secondly, the issue of a one party dominance has 
proven to be a blow for Zimbabwe as shall be later substantiated. 
 
The current Zimbabwe constitution has long been criticized. Makumbe points to, among 
other things, the powers given to the President to appoint some twenty percent of the MPs 
which, he argues, seriously undermines the efficacy of parliament as a public representative 
and a democratic institution.
210
 The consequence is that because the President is the one who 
appoints them (the MPs), he can remove them at any time and as the result they are forced to 
be loyal and to put the interests of the President above those of the public. During debates and 
voting sessions such MPs cannot act autonomously, rather they are bound to stick with the 
person who appointed them. In other words, they are indirectly accountable to the President, 
something that is not good for democracy and constitutionalism. 
 
The current embattled constitution, further, has a controversial clause which grants the 
President unreasonable immunity against any civil or criminal proceedings, consequently 
putting him above the law.
211
 The government of Zimbabwe and ZANU-PF under the 
leadership of President Mugabe has violated the law and human rights on many occasions. 
The President has in many regards failed to respect the principle of separation of powers 
which is crucial in every democracy. Makumbe makes a crucial point by arguing that: 
 
“The fact that the Constitution mixes up the principles of separation of powers and that 
of fusion of powers results in Zimbabwe being neither a parliamentary nor a presidential 
democracy in the true sense of these terms. In essence, therefore, Zimbabwe cannot be 
safely argued to be a democracy at all”.212 
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Although Section 3 declares the Constitution to be the supreme law of Zimbabwe,
213
 in recent 
years, the constitutional order and the rule of law have collapsed in Zimbabwe due to the 
arrogance and interference, or rather disrespect by the President for the other branches of 
government. Dating back from the year 2000, Zimbabwe’s situation (politically, lawfully and 
economically) has been very tense. The issue of land invasion contributed to lawlessness and 
a swift collapse of the economy in Zimbabwe.
214
 Although the governing ZANU-PF and the 
President (Mugabe) put the blame on the imposed “sanctions” by the “Western” countries, it 
is clear that poor governance and the disregard of the rule of law have led to the escalating 
political and economic problems of Zimbabwe. 
 
The coming into being of the main opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC)
215
 in the political facet of Zimbabwe was perceived as a threat by the ruling party 
which for many years has been sitting comfortably at the helm of government. Many 
observers argue that Mugabe and his ZANU-PF have never afforded space for opposition 
parties in Zimbabwe and have for many years tried to keep things that way by every 
means.
216
 After independence Mugabe embarked on a mission to consolidate the opposition 
into his party in order to protect his dominance.
217
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The pre- and post-2008 presidential and parliamentary elections were masked by violence 
which left many people dead, injured, raped, assaulted and traumatized.
218
 The election 
results (2008) took more than a month to be released. These were the elections in which the 
ZANU-PF faced the toughest opposition since they took power in 1980 and such opposition 
was a big threat to the supporters of the ruling party.
219
 With almost half the seats of 
parliament having gone to MDC in the 2000 elections, ZANU-PF was very alert that the 
elections could go either way. Many people were tired of oppression, unemployment and 
poor economic conditions. They wanted change and the only hope for the ruling party was to 
use violence to threaten people and at least divert attention from the opposition. 
 
When the results were later released, for the first time an opposition (MDC) had won a 
majority of seats over the ZANU-PF. However, neither the ZANU-PF nor the MDC 
presidential candidates won an outright majority in order to become President and therefore a 
run-off had to be held in order to determine the winner.
220
 Many people thought that this was 
the end of Mugabe, but he continued with his plan of intimidating the supporters of the 
opposition. People were beaten and murdered. Tsvangirai received different kinds of advice 
on the violence to his supporters and eventually withdrew from the second round which 





The tensions between the MDC and ZANU-PF continued after the second round which 
declared Mugabe President. The MDC declared the results of the run-off void and they were 
not prepared to work with Mugabe and the ZANU-PF after the violent elections. There was 
no way forward and the country was on its knees. A speedy compromise had to be reached to 
salvage the already sunk ship. After months of lengthy negotiations headed by then South 
African President, Thabo Mbeki, a compromise was brokered, and this gave birth to a 
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It has been over two years since the GNU was put in place. There have been ups and downs 
with the fear that it might collapse at any time because of the continuing misunderstandings 
and tension between the President (Mugabe) and the Prime Minister (Tsvangirai). Part of the 
agreement was that a new constitution reflecting the will of Zimbabweans would be drafted 
and adopted to guide the country into fresh democratic elections. The process has been 
moving slowly with different reports citing lack of funds and delaying tactics by Mugabe.  
 
Whether the solution to Zimbabwe’s political problems will be found and if found, when, 
remains a mystery. Only time will tell. Some reports claim that the ZANU-PF and its War 
Veterans are of the opinion that no person who did not fight in the 1970s war of independence 
shall hold the highest office in the country. In December 2010 the Sowetan Newspaper reported 
the following: 
“Mugabe’s defence minister, Emmerson Munangagwa, told voters: ‘In the last elections 
you voted for the wrong party. If you don’t vote for us in the next election, we will rule, 
even if you don’t want’. Zanu (PF) has already started deploying its violent militia in 
rural areas to re-establish previous patterns of brutal intimidation”.223 
 
It appears that there is still some way to go before democracy; the rule of law and 
constitutionalism can be restored in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe unless the other countries put 
necessary pressure and both international and regional organizations such as the UN, SADC 
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2.5.2.6  Constitutionalism and the Doctrine of Separation of Powers in 
Kenya 
2.5.2.6.1 Kenya from Independence (1963) 
Kenya was a British colony until it gained independence in 1963. The Lancaster House 
Constitutional Conferences were held in London in 1960 and 1962, and in Nairobi in 1963 in 
order to negotiate an independence constitution of Kenya
224
 and transition of power from 
colonial masters to Kenyans. Like all other British colonies, Kenya had its constitution 
imposed on it by the British. However, Kibala argues “it was a fairly progressive liberal 
democratic constitution from the departing colonialists”.225 Though it was an imposed 
document, the constitution
226
 at least included some important provisions which indicated 
various components of constitutionalism such as checks on executive power, the protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual,
227
 the Judicature and the Judicial Service 
Commission,
228
 and so on. 
 
The colonialists had spent some time negotiating with, as well as affording the people of 
Kenya an opportunity to prepare themselves for taking over.
229
 Various political parties 
emerged in preparation for the Kenyan General Elections of 1963.
230
 However, issues of 
tribalism or ethnicity manifested which threatened the whole process, but the situation 
calmed and the elections were finally delivered with the Kenya African National Union 
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(KANU) obtaining a majority of seats, followed by the Kenya Democratic Party (KADU) and 
lastly, the African People’s Party (APP) in the House of Representatives.231 
 
Jomo Kenyatta, the leader of KANU, became Prime Minister and after 1964 he was President 
until his death in 1978. As indicated above, the constitution contained clauses that 
represented some elements of constitutionalism but this did not guarantee constitutionalism in 
Kenya in the following years, as will be unfolded. Like many other African leaders who 
assumed power after independence, Kenyatta also tried his best to keep opposition parties out 




Kibala gives an interesting picture of how the situation swiftly diverted from the 
constitutional order: 
 
“Almost immediately after independence the ruling party began to dismantle the 
elaborate checks placed on executive power. This was done by, first and foremost, 
undermining the political opposition and ultimately forcing the official opposition party 
to fold up and join the government to create a de facto one party state. In tandem with the 
decimation of political opposition, was the enactment, repeal and/or amendment of 
several provisions of the constitution all calculated to amass power on the executive, 
particularly the presidency, and the removal of effective powers of the judiciary and 
parliament to hold the executive in check.”233 
 
One can argue without doubt that the issue of imposed constitutions by colonial masters has 
been a thorn in flesh for African countries, irrespective of how well structured the 
constitution was. Tribalism, too, has destroyed hopes of democracy, not only in Kenya but in 
many African countries and still poses a threat and a source of conflict on the continent. The 
colonizers contributed to this epidemic by disregarding this issue during their occupation. 
Perhaps another point is that, because they never practiced democracy during the period of 
colonization and only defended the interests and rights of other white settlers, Africans were 
grouped in their various tribes and those who were observing, and eventually took charge, 
inherited authoritarianism and could not really see the value of a constitution that would limit 
their powers. 
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 See footnote 225 above at 1 (Kibala Gichira “The state of constitutionalism in Kenya 2003”). 
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Kenyatta was accused by other tribes of putting his people (the Kikuyu) first when 
distributing economic resources, which they dubbed “Kikuyization of the civil service”.234 
Political players opposed to KANU holding public meetings without permit were arrested and 
detained.
235
 As time passed, nepotism and bribery became the order of the day under 
Kenyatta’s administration.236 
 
2.5.2.6.2  The Period 1978 to 1991 
After the death of Kenyatta in 1978, Daniel arap Moi who was Deputy President took over as 
President of Kenya.
237
 Upon taking office, Moi committed himself to bringing unity and 
stability in Kenya by ending political factionalism and corruption.
238
 But soon after, he was 
accused of wasting no time in following in the footsteps of Kenyatta by enforcing oppression 
and destruction of opposition.
239
 In 1982 Moi with his ruling KANU party added a clause to 
the constitution which turned the de facto one party state into a de jure one party state in 
order to guarantee that dissidents could not form or register an opposition party.
240
 This 
proved the lack of commitment to and ignorance of the rule of law and the principle of 
constitutionalism by Moi and the KANU party. 
 
Moi’s tenure was characterized by tension, hostility, corruption, beatings, detention, coercion 
and other forms of violence.
241
 Many people lived in fear for their lives despite the 
constitution which made provision for the protection of fundamental rights. However, the 
State did not respect the rule of law. In 1982 there was a failed coup against Moi’s regime.242 
The fact that constitutionalism was fading in Kenya was evident through some constitutional 
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amendments such as the Sixth Amendment that gave the office of the President powers to 




One thing that autocratic leaders have in common is that they are always aware that in order 
to retain power you need to eliminate opposition by every means. Mostly, such people are 
preoccupied with power that will give them and their allies’ access to resources. They are 
always aware that allowing opposition (checks and accountability) will mean limited access 
to resources. Most of them accumulate considerable wealth while in power and are 





Towards the 1990s pressure was mounting on President Moi. The economy was perceived as 
having been politicized. Opponents argued that he was interfering and influenced the 
appointment of his close associates to key economic positions.
245
 In early 1990 he is reported 
to have publicly condemned the idea of a multi-party system – while other African states 
opened up to the system, he referred to it as a manifestation of Western cultural 
imperialism.
246
 In 1991 international pressure was increasing. Foreign donors withheld aid. 
He was left with no choice and eventually submitted to a multi-party system.  
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2.5.2.6.3  The influence of Elections on Constitutionalism and Separation of 
Powers in Kenya 
The way in which elections and the banning and unbanning of political parties, as it will be 
discussed, has had an impact on the development of constitutionalism and on the practice of 
the doctrine of separation of powers in Kenya. 
 
2.5.2.6.3.1  Multi-Party Elections 
“Multi-party politics in Kenya is after all a story of murder, mayhem, gerrymandering, 
financial scandals, election rigging, unprincipled calculations of tribal and self-interest, 
defections, political resurrections and reincarnations”.247 After the unbanning of political 
parties in 1991, multi-party elections were held in 1992. Since the unbanning of opposition 




2.5.2.6.3.2  1992 Elections 
As expected, several newly formed political parties participated in the first multi-party 
elections (1992) since independence in a quest to unseat the long serving Moi and his KANU. 
As is the case with most African states,
249
 the pre-election period was allegedly rocked by 
violence.
250
 Moi and his KANU, however, managed to retain power and it was to be another 
long five years of waiting to try and challenge them in the 1997 elections. 
 
2.5.2.6.3.3  1997 Elections 
Although generally there were improvements compared to the 1992 elections, the 1997 
elections did not meet the general standards of free and fair elections as promoted by the 
international community.
251
 Violence and irregularities occurred. In the words of Mwangi 
Kagwanja – “the road to the 1997 general elections was a dangerous minefield of vigilante 
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violence”.252 The state was accused of inciting and sponsoring violence against the supporters 
of opposition parties in an effort to intimidate them and thereby hold on to power. 
 
It was well known that KANU and Moi had never been proponents of a multi-party system. 
The only time when they welcomed it was when they had no option but to compromise in the 
face of mounting pressure in 1991. Although Moi ended up giving-in to the idea of multi-
party elections, opposition parties and those who did not support him were treated with 




One way of realizing democracy is through elections. Citizens are afforded an opportunity to 
vote for whomever they believe can deliver them from oppression, poverty and under-
development. Although there was violence and the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) 
was accused of incompetence and bias, the 1997 elections went ahead with different political 
parties participating. At least there was an increase in the number of voters and observers 
from both local and the international community. Yet again, Moi and his KANU manage to 
salvage victory though it was a hung parliament as KANU failed to obtain a clear majority to 




2.5.2.6.3.4  2002 Elections 
Unlike the 1992 and 1997 elections, the 2002 elections were reported to be much better and 
indicated democratic processes. Some observers concluded that the government of Kenya and 
the ECK administered a fair and transparent election.
255
 Several constitutional review 
processes took place regarding the elections with various civil society groups, opposition 
parties and the government engaging to find ways of improving democracy in Kenya. This 
enabling environment was a turning point to the traditional politics of Kenya since its 
independence in 1963. 
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The run-up to the 2002 elections is said to have been more peaceful than that of the previous 
two elections (1992 and 1997) since the multi-party system was reinstated.
256
 This round, 
Moi was retiring and he had put Uhuru Kenyatta, the son of Jomo Kenyatta, as the 
presidential candidate for KANU and he (Uhuru) was facing a major challenge from the 
newly formed National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) led by Mwai Kibaki. Kibaki defeated 
Kenyatta to become President and power was transferred in a peaceful democratic fashion.  
 
Bakari gives an interesting summary of the 2002 Kenyan elections and what eventually led to 
the fall of KANU ‒ a party that had dominated Kenyan politics for four decades amid abuse 
of human rights, corruption and undemocratic governance. Perhaps this is a lesson that other 
African countries faced with a similar challenge should consider in future. He argues as 
follows: 
 
“The emergence of a new generation of leaders with better education, sophistication, and 
idealism made it possible to not only challenge the old order, but also gradually 
undermine its claim to legitimacy. The fact that corruption, blatant abuse of human 
rights, divisive ethnic politics had been ingrained in the Kenyan body politic did not help 
matters for the ruling elite. They had almost completely lost credibility as a group, to turn 
things round. But ultimately, the decision on the part of the fragmented opposition to 
close ranks and work toward the defeat of KANU paid dividends in the end. The classic 
Machiavellian politics played by the previous regimes seem have no place in the new 
dispensation.”257 
 
The time for which many people had waited had finally dawned. The monster (KANU) 
which had been a thorn in the flesh of Kenyans for many years was defeated. Now it was 
time to restore constitutionalism and ensure prosperity and peaceful governance. According 
to Khalid and Akivaga, the majority of Kenyans perceived the 2002 elections as the “re-birth 
of a new democratic culture for their country and believed that their government will respond 
to their grievances and treat them with dignity and respect human rights”.258 
 
2.5.2.6.3.5  2007 Elections 
The 2004 Kenya Report on “Democracy and Democratic Culture” warned of the vulnerability 
of democracy and identified, among other challenges, the “problem of impunity and the 
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ineffectual state capacity to implement and enforce the law”.259 Ineffectual state capacity to 
enforce the law always opens a floodgate of problems as will later be discussed with regard to 
the violence that erupted after the 2007 elections. The 2002 elections brought hope and 
progress in Kenya, and so far appears to be a “milestone” in the country’s political and 
constitutional reforms.  
 
2.5.2.7  Constitutionalism and Separation of Powers in Swaziland 
Like the three other African countries discussed above, Swaziland was also a colony of 
Britain. It attained its independence from Britain in 1968 and like most British colonies “had 
a Westminster Constitution similar to that which the British had bequeathed to most of its 
former African colonies”.260 As it was the case with most African countries since the 
beginning of the 1990s, it can be argued that the people of Swaziland also felt the need for a 
new constitution that would reign supreme and bring about constitutionalism and democracy.  
In 2006 Swaziland adopted a new constitution which declared the country a democratic 
Kingdom and made it clear that the Constitution is the supreme law of the Kingdom and 
nullifies any law or conduct which might be inconsistent with it. However, it can be argued, 
based on the continuing “crisis”261 which had rocked the country, that, the new Constitution 
has so far yet to represent constitutionalism in Swaziland. Fombad had rightfully argued that 
although the Constitution has been accepted as the supreme law of the land it has “a split 
personality and is in many respects a parody of contradiction: a good number of legally and 
socially progressive and liberal ideas co-exist with numerous legally and politically 
conservative ideas that can hardly be reconciled with either modern constitutionalism and 
democracy”.262 
The principle of separation of powers is expressed under Chapters VI, VII and VII which 
makes provision for and divides the three branches of government into the executive, 
legislature and the judiciary.  Beside these provisions the King is professed to possess more 
powers which enable him to encroach in all the three branches thereby disregarding the rule 
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of law in the country. Section 11 of the Constitution exacerbates the situation by making a 




2.5.3  A Comparative Assessment of Constitutionalism and Democracy in  
Western and African Countries 
When we compare the political, economic, and social affairs of Western countries with those 
of their African counterparts’, many differences emerge. For example, some African 
countries rely largely on foreign aid to fund government activities. Elections are generally 
peaceful in the West as opposed to threats and violence in most African states. Western 
countries are more stable. Although not perfect, they are united and adhere to the rule of law. 
For instance, an organization like the European Union (EU) is principled and always takes 
the lead in directing the affairs of its member states. There were many wars in Europe up to 
1945 (the end of WW II) but since then Europeans have managed to unite, and to deal better 
with conflicts (as compared to their African counterparts), which have a potential to halt 




The principle of constitutionalism, if properly followed, unleashes the rule of law and 
democracy in every environment. Today it can be argued that most Western countries have 
provided an enabling environment for constitutionalism to blossom in their countries in 
contrast to African nations.
265
 Governance should not be seen as a ticket to wealth and 
dominance, as has been the case in most African countries. However, the problems of Africa 
cannot be laid solely at the door of Africans who have failed their countries. Some Western 
countries are responsible for influencing and supporting rebels and/or despots in Africa for as 
long as they continue to gain economic benefits.  
 
The African Union (AU) on the other side, has failed to stamp its authority on its member 
states. In most countries people suffer and die because of a few individuals who battle for 
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 The AU Constitutive Act
267
 makes provision for the non-recognition of a 
government that come to power by unconstitutional means, yet they fail to solve political 
conflicts in most of the states until violence erupts.
268
 The Heads of States meet regularly to 
discuss African problems, yet they seldom come up with a solution. If the so-called Western 
“super powers” endorse rebels (as it was recently the case in Libya)269 the very same African 
Union which initially had a different opinion in resolving the matter will follow and endorse 
the victorious rebels sponsored by some Western countries in disregard of Article 4
270
 of the 
Constitutive Act.  
 
2.5.4  Africa and the Rule of Law 
2.5.4.1  Explaining the Rule of Law 
There is no specific definition of the rule of law. However, one interesting description of the 
rule of law in the 21
st
 century is by the founder of the World Justice Project, William 
Neukom, who describes the rule of law as follows:  
 
“The rule of law is the foundation for communities of opportunity and equity – it is the 
predicate for the eradication of poverty, violence, corruption, pandemics, and other 
threats to civil society”.271 
 
The World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index 2010 defines the rule of law as a rules-
based system in which the following four universal principles are upheld: 
 
 “The government and its officials and agents are accountable under the law; 
 
 The laws are clear, publicized, stable, and fair, and protect fundamental rights, 
including the security of persons and property; 
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 The process by which the laws are enacted, administered, and enforced is 
accessible, fair, and efficient; 
 
  Access to justice is provided by competent, independent, and ethical adjudicators, 
attorneys or representatives, and judicial officers who are of sufficient number, 
have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they 
serve.”272 
 
It is trite that most African states hardly meet the components mentioned above in the 
definition by the WJP and accompanying principles of the rule of law. Most countries on the 
continent have been characterized by corruption, violence, lack of justice, unlimited 
government powers, lack of accountability, a controlled judiciary, and other undemocratic 
activities.
273
 It is the disregard of this rule of law by some African leaders that has been a 
recipe for problems and anarchy in African states for many years. If the rule of law is adhered 
to, good governance can be achieved and democracy realized.  
 
Article 4 of the AU Constitutive Act provides, among other things, that the Union shall 
function in accordance with the following principles:  
“(m) Respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good 
governance”. 
 
 The preamble to the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance points out 
that AU member states have reaffirmed to work relentlessly and collectively to deepen and 
consolidate the rule of law, peace, security and development in Africa. 
 
However, as was argued in the previous chapter, so far the African declarations and the 
Constitutive Act have not achieved the desired goal of creating a prosperous continent where 
the rule of law reigns supreme. The very same leaders who participate in making these 
treaties, go back to their countries to violate human rights and disregard the rule of law and as 
“sovereign states”, nothing can be done by the AU to effectively prevent such power abuses. 
Perhaps it is time the concept of state sovereignty in Africa is reexamined against the powers 
of AU in order to enable it to deal with the challenges that most countries face. 
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An interesting lesson for African leaders could be extracted from the US Justice Brandeis in 
Myers v United States.
274
 According to Korn, Justice Brandeis “expected the constitutional 
system to ‘fit its rulers for their task’ demanding from them ‘in the main, education and 
character’, so that they would best fulfill the various responsibilities of governing”.275 It is 
very important for leaders to be educated and to understand the responsibility that comes with 
holding public office.  
 
At the OAU Meeting of Heads of State and Government in Tunisia, 1994, then South African 
President and world political icon, Nelson Mandela, said:  
 
“We must face the matter squarely that where there is something wrong in how we 
govern ourselves, it must be said that the fault is not in our stars but in ourselves. We 
know that we have it in ourselves, as Africans, to change all this. We must assert our will 
to do so – we must say that there is no obstacle big enough to stop us from bringing 
about an African renaissance”.276 
This type of statement shows Mandela’s selfless attitude as a leader and the understanding 
that leadership is not about self-fulfillment and domination of others. Leaders must learn to 
respect the rule of law and understand what the principles of separation of powers and 
constitutionalism seek to achieve under democracy.  
 
2.5.4.2  The African Peer Review Mechanism (ARPM) and the rule of law 
in Africa 
The political, economic and social spheres form the backbone of every state. Also, these 
spheres are bound to interact with one another. One cannot ignore one sphere if one is to 
realize prosperity and good governance in a state. It is essential to maintain cooperation and a 
good relationship between these spheres in order to safeguard democracy and 
constitutionalism. In an attempt to deliver good governance in Africa, NEPAD
277
 has 
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introduced what has come to be known as African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).
278
 
However, the problem in Africa has always been the question implementation, commitment 
and inconsistency;
279
 individual leaders and factionalism
280
 as well as the West which is 
perceived by some leaders as having an “agenda” against “African solutions for African 
problems”.281 
 
There has been progress and regression at the same time, on issues of good governance on the 
African continent. Without fear or favour, there are issues that must be pointed out which 
have always put the continent’s democratic initiatives at risk. First, efforts on resolutions that 
may benefit Africa’s countries are always made, but later either abandoned or ignored by the 




Secondly, in some instances individual leaders are “worshipped” by certain groups of people 
to the extent that the country ends up being divided. In many cases this has contributed to 
political turmoil. For instance, not long ago many people died in Kenya during the 2007 
general elections because of the influence and disagreement of two leaders of different 
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of constitutionalism must be adhered to. 
278
 The African Peer Review Mechanism is a mutually agreed programme, voluntarily adopted by the member 
states of the African Union, to promote and re-enforce high standards of governance. 
 The APRM process looks at four focus areas: 
1  Democracy and good political governance – This area looks at ensuring that member state constitutions reflect 
the democratic ethos, provide accountable governance and that political representation is promoted, allowing all 
citizens to participate in the political process in a free and fair political environment. 
2 Economic governance and management – Good economic governance including transparency in financial 
management is an essential pre-requisite for promoting economic growth and reducing poverty. 
3. Corporate governance – This area focuses on promoting ethical principles, values and practices that are in line 
with broader social and economic goals to benefit all citizens. It works to promote a sound framework for good 
corporate governance. 
4 Socio-economic Development – Poverty can only be effectively tackled through the promotion of democracy, 
good governance, peace and security as well as the development of human and physical resources  
available at http://www.nepad.org/economicandcorporategovernance/african-peer-reviewmechanism/about 
(accessed 30/09/2011). 
279
 See Mangu AMB “Assessing the effectiveness of the African Peer Review Mechanism and its impact on 
the Promotion of Democracy and Good Political Governance (2007) 7/2 African Human Rights Law 
Journal at 367. 
280
 By individual leaders and factionalism I am referring to many incidents in Africa where conflict starts 
because of individuals like, for instance, the 2007/2008 violence in Kenya between the supporters of Mwai 
Kibaki and Raila Odinga which claimed many lives, in South Africa the dominant ruling ANC in which 
prior to the party’s electoral conference people stop identifying themselves with the party in support of 
individuals, as, for instance, happened in 2007 when people were divided between the ‘Mbeki camp’ (then 
party President) and the ‘Zuma camp’ (the challenger who later claimed the presidency).  
281
 For example, during the recent uprisings in Libya in which Gadaffi was dethroned and killed by the rebels, 
the AU’s resolution was undermined by the West through NATO which assisted the rebels which resulted 
in loss of many lives and destruction of Libya. 
282
 For example, during Mbeki’s, Obasanjo’s and Chissano’s terms of office as presidents in their respective 
countries there was much talk and hope about the African Renaissance and NEPAD, among other things, 
but since their departure little is heard or done to advance the later’s objectives. 
71 
 
political parties – Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga.283 In Ivory Coast a war ensued because of 
the power struggle between two individuals Laurent Gbagbo and Allasane Outtarra.
284
 In 
Zimbabwe too, during the 2008 elections violence erupted which resulted in many people 
being beaten, raped and killed by people “hero worshipping” president Mugabe and opposed 




In all these instances, the rule of law and other mechanisms put in place to safeguard 
democracy and good governance were ignored. The question that arises is – why do the 
majority of people suffer and die for their leaders who dress in expensive clothes, feast on 
gastronomic delights, and occupy luxury places? In turn, how does a “good leader” with the 
best interest of his people at heart, allow them to die or be killed in his name? In many cases 
loyalists are repaid by being appointed to key government positions with political and 
economic influence in the country. In this way corruption becomes institutionalized, which 
results in conflict in the long run. Whether this may be denied or challenged, the fact of the 
matter is that this has become a trend in African politics that hampers democracy and 
constitutionalism on the continent and needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency. 
 
2.6  Conclusion 
The two decades (1990-2010) were a crucial transition period for African democracy and 
constitutionalism. Several changes took place with most states drafting and adopting new 
constitutions which “entrenched constitutionalism” as they tried to move away from the 
“problematic independent constitutions”, purportedly imposed by former colonizers, which 
were blamed for the failure of democracy in most parts of the continent. 
 
As Mangu rightfully points out, “the history of post-colonial Africa has hardly been a success 
story for constitutional democracy and constitutionalism”.286 Although colonialism is 
rightfully blamed, the continual challenges rest squarely on the ineffective African Union 
which has failed to create an enabling environment for the new democracies in Africa.  A 
constitution per se is not a guarantee of democracy and constitutionalism, as has been 
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witnessed, for instance, in states like Swaziland where a new Constitution was adopted in 
2005 but reports of the violation of human rights and disregard of the rule of law by the King 




As it stands, the struggle for democracy and constitutionalism in most African states is still a 
far-fetched dream that requires unity, hard work and commitment by African leaders if the 
dream for a united, prosperous and peaceful Africa is to be realized.  As Mangu puts it –  
 
“Africans should understand that constitutional democracy and constitutionalism can 
never be given on a silver platter, but it will always be the result of struggles in which 
many sacrifices will have to be made”.288 
 
Although the doctrines of separation of powers and constitutionalism have gained momentum 
in Africa since the early 1990s, the problem of poor governance and conflict has continued to 
torment some parts of Africa. While it can be argued that some countries like South Africa 
have progressed better, unfortunately the same cannot be said about other countries like 
Zimbabwe which had a promising democracy but suddenly succumbed to undemocratic 
tactics including elections which were not free and fair, violence, and other human rights 
violations.  
 
Despite the renewal of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1999 which eventually 
led to the formation of the AU in 2002, political unrest has continued to bedevil some 
countries with the recent famous “Arab Spring” which dethroned some long serving leaders 
in Tunisia and Egypt, and led to the death of Muammar Gadaffi in Libya. Although efforts 
are always made through declarations and treaties and other mechanism such as APRM to 
promote democracy and secure good governance and peace in Africa, implementation is still 
a major hurdle that hampers success.  
 
In this chapter we established the need for constitutionalism and good governance if 
democracy is to prevail worldwide, but in particular on the African Continent. Our 
investigation further established essential elements without which there can be no, or only 
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severely limited, constitutionalism and good governance. We further investigated the state of 
constitutionalism and good governance in selected African jurisdictions.  
 
However, establishing a situation or identifying a lacuna, without offering a solution – or at 
least a way forward in starting to address the problems identified – does not make for good 
law. The following chapters therefore, turn to an examination, analysis, and evaluation of one 
of the most essential elements or “requirements” to ensure the successful pursuit of 
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3.1  Introduction 
In this chapter we examine judicial independence as a cornerstone of good governance and 
constitutionalism. The chapter opens with an analysis of the concept of judicial independence 
as it is used in the contemporary state and this is followed by the identification and 
explanation of the various mechanisms used by different states to safeguard judicial 
independence and its relationship with the concepts of democracy and human rights. 
 
Over years, the concept of judicial independence has evolved throughout the world and today 
is acknowledged by many states as an important mechanism for safeguarding democracy. It 
forms a vital part of some aspects which give meaning to the principle of separation of 
powers, the protection of democracy, and constitutionalism against any contravention by the 
state. Over years, governments, jurists, scholars, commentators, journalists, students and the 
general public have come to appreciate the importance of an independent judiciary in 
realizing democracy. It is through an independent judiciary that the rule of law can be upheld 
in a democratic state; hence it has received “scrutiny” from all spheres of society. 
 
Most contemporary constitutions across the globe contain specific guarantees which seek to 
promote the functional and personal independence of the judiciary. For example, the 
Constitution of Greece provides that – “justice shall be administered by courts composed of 
regular judges who shall enjoy functional and personal independence”.289 Sub-article (2) of 
article 87 indicates that “in the discharge of their duties, judges shall be subject only to the 
constitution and the laws”290 – meaning, according to Pikramenos, that “judges are not 
subject to other state powers or judges of higher ranks”,291 but only to the Constitution and 
the laws of the country. 
 
Matters concerning appointment, salaries, pensions and tenure of judicial officers, among 
other things, are normally included in Constitutions or Acts of Parliament to further 
strengthen and protect the independence of the judiciary in executing its functions. The US 
Agency for International Development Guidance for Promoting Judicial Independence and 
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Impartiality identifies a number of sources from which interference in judicial independence 
may originate: 
 
 “The executive, the legislature, local governments 
 Individual government officials or legislators 
 Political parties 
 Political and economic elites 
 The military, paramilitary and intelligence forces 
 Criminal networks 
 The judicial hierarchy itself.”292 
 
When looked at, these sources, if there are no strong regulatory mechanisms in place, have 
the potential to influence or control the judicial system in the country, hence the importance 
of personal and functional independence of the judiciary to grant judicial officers freedom 
and protection when executing their functions without fear or favour.  
 
Different countries follow different methods; however there is no fixed method prescribed to 
ensure judicial independence. As members of the global community in the modern world, 
states try to meet universal standards for ensuring and safeguarding judicial independence. 
Countries normally borrow from other countries’ constitutions and try to comply with 
international law and treaties emanating from organizations of which they are members, in an 
effort to attain good governance and democracy. 
 
The judicial authority in South Africa as entrenched in the Constitution will be the principal 
guide and will be supported by examples of some other countries’ provisions for ensuring 
judicial independence across the globe. 
 
The term of “a judicial officer” in the wide sense refers to judges, magistrates, lawyers, 
advocates and prosecutors in the field of law. In this work, however, I use the term to refer 
specifically to the judges of the court, although reference will be made to other judicial 
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3.2  Judicial Independence in the Contemporary State 
Judicial independence is a universal notion concerning the judicial branch of government’s 
independence from any sort of interference by, or any influence or functioning from the other 
two branches namely, the executive and the legislature, bolstered by the general conception 
that the judiciary must at all times be effective and impartial in adjudicating cases and 
upholding the rule of law in a given state. The concept of judicial independence is a broad 
term that covers a wide field of constitutional law. It covers, among other things, the process 
of appointment of judicial officers; conducting of independent trials; striking a balance and 
cooperation among the three wings of government; and the promotion and protection of 
human rights and democracy in a state. 
 
The principle of judicial independence seeks to guarantee the autonomy of judicial organs 
when exercising judicial authority in line with established standards (whether international, 
regional or local) and the given law.
293
 Consequently, the fundamental nature of judicial 
independence is to provide judicial organs with a means to “determine right from wrong 







 argues that – “although the phrase is hard to define, the term judicial 
independence embodies the concept that a judge decides cases fairly, impartially and 
according to the facts and law, not according to whim, prejudice or fear, the dictates of the 
legislature or executive or the latest opinion poll”.296 It is the law that must reign supreme and 
which must be applied and interpreted fairly and without fear or favour to every citizen by 
independent judicial officers. The judiciary deals with different cases that affect different 
people from different backgrounds with different status in the society. 
 
Again judicial officers are members of the community who may have certain religious beliefs 
and who belong, or might belong, to a certain political organizations within the society. 
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Nonetheless, they need to rise above their backgrounds and decide cases according to the 
facts and the law. As Stephen Burbank puts it: 
 
“Courts are institutions run by human beings. Human beings are subject to selfish and/or 
venal motives and even moral paragons differ in the quality of their mental faculties and 
in their capacity for judgment and wisdom.”297 
 
It is against this background that the judiciary must be independent and impartial in executing 
its functions and this can be realised by creating an enabling environment for the law of the 
country to take control of the situation and ensure that everyone, from the executive to the 
legislature, and including the judiciary, abide by the law. 
 
The importance of securing judicial independence in a given state has always been regarded 
as vital. However, it was not until the mid 1980s that world countries (under the umbrella of 
United Nations) saw the need to document some general standards that should guide member 
states in realising this notion. During the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention 
of Crime and Treatment of Offenders held at Milan from 26 August to 6 September 1985 and 
endorsed by General Assembly resolutions 40/32 of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 
December 1985, a number of “Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary” were 
adopted.  
 
Twenty Basic Principles were adopted. Among others are the following: 
 
“(1)  The independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined 
in the Constitution or the law of the country. It is the duty of all governmental and 
other institutions to respect and observe the independence of the judiciary. 
(2) The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts 
and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, 
inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any 
quarter or for any reason. 
(3) The judiciary shall have jurisdiction over all issues of a judicial nature and shall 
have exclusive authority to decide whether an issue submitted for its decision is 
within its competence as defined by law. 
(4) There shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial 
process, nor shall judicial decisions by the courts be subject to revision. This 
principle is without prejudice to judicial review or to mitigation or commutation 
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by competent authorities of sentences imposed by the judiciary, in accordance with 
the law. 
(5) Everyone shall have the right to be tried by ordinary courts or tribunals using 
established legal procedures. Tribunals that do not use the duly established 
procedures of the legal process shall not be created to displace the jurisdiction 
belonging to the ordinary courts or judicial tribunals. 
(6) The principle of the independence of the judiciary entitles and requires the judiciary 
to ensure that judicial proceedings are conducted fairly and that the rights of the 
parties are respected. 
(7) It is the duty of each Member State to provide adequate resources to enable the judiciary to 
properly perform its functions.”298 
 
The Congress further declared that: 
 
“Member States have a task of securing and promoting the independence of the judiciary 
and that this should be taken into account and respected by Governments within the 
framework of their national legislation and practice and should be brought to the 
attention of judges, lawyers, members of the executive and the legislature and the public 
in general”.299 
 
As highlighted earlier, the notion of judicial independence complements the notions of 
democracy, constitutionalism, the rule of law and the desire for good governance in a state. 
The 20
th
 century saw the concept of human rights emerging as one of the most important 
issues that a government must prioritise when dealing with its people, with the adoption of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
300
 in 1945, and later the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 




The principle of constitutionalism implies that the government can be taken to court by its 
people for any act of violation, while, conversely, the government may take decisions that 
may appear adverse in the eyes of the public. But what is important in a constitutional and 
democratic state, where the rule of law reigns supreme with an impartial and independent 
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 Article 8 of the UDHR provides that: “everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent 
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law”; 
whereas Article 10 provides that: “everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an 
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judiciary, is that even if courts of law find against the government, court processes and 
judgments will be respected and executed according to the law.  
 
3.3  Different Ways of Ensuring Judicial Independence 
There are many methods that can be used in the securing of the principle of judicial 
independence. In this section a few methods are identified, namely the Constitution and 
legislation; judicial service commissions or councils/boards; courts or tribunals; the process 
of appointment of judicial officers; international law/conventions or documents; and personal 
and functional independence. The appointment process which forms the cornerstone of this 
dissertation is discussed in detail in chapter four.  
 
3.3.1  The Constitution and Legislation 
The notion of judicial independence in the main finds expression in the constitution of a 
country. The constitution can be regarded as the supreme mechanism for safeguarding the 
independence of the judiciary since other mechanisms such as the judicial service councils, 
the appointment process, the role of international law and how it is applied in terms of the 
municipal laws, usually find expression in the constitution through the courts, and by virtue 





The general rule is that the constitution indicates that “the constitution” is the highest law in 
the country.
303
 It makes provision for the separation of powers, a Bill of Rights, the 
functioning of the three wings of government, and more importantly, vests the judicial 
authority in “independent” courts of law.  
 
So we find in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa that the “judicial authority is 
vested in the courts which are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law 
which they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice”.304 It further 
provides for the enactment of legislation by National Parliament to complement the 
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provisions of the Constitution in order ensure an effective and efficient administration of 
justice in the country. Section 180 of the said Constitution indicates that: 
 
“National legislation may provide for any matter concerning the administration of justice 
that is not dealt with in the Constitution including – 
(a) training programmes for judicial officer; 
(b) procedures for dealing with complaints about judicial officers; and 
(c) participation of people other than judicial officer in court decisions.” 
 
 
3.3.2  Judicial Service Commissions or Councils 
Today most countries’ constitutions make provision for the establishment of Judicial Service 
Commissions or Councils/Boards in order to guarantee judicial independence. These bodies 
are usually composed of different people from various backgrounds ‒ such as lawyers, 
politicians and academics‒ charged by the constitution with a responsibility of finding 
appropriately qualified lawyers who are fit and proper to sit on the bench and dispense justice 





More details about the role of judicial service commissions or councils/boards are discussed 
in detail in chapter four which deals with the appointment processes of judicial officers.  
 
3.3.3  Courts or Tribunals 
Traditionally courts and/or tribunals are the custodians of the law in a state. According to the 
Bangalore Code of Judicial Conduct “a competent, independent and impartial judiciary is 
likewise essential if the courts are to fulfill their role in upholding constitutionalism and the 
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rule of law”.306 When there is a dispute, whether among organs of state, between the state and 
its citizens, or among private individuals, the courts generally act as the referee in order to 
find a just solution in line with the laws of the country. 
 
Courts play an important role in shaping society both at national and at international level. 
Section 4 of the Treaty establishing European Economic Community (EEC)
307
 makes 
provision for the establishment of a Court of Justice in Europe. Article 164 of the EEC 
provides that “the Court of Justice shall ensure observance of law and justice in the 
interpretation and application of the treaty”. This indicates that the role of courts is not only 
about the settlement of cases and controversies, but that there is a duty on the courts to ensure 




Shetreet correctly argues that “courts perform an important function of adjudicating and 
reprimanding the parties before the court and on occasion the general public and the social 
and political institutions”.309 Through the judicial decisions they make, he adds, “courts are 
thus able to shape societal ideas and mores, to create laws and to resolve specific disputes 
thereby, contributing towards an ordered society and promoting good governance in a 
state”.310 
 
For all of the above to be possible the courts must be managed by an independent judiciary. 
As managers of courts, judicial officers must at all times be independent and be seen to be 
independent when applying the law. The nature of courts is that they are important 
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 In the complaint by the justices of the Constitutional Court of South Africa to the Judicial Service 
Commission concerning an alleged interference and an attempt to influence two justices of the court in a 
pending case concerning an influential politician of the ruling party by the judge president of the Western 
Cape High Court, the Constitutional Court justices pointed out among other things that “public confidence 
in the integrity of the courts is of crucial importance for our constitutional democracy and may not be 
jeopardised”. (See Hlophe v Constitutional Court of South Africa and Others (08/22932) [2008] ZAGPHC 
289 at par 4.4.) 
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In its consideration of foreign law, the Constitutional Court of South Africa emphasized the 
importance of public confidence in the administration of justice in the De Lange
312
 case as 
the Canadian Supreme Court had pointed out in Valente.
313
 The court argued that: 
 
“Both independence and impartiality are fundamental not only to the capacity to do 
justice in a particular case but also to individual and public confidence in the 
administration of justice. Without that confidence the system cannot command the 
respect and acceptance that are essential to its effectiveness. It is, therefore, important 
that a tribunal should be perceived as independent, as well as impartial, and that the test 
for independence should include that perception”.314 
 
3.3.4  International Law/Conventions or Documents 
There are many international documents or conventions or institutions that promote or strive 
to contribute towards the notion of judicial independence. These include, but are not limited 
to, the following –  
 
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (see articles 8 and 10).315 
 The Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary.316 
 The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Code of Conduct.317 
 The International Commission of Jurists (International Principles on the 
Independence and Accountability of Judges, Lawyers and Prosecutors).
318
 
 Latimer House Principles on the Three Branches of Government.319 
 
Although they are important, it must be emphasized that most of these international and 
regional instruments are not obligatory or binding on individual states. However, they serve 
as guidelines and universally accepted standards that countries are reasonably expected to 
abide by as members of the international community. Today many countries find it to be in 
their best national interest to conduct themselves in line with the contemporary norms of 
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international practice. If individual states reject what is perceived as universal practice they 
normally face isolation or sanctions from the international community. 
 
3.3.5  The Process for the Appointment of Judicial Officers 
The process for appointing judicial officers definitely contributes to the independence of the 
judiciary. For judicial officers to be impartial and independent in applying the law, they must 
be appointed on merit, experience and qualifications. Their appointment should not be 
influenced by any connections or relations they might have with the president or the ruling 
political party or members of judicial service councils or boards.  
 
According to the provisions of the Commonwealth (Latimer House) Principles: 
 
“The appointment process, whether or not involving an appropriately constituted and 
representative judicial services commission, should be designed to guarantee the quality 
and independence of mind of those selected for appointment at all levels of the 
judiciary”.320 
 
As indicated above, this section only serves to identify different mechanisms but the process 
of appointment of judicial officers and the role played by judicial service council’s 
/commissions / boards will be discussed in detail in chapter six below. 
 
3.3.6  Personal Independence 
The idea of personal independence is concerned with the personality and/ or personal security 
of judicial officers in relation to the performance of their functions.
321
  Judicial officers must 
be free and satisfied with their conditions of service. They must be protected against any kind 
of threat, or from any temptation that might seek to divert them from performing their core 
functions in terms of the law and the constitution. 
 
Rautenbach and Malherbe define personal independence as follows: 
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“The personal independence of the judiciary means that the appointment, terms of office 
and conditions of service of judicial officers are not controlled arbitrarily by other 
government bodies”.322 
 
There are various factors which are normally included in constitutions and legislation which 
determine the personal independence of judicial officers: 
 
(i) Appointment  
The appointment process must be transparent and free from any influence whether from the 
executive or legislature or the ruling political party.
323
 The reason for transparency and 
freedom from internal and external influence is to ensure impartiality of judicial officers. A 
transparent and free appointment process guarantees allegiance to the law rather than to 
individuals or certain groups or institutions. 
 
(ii) Removal 
Generally, modern constitutions or Acts of Parliament specifically indicate circumstances 
under which a judicial officer may be removed from office.
324
 This means that a judicial 
officer cannot be removed or dismissed by anyone for any reason that is not provided for in 
the constitution or legislation. This is important in order to ensure that judicial officers do not 









 The process of appointment of judicial officers is dealt with in detail in chapter six below. In some 
instances (for example in developing democracies like South Africa) a judicial service commission is 
established in terms of the provision of the constitution for purposes of eliminating external influences, but 
one finds it criticised for being dominated by politicians or politically connected people who play a major 
role in influencing the outcome of the appointment process. See, discussions in Chapter four below. 
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(iii)  Terms of Office 
Judicial officers are usually appointed for a fixed, non-renewable period. This also 
contributes to independence and impartiality because there will be no need to fear not being 
retained where decisions against some influential executive or legislative members are made. 
Section 176(1) of South Africa’s Constitution provides that a Constitutional Court judge 
holds office for a non-renewable term of twelve years or until he or she attains the age of 70, 
whichever occurs first, except where an Act of Parliament extends such judge’s term of 
office. Subsection (2) of the same section provides that other judges hold office until they are 
discharged from active service in terms of an Act of Parliament. 
 
(iv)  Remuneration 
According to Rosenn, “the underlying policy is to protect judges from financial retribution 
for rendering decisions that displease the legislature or the executive”.326 Remuneration is a 
big issue in any given situation. There is a belief that where judicial officers earn low salaries 
they will be susceptible to bribes and corrupt activities. It is important to offer adequate 
remuneration in order to guard and promote the integrity of the judiciary. The USAID 
Guidance for Promoting Judicial Independence and Impartiality indicates that most judges 
who participated in their study agreed that “respectable salaries are a necessary element of 
judicial independence”.327 In recent years various countries have increased judicial officers’ 
salaries in an effort to strengthen judicial independence in line with various international and 




In South Africa, section 176(3) of the Constitution protects this factor by providing that: “the 
salaries, allowances and benefits of judges may not be reduced”.329 In the Canadian case of 
Valente v The Queen
330
 the court mentioned remuneration as one of the essential conditions 
for judicial independence. It argued that “the essence of such security is that the right to 
salary and pension should be established by law and not be subject to arbitrary interference 
by the executive in a manner that could affect judicial independence”.331 
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 See also the Judges’s Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act No 47 of 2001 which gives a 
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 Id at 162-163. 
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(v) Conditions of Service 
Principle 11 of the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary seeks to create a 
universal standard for better conditions of service for judicial officers by providing that: “the 
term of office of judges, their independence, security, adequate remuneration, conditions of 
service, pensions and the age of retirement shall be adequately secured by the law”. If all the 
above-mentioned aspects are adequately secured it would not be easy for any influential 
person to find a loophole to penetrate or divert the independence of the judiciary and in this 
manner justice cannot be tempered with. 
  
In the case of Mackin v New Brunswick
332
 the Canadian Supreme Court emphasised the 
importance of judicial independence and argued that:  
 
“Emphasis is placed on the existence of an independent status, because not only does a 
court have to be truly independent but it must also be reasonably seen to be independent. 
The independence of the judiciary is essential in maintaining the confidence of litigants 
in the administration of justice. Without this confidence, the Canadian judicial system 
cannot truly claim any legitimacy or command the respect and acceptance that are 
essential to it. In order for such confidence to be established and maintained, it is 
important that the independence of the court be openly ‘communicated’ to the public. 
Consequently, in order for independence in the constitutional sense to exist, a reasonable 
and well-informed person should not only conclude that there is independence in fact, 
but also find that the conditions are present to provide a reasonable perception of 
independence. Only objective legal guarantees are capable of meeting this double 
requirement.”333 
 
The term of office of judges, their independence, security, adequate remuneration, conditions 
of service, pensions and retirement age as provided for by Principle 11 of the UN Basic 
Principles of Judicial Independence, are the objective legal guarantees capable of preserving 
or restoring public confidence in the judicial system, thereby giving it legitimacy and strength 
to dispense justice impartially.  
 
3.3.7  Functional Independence 
The notion of functional independence focuses on the way in which courts as custodians of 
the judicial authority in the state carry out their duties within the framework of the law and 
the constitution. In order to administer justice, courts must not be subject to the executive or 
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the majority in parliament, or the whims of public opinion or media, but only to the law and 





With regard to freedom from executive or legislative interference, the functional 
independence aspect manifests from the court power to review the legality of administrative 
acts and the constitutionality of statutory legislation. Functional independence further 
stretches to freedom from internal influence or interference from within the judiciary itself. 
For instance, although the doctrine of stare decisis
335
 must be respected, it should not be 
misused by higher ranked judicial officers to meddle with the functioning of other officers or 
lower courts. 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada in the case of The Queen in Right of Canada v Beauregard
336
 
described judicial independence as follows – 
 
“Historically, the generally accepted core of the principle of judicial independence has 
been the complete liberty of individual judges to hear and decide cases that come before 
them: no outsider – be it government, pressure group, individual or even another judge – 
should interfere in fact or attempt to interfere, with the way in which a judge conducts his 
or her case and makes his or her decision. This core continues to be central to the 
principle of judicial independence”.337 
 
This Canadian approach to the independence of the judiciary has since been emphasized in 
various cases by the Constitutional Court of South Africa in an effort to clarify and guarantee 
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It is a general standard that judicial officers enjoy immunity against civil actions and the 
offence of contempt of court.
339
 This is another important rule which enhances the 
independence of judicial officers in applying the law without the fear or risk of “being sued 
for defamation every time they express an unfavourable view about a litigant or the 
credibility of a witness during the course of giving a judgment”.340 
 
In the South African case of May v Udwin
341
 the Appellate Division (now Supreme Court of 
Appeal) upheld an appeal against a judgment by a High Court awarding Udwin, an attorney, 
damages and costs in an action he brought against May, a magistrate, for defamation. The 
court held that ‒    
 
“the nature of judicial duties are such that a judicial officer is more often than not active 
in a sphere where the performance of his judicial duties exposes him to the risk of 
injuring a person in his reputation and it is for this very reason that there is according to 
our common law a rebuttable presumption that a judicial officer who defames someone 
in the exercise of his judicial authority does so lawfully within the limits of his 
authority”.342 
 
The court further indicated that “public interest in the due administration of justice requires 
that a judicial officer, in the exercise of his function should be able to speak his mind freely 
without fear of incurring liability for damages of defamation”.343 
 
In Penrice v Dickson the appeal court upheld the immunity privilege of judicial officers when 
acting in official capacity and pointed out that a judicial officer will only be liable for 
damages where there is proof that he had acted in bad faith or proof of an absence of 
reasonable care being insufficient.
344
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 Penrice v Dickson 1945 AD 6 14. 
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As the British court argued in Valente v The Queen, “both independence and impartiality are 
fundamental not only to the capacity to do justice in a particular case but also to individual 
and public confidence in the administration of justice, and without that confidence the system 
cannot command the respect and acceptance that are essential to its effective  operation”.345 
Judicial independence is an essential element of democracy
346
 that needs to be promoted, 
protected and respected at all times by judicial officers themselves, the government, and the 
public in general. 
 
3.4  Judicial Independence in Practice: The Case of South Africa 
3.4.1  South Africa’s Constitution (1996) and the Notion of Judicial 
Independence 
Section 2 of the Constitution declares the Constitution as the supreme law in South Africa and 
nullifies any law or conduct that is not consistent with it. It further affirms that all obligations 
imposed by the Constitution must be fulfilled. Chapter two contains the Bill of Rights. Section 
7(1) provides that the Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa and a duty is 
laid upon the state to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.
347
 The 
judicial authority of the country vests with the courts which are independent and subject only to 





The International Commission of Jurists emphasizes a country’s judicial system as central to 
the protection of human rights and the preservation of the rule of law.
349
 It can be argued that 
an independent judiciary has become a sine qua non for human rights in the modern 
democratic state. During the period in South Africa before 1994, the judiciary functioned at 
the will and whim of the executive and the legislature.
350
 It did not enjoy any independence 
or constitutional guarantees in its functioning.
351
 It was during the apartheid era in South 
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Africa when John Dugard wrote an article on “The judiciary in a state of national crisis” and 
asked a very important question: 
 
“Can judges save a society in which the ruling regime has embarked upon a program 
involving the suppression of basic human rights and the departure from accepted legal 
principles?”352 
 
Interestingly, Dugard highlights many instances not only in South Africa but throughout the 
world, where at some stage the judiciary found itself being influenced or sympathizing with 
the sitting government and compromising the principles of impartiality and the rule of law 
and human rights that must be upheld by the judiciary.
353
 If the judiciary is appointed and/ or 
controlled by the executive branch the principle of checks and balances will be compromised 
as judicial officers will have to prove loyalty to those who appointed them rather than to 
justice and the rule of law. 
  
3.4.2  How does the Concept of Judicial Independence Link to Human 
Rights and Democracy in a State? (For example – the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa declares that the bill of rights is the 
cornerstone of democracy in the country) 
Human rights must be respected, protected and promoted by the government as well as 
private individuals when dealing with one another. There is a huge potential for anarchy in a 
state where human rights are disregarded, or where “simple justice between man and man” 
does not exist.
354
 In the South African context (Constitution, 1996), the concept of “human 
rights” carries with it a number of fundamental rights listed under chapter two.355 
 
Given the country’s history and its system of oppression of the majority under apartheid, 
South Africa has since the dawn of democracy and constitutional order made significant 
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conditions is alleviated people may be tempted to take the law into their own hands in order to escape such 
conditions” (see footnote 379 below at par 2). 
355
 The Bill of Rights mentions a number of fundamental rights, including but not limited to the following – 
equality; human dignity; life; security of the person; privacy; freedom of religion, belief and opinion; 
freedom of expression; freedom of association; assembly, demonstration, picket and petition; political 
rights; citizenship; freedom of movement and residence; freedom of trade, occupation and profession; 
property; housing; environment; healthcare, food, water and social security; education; language and 
culture; cultural, religious and linguistic communities; access to information; just administrative action; 
access to courts; and other rights. 
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progress through the judiciary in trying to strike a balance between the government and its 
citizens amid a number of challenges resulting from the apartheid legacy. According to the 
Institute for Democracy in South Africa:  
 
“The judiciary is essentially developing and re-defining South African jurisprudence and 
therefore playing an important role in the transformation of South Africa into an open 
and inclusive constitutional democracy that guarantees the progressive realization of 
social and economic rights. Viewed in this light, the independence of the judiciary must 
not only be constitutionally protected; it must also capture and maintain the confidence 
of the public it seeks to protect.”356 
 
The notion of judicial independence bestows upon judicial officers a responsibility to protect 
the balance of powers and human rights in a given state. With democracy expanding and 
levels of literacy increasing in the modern world, it is expected that many people will start 
understanding and knowing their rights and freedoms (especially in developing nations). 
Judicial officers might be faced with major challenges or threats that may influence their 
decisions when adjudicating cases if they are not properly trained to uphold the rule of law.
357
 
The subject of judicial independence has evolved and become an interesting topic in the 
contemporary state, which must be understood to instil and strengthen impartiality in judicial 
officers to safeguard the balance of power among the three branches of government and with 
the public.  
 
3.4.3  Judicial officers and the “fit and proper” requirement 
The South African Constitution makes provision for a number of courts as the backbone for 
the country’s judicial system.358 Any person who is to be appointed as a judicial officer in 
                                                          
356
 See footnote 350 above at 3. 
357
 For example a judicial officer can be influenced by his or her religion; political opinion or political 
orientation; media; culture; public opinion; academia; pressure from or his/her relationship with the 
executive or legislature and other factors such as bribes and corruption. See footnote 292 above in which 
Steven Burbank argues that courts are institutions presided over by judicial officials who are not by nature 
different from other human beings who can be prone to bribes or other corrupt activities and moral 
obligations. 
358
 Section 166 illustrates the judicial system that includes the following courts –  
(a)  The Constitutional Court 
(b)  The Supreme Court of Appeal 
(c)  The High Courts, including any high court of appeal that may be established by an Act of Parliament to hear 
appeals from High Courts 
(d)  The Magistrates’ Courts 
(e)  And any other court established or recognised in terms of an Act of Parliament, including any court of a status 
similar either the High Courts or the Magistrates’ Courts. 
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South Africa must be both appropriately qualified and fit and proper.
359
 The term “fit and 
proper” may be interpreted to mean that a judicial officer is independent and impartial, and 
can apply the law without fear, favour or prejudice. Slabbert argues that: 
 
“It is commonly accepted that in order to be ‘fit and proper’ a person must show 
integrity, reliability and honesty as these are the characteristics which could affect the 
relationship between a lawyer and a client and a lawyer and the public”.360 
 
As indicated in the introduction above, the following section shall refer to a “judicial officer” 
in the form of a prosecutor within the South African context in an effort to corroborate the 
relationship between a “fit and proper” person and a judicial officer with the notion of 
judicial independence.
361
 The office of the National Director of Public Prosecution (NDPP), 
like that of a chief justice or any judge, is an integral office of trust, honesty and integrity. 
The same level of impartiality and independence is expected from both offices in order to 
dispense justice and execute their functions without fear, favour or prejudice. 
 
 Chapter 8 of South Africa’s Constitution deals with the administration of justice, and among 
other things makes provision for the establishment of the prosecuting authority,
362
 which in 
terms of national legislation must exercise its functions without fear, favour or prejudice.
363
 
The National Prosecuting Act
364
 regulates the prosecution proceedings as dictated by the 
Constitution. Section 9 (1) of the Act provides that – 
 
“Any person to be appointed as National Director, Deputy Director or Director must – 
                                                          
359
 See section 174(1) of the Constitution; See also section 15(1)(a) of the Attorneys Act 63 of 1979 and 
section 3(1)(a) of the Admission of Advocates Act 74 of 1964 which requires a person to be fit and proper 
in order to practice law in the courts of the Republic. 
360
 Slabbert Magda “The requirement of being a ‘fit and proper’ person for the legal profession” (2011) 14/4 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal at 212. 
361
 Prosecutors are also judicial officers but here reference is made to the South African scenario in order to 
emphasize the importance of the term ‘fit and proper person’ to the perception of judicial independence. 
For example, the former Deputy National Director of Public Prosecutions and later Acting National 
Director of Public Prosecution, Advocate Mokotedi Mphse was later appointed as Acting Judge in the 
North West High Court. This, however drew some criticism from the legal fraternity [the Law Society of 
South Africa (LSSA) and the General Council of the Bar (GCB)], concerning his impartiality as some saw 
his appointment as a reward following his controversial decision to withdraw corruption charges against 
the ANC President Jacob Zuma on the eve of the national elections in 2009 (see http://www.timeslive 
.co.za/local/2010/02/18/radebe-defends-mokotedi-mpshe-appointment“Radebe defends Mokotedi Mpshe 
appointment” (accessed 26/01/2012). 
362
 Section 179. 
363
 Section 179(4). 
364
 National Prosecuting Act 32 of 1998. 
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(b)  be a fit and proper person, with due regard to his or her experience 
conscientiousness and integrity, to be entrusted with the responsibilities of the 
office concerned.” 
 
In the Democratic Alliance v The President of the Republic of South Africa and Others
365
 
case the South African Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the appeal by the Democratic 
Alliance
366
 launched on the questioning of the appointment of the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Menzi Simelane,
367
 in terms of Section 179
368
 of the Constitution read with 
                                                          
365
 Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa and others (263/11) [2011] ZASCA 241 
(1 December 2011). 
366
 The Democratic Alliance is the official opposition party in South Africa. 
367
 Simelane had worked for the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DJCD) as Director-
General. In 2008 the Ginwala Inquiry was launched to establish the fitness of Vusi Pikoli (Simelane’s 
predecessor) to hold office as NDPP after he had been suspended by the President. Simelane, as the 
accounting officer of the DJCD, was called by the Commission to give evidence in the inquiry into Pikoli. 
Simelane he was found to have given misleading and untruthful evidence, therefore unreasonable, hence 
the DA’s later argument that he was not a fit and proper person to hold office as NDPP. (See “Report of 
Enquiry into NDPP: Report of the Enquiry into the Fitness of Advocate VP Pikoli to hold the Office of 
National Director of Public Prosecutions” November 2008 available at www.justice.gov.za 
/commissions/2008_ginwala.pdf.) 
 On 9 December 2008 the then Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development (MJCD) issued a 
statement indicating that the Ginwala Inquiry had made certain findings about Simelane – that his conduct 
was highly irregular and that as a result of these findings he (the Minister) regarded the findings as “very 
serious in light of the constitutional imperatives contained in Section 195 which include a high standard of 
professional ethics, accountability and transparency” (see http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2008 
/08122315451004.htm).He then requested the Public Service Commission (PSC) to carry out an 
investigation into the conduct of Simelane during the Ginwala Inquiry. The PSC found Simelane to have, 
among other things, misrepresented facts, failed to disclose information and certain documents to the 
Ginwala Inquiry, and recommended to the MJCD that disciplinary action may be taken against him (see 
letter titled “Investigation into the Conduct of the Director-General of the Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development during the Ginwala Enquiry”, faxed to then MJCD Enver Surty by the 
Chairperson of the PSC dated 6 April 2009). 
368
 Section 179 of the Constitution provides as follows –  
(1) There is a single national prosecuting authority in the Republic, structured in terms of an Act of Parliament, and 
consisting of –  
(a) a National Director of Public Prosecutions, who is the head of the prosecuting authority, and is appointed 
by the President, as head of the National executive; and 
(b) Directors of Public Prosecutions and Prosecutors as determined by an Act of Parliament. 
(2) The prosecuting authority has the power to institute criminal proceedings on behalf of the state, and to carry out 
any necessary functions incidental to instituting criminal proceedings. 
(3) National legislation must ensure that the Directors of Public Prosecutions – 
(a) are appropriately qualified; and 
(b) are responsible for prosecutions in specific jurisdictions, subject to subsection (5). 
(4) National legislation must ensure that the prosecuting authority exercises its functions without fear, favour or 
prejudice. 
(5) The National Director of Public Prosecutions –  
(a) must determine, with the concurrence of the Cabinet member responsible for the administration of justice, 
and after consulting the Directors of Public Prosecutions, prosecution policy, which must be observed in 
the prosecution process; 
(b) must issue policy directives which must be observed in the prosecution process 
(c) may intervene in the prosecution process when policy directives are not complied with; and 
(d) may review a decision to prosecute or not to prosecute, after consulting the relevant Director of Public 
Prosecutions and after taking representations within a period specified by the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions, from the following: 
(i) The accused person. 
(ii) The complainant. 







 of the National Prosecuting Act by President Jacob Zuma in 
November 2009. 
 
The question before the appeal court was whether President Zuma had complied with the 
prescripts of the Constitution and Section 9(1)(b) of the National Prosecuting Act (see footnote 
51) in his appointment of Simelane as the National Director of Public Prosecutions.
371
 The 
court ruled as follows: 
 
“It is declared that the decision of the President of the Republic of South Africa, the First 
Respondent, taken on or about Wednesday 25 November 2009, purportedly in terms of 
section 179 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (the Constitution), read 
with sections 9 and 10 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 to appoint 
Mr Menzi Simelane, the Fourth Respondent, as the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions (the appointment), is inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid”.372 
 
It is expected of a fit and proper person to, at all times, stand firm in principle when applying 





Section 172(2) of the Constitution provides that: 
 
(a) The Supreme Court of Appeal, a High Court or a court of similar status may make 
an order concerning the constitutional validity of an Act of Parliament, a 
provincial Act or any conduct of the President, but an order of constitutional 
invalidity has no force unless it is confirmed by the Constitutional Court. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(6) The Cabinet member responsible for the administration of justice must exercise final responsibility over the 
prosecuting authority. 
(7) All other matters concerning the prosecuting authority must be determined by national legislation. 
369
 Section 9 of the National Prosecuting Act provides –  
(1) Any person to be appointed as National Director, Deputy National Director or Director must –  
(a) possess legal qualifications that would entitle him or her to practise in all courts in the Republic; and 
(b) be a fit and proper person, with due regard to his or her experience, conscientiousness and integrity, to be 
entrusted with the responsibilities of the office concerned. 
(2) Any person to be appointed as the National Director must be a South African citizen. 
370
 Section 10 of the Act provides that the “the President must in accordance with Section 179 of the 
Constitution appoint the National Director”.  
371 Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa and others (263/11) [2011] ZASCA 241 at 
par 1. 
372
 Id at par 124. However, the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) had to be confirmed by the 
CC in line with section 167(5) of the Constitution which provides that: “the Constitutional Court makes the 
final decision whether an Act of Parliament, a provincial Act or conduct of the President is constitutional, 
and must confirm any order of invalidity made by the Supreme Court of Appeal, a High Court, or a court 
of similar status, before that order has any force”. 
373




(b) A court which makes an order of constitutional invalidity may grant a temporary 
interdict or other temporary relief to a party, or may adjourn the proceedings, 
pending a decision of the Constitutional Court on the validity of that Act or 
conduct. 
 
The Democratic Alliance applied to the Constitutional Court for confirmation of the order of 
the Supreme Court of Appeal, while the Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development 
and Simelane (NDPP) appealed against the judgment and order of the SCA. The 
Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the declaration by the SCA that the 




The court questioned the Minister’s action for ignoring the findings of the Ginwala 
Commission and the recommendations of the Public Service Commission on the conduct of 
Simelane.
375
 The court further held that:  
 
“the difficulties concerning Mr Simelane’s evidence that appear from a study of the 
records of the Ginwala Commission were and remain highly relevant to Mr Simelane’s 
credibility, honesty, integrity and conscientiousness. The Minister’s advice to the 
President to ignore these matters and to appoint Mr Simelane without more was 
unfortunate. The material was relevant. The President’s decision to ignore it was of a 
kind that coloured the rationality of the entire process, and thus rendered the ultimate 
decision irrational.”376 
 
3.4.4  The nexus between the notion of judicial independence and human 
rights and democracy: A South African Constitutional perspective 
Justice Moseneke points out that “the South African Constitution designates the judiciary and 
in particular the Constitutional Court as the prime upholder and enforcer of the 
Constitution”.377 Since its establishment the South African Constitutional Court has never 
disappointed but stood firm in promoting and protecting the rule of law, constitutional 
supremacy and human rights in the country.
378
 The court has since its inception dealt with 
                                                          
374 Democratic Alliance v President of South Africa and Others (CCT 122/11) [2012] ZACC 24 at par 95. 
375
 At par 85.   
376
 At par 86. 
377
 See n 373 above. 
378
 Justice Moseneke also argues that it is through “a robust and supreme constitution” in which the 
government can grow stronger as well as have stability in the eyes of its people, and whereas, “institutional 
arrangements such as the separation of powers, checks and balances and individual civil, political and 
justiciable socioeconomic rights make the government more responsible, more consistent, more predictable 
more just, more caring, more responsive and more legitimate in the eyes of the citizenry”, if the judiciary is 
vigilant, independent and functions in consistence with the rule of law and the Constitution. (Ibid.) 
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many landmark cases that proved its commitment to the Constitution and the rule of law in 
the country. It has made rulings without fear, favour or prejudice against the public or 
government but according to the facts and the law and in the spirit of the Constitution. 
 
In an effort to answer the question tabled above, ie how does the concept of judicial 
independence link to human rights and democracy in a state? (and the provisions of section 
7(1) which provides that the Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa), 
two cases by the Constitutional Court – the Government of the RSA v Grootboom which shall 
later be referred to as Grootboom and S v Makwanyane which shall later be referred to as 





The Grootboom case involved the enforcement of socio-economic rights in terms of the 
Constitution of South Africa. Irene Grootboom and members of her community (390 adults 
and 510 children) were evicted from their dwellings and left without shelter in the cold and 
wet Cape winter. They applied to the High Court for an order court “directing the First 
Respondent, the local authority or one or more of the respondents,
380
 to provide adequate 
basic temporary shelter or housing for them and their children pending their obtaining 
permanent accommodation, and also to provide them with adequate and sufficient basic 
nutrition, shelter, health and care services and social services to all their children”.381 
 
                                                          
379
 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169. 
 Mrs Grootboom together with other people (about 390 adults and 510 children) lived in an informal 
squatter settlement called Wallecedene in the Western Cape. They had no water, sewage or refuse removal 
services and the area was partly waterlogged and lies dangerously close to a main public road. Most people 
in this area had applied for subsidized low-cost housing from the municipality and had been on the waiting 
list for about seven years, however it appeared that it was going to be a long wait and their conditions of 
living were continuously deteriorating. In September 1998 they moved to a vacant land that was privately 
owned and had been earmarked for low cost housing and put up their shacks and shelters. The land was 
unlawfully occupied as the occupants did not have the consent of the owner. In March 1999 the magistrate 
ordered that the occupants vacate the property and authorised the sheriff to evict, dismantle and remove 
any structure remaining on the property by the 19
th
 of May 1999. The municipality was ordered to identify 
alternative land for the permanent or temporary occupation of these residents. By the 18
th
 of May 1999 the 
municipality had not provided an alternative place as ordered by the magistrate and the residents were 
forcibly evicted. Their homes were bulldozed and burnt and their possessions destroyed as many of them 
were not present and could not salvage their personal belongings. 
380
 The respondents were the Oostenberg Municipality, Cape Metropolitan Council, Western Cape Provincial 
and the Government of the Republic of South Africa.  
381
 Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality and Others 2000 (3) BCLR 277 (C) Editors’ summary at par A. 
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 of the Constitution to justify their submission that the 
respondents had a duty to provide them and their children with basic shelter. They argued that 
“the right of access to adequate housing had to be interpreted to include a minimum core 
entitlement to shelter and that there was a minimum core obligation resting upon every State 
party to ensure the satisfaction of minimum essential levels of each of the rights recognized 
by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”.384 
 
As to whether socio-economic rights are justiciable, Justice Yacoob pointed that they are 
expressly included in the Bill of Rights and that section 7(2) of the Constitution binds the 
state to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights as provided in chapter 2, and therefore 
the question is not whether they are justiciable, but how to enforce them in a given case.
385
 
However, he advised, it would be wise to deal carefully with each case as it arises because 
different factors may also come into play. The state does not have unlimited resources, it also 
needs to be protected by the law against unfair or unreasonable demands by members of the 




The CC held that all the rights in the Bill of Rights are inter-related and mutually 
supportive.
387
 They complement one another, for example, the rights to human dignity will be 
denied if people do not have food, clothing or shelter.
388
 Socio-economic rights for all people 
therefore enable them to enjoy the other rights enshrined in chapter 2.
389
 The realisation of 
socio-economic rights also contributes to the advancement of race and gender equality and 
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 Section 26 provides as follows: 
(1) Everyone has a right to have access to adequate housing. 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources to achieve the 
progressive realization of this right. 
(3) No one may be evicted from their home or have their home demolished without an order of court made after 
considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions. 
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 Section 28(1)(c) provides that every child has the right “to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care 
services and social services”. 
384
 See footnote 381 above at par D. 
385
 See footnote 379 above at par 20. 
386
 In terms of section 36(1) of the Constitution – the rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms 
of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors 
including – 
(a) The nature of the right; 
(b) The importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) The nature and extent of the limitation 
(d) The relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) Less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
387







the evolution of a society in which men and women are equally able to achieve their full 
potential.
390
 Respect for human rights is a recipe for successful democracy and makes it 





This case dealt with the constitutionality of the death penalty in South Africa’s new 
constitutional order. 
 
Two accused persons were convicted in the High Court on four counts of murder, one count 
of attempted murder and one count of robbery with aggravating circumstances.
392
 They were 
given death sentences by the High Court on each of the counts of murder, and long-term 
imprisonment on the other counts.
393
 They appealed against both the convictions and 
sentences to the Appellate Division (now Supreme Court of Appeal) which dismissed the 
conviction appeal and confirmed that the circumstances of the murders were such that the 




In terms of section 277(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act
395
 (CPA) the death penalty was 
an appropriate sentence for the crime of murder. At this time the Interim Constitution (1993) 
(IC) was in force, however, it was not in force during the trial in the High Court. Now the 
Appellate Division had to take into account the provisions of the Constitution of South Africa 
(IC). On appeal, the question was whether the provisions of section 277(1)(a) of the CPA 
were consistent the Constitution.
396
 Counsel for the accused argued that the section 




 of the Constitution (IC). 
 
The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal against the sentences on the counts of attempted 
murder and robbery and referred the matter to the Constitutional Court (CC), but postponed 
the further hearing of the appeals against the death sentences until the constitutional issues 




 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (6) BCLR 665. 
392






 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
396
 Paragraph 2. 
397
 Section 9 of the Interim Constitution provided that: “every person shall have the right to life”. 
398
 Section 11(2) provided that – “no person shall be subject to torture of any kind, whether physical, mental 
or emotional, nor shall any person be subject to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”.  
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had been dealt with by the CC.
399
 Chaskalson P identified two issues that were raised, 
namely, the constitutionality of section 277(1)(a) of the CPA, and the implications of section 
241(8)
400
 of the IC.
401
 Also, the court acknowledged the provisions of section 102(6)
402
 of the 




The CC was required to determine the constitutionality of the death penalty. The court 
argued, among other things, that the dawn of democracy and the new constitutional order 
brought a radical change in South Africa. The new order provided a future for everyone that 
is founded on human rights, democracy and supremacy of the law.
404
 The court made 
references and comparisons to and with both international and foreign law and authorities for 




On the view of the public’s opinion with regard to the death penalty, Chaskalson P raised a 
progressive argument which proves the independence and commitment of the judiciary to the 
Constitution and the rule of law. He acknowledged that, the majority of South Africans feel 
that the death penalty should be imposed in extreme cases of murder, but argued that 
“although public opinion may have some relevance, but in itself, it is no substitute for the 
duty vested in the courts to interpret the Constitution and to uphold its provisions without fear 
or favour”.406 Most importantly, “if public opinion were to be decisive there would be no 
need for constitutional adjudication”, he continued.407 
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 Paragraph 3. 
400
 Section 241(8) provided that: 
“All proceedings which immediately before the commencement of this Constitution were pending before any 
court of law, including any tribunal or reviewing authority established by or under law, exercising jurisdiction in 
accordance with the law then in force, shall be dealt with as if this Constitution had not been passed: Provided 
that if an appeal in such proceedings is noted or review proceedings with regard thereto are instituted after such 
commencement such proceedings shall be brought before the court having jurisdiction under this Constitution.” 
401
 Paragraph 3. 
402
 Section 102(6) provided that: “If it is necessary for the purposes of disposing of the said appeal for the 
constitutional issue to be decided, the Appellate Division shall refer such issue to the Constitutional Court 
for its decision”. 
403
 Paragraph 3. 
404
 Paragraph 7. 
405
 For example, Chaskalson P considered examples from countries such as Canada, US, Germany, India, 
Hungary, Zimbabwe, Jamaica, Tanzania and others; and other authorities such as the UN Human Rights 
Commission, the European Court of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and so on, in an effort to strike the balance and arrive at a just decision in accordance with South 
Africa’s new constitutional provisions. 
406





Indeed if judicial officers were dictated to by public opinion or government officials what 
would be role of the law and the Constitution? It is this character, knowledge and 
understanding of the notion of judicial independence and the principle of separation of 
powers which enables judges to make rational judgments and uphold the rule of law in the 
country. 
 
Human rights form a part of democratic processes that can only be possible through an 
independent judiciary. The court is the custodian of human rights and has a duty at all times 
to strike the balance between the majority and minority through the law. In the words of 
Chaskalson P: “the very reason for establishing the new legal order and for vesting the power 
of judicial review of all legislation in the courts was to protect the rights of minorities and 
others who cannot protect their rights adequately through the democratic process”.408 
 
The court found the death penalty to be in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution and 
declared it unconstitutional and referred the case back to the Appellate Division for a lawful 
sentence.
409
 All the other justices
410
 of the CC concurred with Chaskalson P judgment 
regarding his conclusion, reasons and the proposed order. 
 
The Grootboom and Makwanyane cases are two of the most important cases regarding, 
among other things, principles of South African law and matters of interpretation of the 
Constitution that the CC has ruled upon since its inception and which have highlighted the 
importance of the new constitutional order in the new democratic South Africa. The cases 
demonstrate the role of the courts and the independence of the judiciary in applying and 
interpreting the laws of the new Republic as compared to the apartheid era.
411
 Dugard points 
out that there have been remarkable situations in which South African courts gave preference 





The CC also clarifies through its judgments that no one is above the law and that at all times 
the law must reign supreme. In Grootboom Justice Yacoob pointed out that the Constitution 




 Paragraph 151. 
410
 The other justices were Ackermann, Didcott, Kentridge, Kriegler, Langa, Madala, Mahomed, Mokgoro, 
O’Regan and Sachs. 
411





places certain obligations on both the state and the public, and it is the duty of courts to 




3.5  South Africa’s Judicial History under Apartheid Rule and the 
Judicial Triumph and Challenges since the Start of a New 
Democratic and Constitutional Order 
South Africa has since 1994 made some progress in terms of how the judiciary dispenses 
justice to the people as compared to the apartheid era. Certainly, the dawn of democracy and 
a new constitutional order has changed the mindset of the public (especially the black 
majority) and restored confidence in the judiciary that was fading under the apartheid 
government.
414
 As pointed out by Dugard: 
 
“From 1960 to 1982 the Appellate Division was presided over by Chief Justices who 
were politically sympathetic to the Government. Judge Presidents of this period were 
likewise inclined. Although there was some questioning of judicial behavior from 
academic quarters during this period, most judges seemed to be impervious to criticism 
and convinced that the policy of abstention or support for the executive was juridically 
sound.”415 
 
He further explains that the reputation of courts and the judicial process in South Africa had 
deteriorated by 1982 as the black majority had lost confidence in it because of its support for 
the executive’s racial policies and the fact that it had become a subject of criticism to 
academics and legal activists.
416
 However, as was highlighted above through the Grootboom 
and Makwanyane cases, the new constitutional order has since brought about a huge 
difference in South Africa’s legal and political spheres. 
 
Beside the judicial triumphs that South Africa has witnessed during the past seventeen years 
of constitutional order, lately there have been challenges that pose a threat to the future of the 
judicial process in the country. This is the result of some of the ruling political party, the 
African National Congress (ANC) senior leaders who have made comments and allegations 
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 See footnote 379 above at par 20. 
414
 See the discussions of Grootboom and Makwanyane above. 
415
 See footnote 352 above at 487; see also Dugard footnote 411 above at 263 where he argues that: “Our 
judiciary has a reputation for independence from the executive but, as in many Western societies, the 
judiciary has often been accused of leaning too heavily in favour of the executive”. 
416
 See Dugard footnote 352 above at 492. 
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labeling the judiciary in public gatherings or through the media platforms as “counter-
revolutionary”.417 
 
Arguably, South Africa’s history of a judiciary with a “damaged reputation” is not far-
fetched, as is highlighted above during the apartheid rule, hence the fear that the comments 
made by senior and influential members of the “powerful” ruling party pose some threat as to 




3.6  Conclusion 
The notion of judicial independence in the contemporary world has become an important 
mechanism in which modern states hope for in order to achieve democracy, 
constitutionalism, and realising the principle of separation of powers as well as upholding the 
rule of law. The concepts of judicial independence, democracy, separation of powers, 
constitutionalism and the rule of law are interrelated. They balance each other and secure the 
well-being of the people, preserve peace, and national unity, and provide an effective, 
efficient, transparent, accountable and coherent government in any given state. 
 
The above mentioned mechanisms, ie the constitution; judicial service councils / boards / 
commissions; courts or tribunals; the process of appointment; and international law / 
conventions or institutions need to be protected and promoted by governments in order to 
safeguard the principle of judicial independence and render the judiciary impartial. Also, it is 
important for judicial officers to preserve their honour and integrity in the eyes of the public 
to restore public confidence in the system, by applying the law fairly and without fear or 
favour. A judicial system that is controlled or influenced by the other branches of government 
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 See Times Live article of 11 September  2011 titled “Apartheid returns via the back door”, where the 
former ANC Youth League President  and then influential Malema was quoted saying that the judiciary 
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cannot be effective or efficient in carrying out its mandate, while, on the other hand, it can be 
a threat to justice, the law and good governance.
419
 After all, judicial independence is a 
necessity for good governance and democracy. 
 
  
                                                          
419
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4.1  Introduction 
As indicated in chapter three above, judicial independence has emerged as a crucial 
component in the field of constitutional law which contributes massively in shaping 
democracies and also serves to uphold the doctrine of separation of powers in the modern 
state.420 In chapter 3 we examined the concept of judicial independence from a theoretical 
point of view, identified its two manifestations as personal and functional independence, and 
identified the different ways in which it is protected in the modern state. In this chapter, the 
final substantive chapter in the study, we turn to a practical examination of the protection of 
judicial independence in the African jurisdictions selected for study. This is done through an 
analysis of the appointment process in each of the jurisdictions, and a study of the relevant 
case law which come to us from the courts. 
 
Over the years, the notion of judicial independence has evolved and received considerable 
attention from scholars, lawyers, politicians and members of the public in general in 
evaluating its role in promoting and protecting democracy and good governance in any given 
state.421 
 
The big question, thus, is the way in which judicial officers are selected. This is an important 
issue that contributes to the good governance of the country. A mere qualification in law does 
not automatically qualify a person for judicial office. Wiener correctly argues that judicial 
officers should be selected from senior officers “who are deemed best qualified by reason of 
maturity, temperament, training and experience to perform judicial functions”.422 There 
appears to be a general understanding throughout the world about the sensitive nature of the 
principle of judicial independence and the importance of a process that is transparent and free 
from political influence in selecting judicial officers.423 Although the judiciary must be 
independent, it is important to always keep in mind that, together with the other two branches 
of government (the executive and the legislature), it completes what in the end is called “the 
government”.  
                                                          
420 Vanberg Georg The politics of constitutional review in Germany (2005) at 1. 
421 Morton Frederick Lee Law, politics and the judicial process in Canada (2002) at 217. See also Uitz Renáta 
Constitutions, courts, and history: Historical narratives in constitutional adjudication (2005) at 41. 
422 Wiener Frederick Bernays “The army’s field judiciary system: A notable advance” (1960) 46 American 
Bar Association Journal at 1182. 
423 Throup David and Hornsby Charles Multi-party politics in Kenya: The Kenyatta and Moi States and the 
triumph of the system in the 1992 election (1998) at 101. 
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The three branches of government are different and independent from each other, but in 
principle should be interdependent, interrelate and co-operate to secure the well-being and 
good governance of the country. In the Kenyan case of Otieno Clifford Richard v Republic 
the court argued that “… there cannot be strict separation of powers and that there must be 
interaction between all arms of government …”.424 This also manifested in In re: 
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa when the Constitutional 
Court held that: 
 
“There is, however, no universal model of separation of powers, and in democratic 
systems of government in which checks and balances result in the imposition of restraints 
by one branch of government upon another, there is no separation that is absolute … . 
 
The principle of separation of powers, on the one hand, recognizes the functional 
independence of branches of government. On the other hand, the principle of checks and 
balances focuses on the desirability of ensuring that the constitutional order, as a totality, 
prevents the branches of government from usurping power from one another. In this 
sense it anticipates the necessary or unavoidable intrusion of one branch on the terrain of 
another. No constitutional scheme can reflect a complete separation of powers: the 
scheme is always one of partial separation. In Justice Frankfurter’s words, ‘[t]he areas 
are partly interacting, not wholly disjointed’.”425 
 
Countries use different methods of selection in an effort to secure judicial independence and 
preserve confidence in the judiciary.
426
 Henry Abraham points out that the “practices of 
selection differ in large measure in accordance with the traditions and needs of the country 
concerned”.427 He points to two basic methods of selecting judicial officers that are used by 




This chapter focuses on the constitutions of the four respective countries and examines the 
clauses that deal with the appointment of judges. The role played by the presidents, 
parliament and judicial service commissions/councils in the appointment process is explained 
in details. The argument is that the way in which judges are appointed has or may have an 
impact on way in which judges dispense justice. The chapter critically describes, analyzes, 
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and compares this process of appointment starting with Swaziland, Kenya, Zimbabwe and 
South Africa sequentially.  
 
4.2 The Judiciary and the Selection Process of Judicial Officers in 
Swaziland 
4.2.1 The Constitution and Judicial Authority in Swaziland 
In 2005 King Mswati III approved a new Constitution for Swaziland which came into effect 
in February 2006.
429
 Section 1(1) of the Constitution declares the country a sovereign and 
democratic kingdom.
430
 Section 2(1) makes it clear that the Constitution is the supreme law 
of Swaziland and invalidates any law which might be in conflict with the Constitution and 
further places a duty on the King and iNgwenyama, as well as all the citizens of Swaziland, 
in terms of subsection (2), always to uphold and defend the Constitution. 
 
Chapter VIII makes provision for the judicature. The judicial authority of the Kingdom of 
Swaziland is vested in the Judiciary.
431
 The Constitution defends the independence of the 
judiciary which is subject only to the Constitution. The independence of the judiciary of 
Swaziland is entrenched in section 141 of the Constitution which provides as follows: 
 
(1) “In the exercise of judicial power of Swaziland, the Judiciary, in both its judicial 
and administrative functions, including financial administration shall be 
independent and subject only to this Constitution and shall not be subject to the 
control or direction of any person or authority. 
(2) Neither the Crown nor Parliament nor any person acting under the authority of the 
Crown or Parliament nor any person whatsoever shall interfere with judges or 
judicial officers, or other persons exercising judicial power, in the exercise of their 
judicial functions. 
(3) All organs or agencies of the Crown shall give to the courts such assistance as the 
courts may reasonably require to protect the independence, dignity and 
effectiveness of the courts under this Constitution. 
(4)  A judge of a superior court or any person exercising judicial power is not liable to 
any action or suit for any act or omission by that judge or person in the exercise of 
judicial power. 
                                                          
429
 See http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2841.htm under the heading “Government and Political Conditions” 
(accessed 14/11/2011). 
430
 The Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland, 2005. 
431
 Section 140(1). 
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(5) The administrative expenses of the judiciary, including all salaries, allowances, 
gratuities and pensions payable to or in respect of persons serving in the judiciary 
shall be charged on the Consolidated Fund. 
(6) The salary, allowances, privileges and rights in respect of leave of absence, 
gratuity, pension and other conditions of service of a judge of a superior court or 
any judicial officer or other person exercising judicial power, shall not be varied to 
the disadvantage of that judge or judicial officer or other person. 
(7) The Judiciary shall keep its own finances and administer its own affairs, and may 
deal directly with the Ministry responsible for finance or any other person in 
relation to its finances or affairs.” 
 
The history of Swaziland indicates the dominance of the Monarch over the principles of 
democracy and constitutionalism. For example, in their research, Joubert, Masilela and 
Langwenya point out that:  
 
“The influence of the Monarch on the functioning of the state has led to numerous 
instances of undue influences on the various arms of government, most notably the 
Judiciary and the Parliament where traditional interests gloved by the name of the King 
have subverted justice and development and compounded and escalated corruption as 
well as significantly weakening institutions of government. For instance, in Parliament it 
is common for members not to debate matters that may be perceived to touch on the 
interests and authority of the King.”432 
 
Clearly, there is no way democracy can flourish in a state like Swaziland where the King 
freely intervenes in every sphere of government (executive, legislative and judicial) and 
judges are ordered by the Attorney General and heads of security forces not to adjudicate on 
matters in which the King is involved.
433
 It is, among other things, for this reason that judicial 
independence is encouraged in the modern state in order to ensure that the rule of law reigns 




Like every state in the world striving to balance government authority, section 141 of 
Swaziland Constitution strives to protect and promote the independence of the judiciary in 
that country in line with the general standards advocated by the majority of members of the 
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 Joubert P, Masilela Z and Langwenya M (2008) “Consolidating democratic governance in the SADC 
Region: Swaziland” EISA Research Report no 38 at 28, available at http://www.eisa.org.za/PDF/rr38.pdf. 
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international community. An independent judiciary symbolizes a desire to promote and 
achieve good governance, the rule of law, and the progressive development of the society.
435
 
The nature of a constitution in the modern state is that it serves as a guarantor in ensuring that 
no one interferes with the functioning of the courts and that judicial officers are not 




However, in the case of Swaziland it should be noted that the Kingdom has struggled to 
embrace the idea of promoting and protecting judicial independence.
437
 Although some 
people hoped that the new Constitution would bring about change, others warned that it left 
too much political power in the hands of the Monarch and this is evident today in the current 
judicial crisis rocking Swaziland.
438
 In his comments on the draft Constitution, Maroleng 
presaged the King’s absolute powers and responsibilities including the appointment of the 
prime minister, the cabinet, chiefs and judges, as well as his power to approve bills before 
they are passed into law by Parliament.
439
 The power wielded by the Monarch does not 
promote democracy and defeats the object of separation of powers that seeks to balance 
government powers in the contemporary state. 
 
4.2.2 The Appointment of Judicial Officers under the Swazi Constitution 
Langwenya emphasizes that “the process of judicial appointments is a key factor in 
determining the independence of the judiciary”.440 Judicial independence is universally 
categorized and accepted as one of the foremost mechanisms that promote and protect 




The Kingdom of Swaziland follows the appointment method for the selection of its judicial 
officers. The process is catered for under chapter VIII, Part 3 (Appointment, removal, etc of 
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Superior Court Justices) and Part 4 (Judicial Service Commission) of the Constitution. 
section 153 provides as follows: 
 
“(1)  The Chief Justice and the other Justices of the superior courts – shall be appointed 
by the King on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission.  
(1) Where the office of the Chief Justice is vacant, or where the Chief Justice is for 
any reason unable to perform the functions of the office – 
(a) until a person has been appointed to, and has assumed the functions of, that 
office; or 
(b) until the person holding the office of Chief Justice has resumed the 
functions of that office, as the case may be, 
those functions shall be performed by the most senior of the Justices of the 
Supreme Court. 
(2) Where it appears to the Chief Justice that for a short duration the prescribed 
complement of the Supreme Court or High Court, as the case may be, is for any 
reason unlikely to be realized or where the exigencies of the situation so require, 
the Chief Justice shall advise the King to appoint a qualified person to act in that 
court for that duration. 
(3) Whether in respect of the office of the Chief Justice or Office of any justice of the 
superior courts, an acting appointment shall not exceed a single renewable period 
of three months. 
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (3) and (4), the Chief Justice after 
consultations with the Judicial Service Commission may make an acting 
appointment where the duration does not exceed one month, unrenewable. 
(5) A person whose appointment to act as a Justice of a superior court has expired 
may, with the consent of the King acting on the advice of the Chief Justice or the 
Chief Justice after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission, continue to 
act for such a period not exceeding three months as may be necessary to enable 
that person to deliver judgment or to do any other thing in relation to proceedings 
that were commenced before that person previously to the expiry of the acting 
appointment. 
The Chief Justice acts as head of judiciary.”442 
 
As provided in the Constitution, the King cannot appoint judicial officers at his own will but 
acts in his authority as Head of State and must do so within the ambit of the Constitution.
443
 
He is obliged to follow the precepts of section 4(4) which provides: “the King and 
iNgwenyama has such rights, prerogatives and obligations as are conferred on him by this 
Constitution or any other law, including Swazi law and custom, and shall exercise those 
rights, prerogatives and obligations in terms and in the spirit of this Constitution”.  
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The Constitution dictates that any person to be appointed as a judicial officer in Swaziland 
must be a person of high moral character and integrity.
444
 Such person must also have 
sufficient experience as a legal practitioner, barrister or advocate for a certain number of 
years depending on the position or the court (whether in the Supreme Court or in the High 
Court) to which he/she is to be appointed.
445
 Further, such person must have practised law in 




Although the King appoints judicial officers in his capacity as Head of State, it could be 
argued that the wording of section 153 (1) “… shall be appointed by the King on the advice 
of …” is problematic in that the King is not bound to take the decision of appointing justices 
of courts “with” the JSC. He merely acts on the JSC’s advice. This renders the JSC 




4.2.3  The Judicial Service Commission (JSC) in Swaziland 
The purpose of a judicial service commission/council/board in the contemporary state is to 
ensure a fair and transparent way of appointing judicial officers and to exclude any possible 
interference in the appointment process by influential people, including the executive or 
members of parliament. Section 159 of the Swazi Constitution establishes a judicial service 
commission for Swaziland. The Swaziland JSC cannot be an exception; as in other countries, 
it was presumably established to contribute to a transparent process of appointment of judges 




The composition of a judicial service commission should represent a commitment to an 
independent judiciary. Such composition must reflect that the members themselves are free 
from political influence that might seek to sway the object of a judicial service 
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 If, for instance, the head of the executive is given powers to 
appoint the majority of members of the JSC, the likelihood is that its independence will be 
compromised thereby defeating the purpose of the JSC. 
 
Although the Constitution provides for an independent JSC in Swaziland,
450
 in practical 
terms the King is afforded the power to appoint all members of the JSC. Section 159(2) of the 
Swazi Constitution provides as follows:  
 
“The Commission shall consist of the following – 
(a) The Chief Justice who, shall be the Chairman; 
(b) Two legal practitioners of no less than seven years practice and in good 
professional standing to be appointed by the King; 
(c) The Chairman of the Civil Service Commission; and 
(d) Two persons appointed by the King.” 
 
The JSC is further protected by section 159(3) which provide that: “in the exercise of its 
functions under this Constitution, the commission or member of the commission shall not be 
subject to the direction or control of any person or authority”. It is clear that, through the 
provisions of section 159(1) and (3), the Constitution seek to protect the independence of the 
JSC, with the King appointing all the members constituting the JSC, its independence is 
compromised.
451
 The power of the King to appoint all members of the JSC gives him indirect 
influence over the JSC which runs counter to the object of its existence.  
 
The functions of the judicial service commission are clearly articulated in section 160 of the 
Constitution which provides that:  
 
“(1)  Subject to any other powers or general functions conferred on a service 
commission in terms of this Constitution, the judicial service commission shall 
among other things perform the following functions – 
(a) Advise the King in the exercise of the power to appoint persons to hold or 
act in any office specified in this Constitution which includes power to 
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exercise disciplinary control over those persons and to remove those persons 
from office; 
(b) … 
(c) Review and make recommendations, subject to the provisions of this 
Constitution on the terms and conditions of service of judges and persons 
holding the judicial offices enumerated in subsection (3); 
(d) … 
(e) Receive and process recommendations and complaints concerning the 
judiciary; 
(f) Advise the Government through the Minister responsible for Justice on 
improving the administration of justice generally;” 
 
Members of the Commission hold office for a four-year term renewable only once.
452
 The 
Constitution appears to have been crafted in a manner that evidences commitment and 
readiness by the government to transform Swaziland and uphold constitutionalism in the 
quest for a “sustainable home-grown political order to promote transparency and the social, 
economic and cultural development of the country”.453 
 
The JSC could be perceived as another pillar (alongside the Constitution) in safeguarding the 
independence of the judiciary and it is very important that the public have confidence in the 
body vested with powers to ensure transparent and free processes of appointing judicial 
officers. This perception was confirmed by the Industrial Court of Swaziland in Hlatshwayo v 
Swaziland Government and Another
454
 when the Court acknowledged that “the Constitution 
recognizes that public confidence in the Judicial Service Commission is crucial for the 
credibility and legitimacy of the judiciary”.455 The Court further held that “the independence 
of the JSC is inextricably linked to the independence of the judiciary”456 and substantiated 
this by quoting the South African case of Van Rooyen v De Kock and Others
457
 where the 
court held that: 
 
“the attributes of judicial independence lie at the very heart of the due process of the law. 
They represent the true essence of a proper judicial process. It follows logically that all 
attempts must therefore be made to avoid any perception or indication of dependence by 
the judiciary on the Executive.”458 
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The independence of the JSC is undoubtedly essential for the independence of the judicial 
branch of government. However, in Swaziland it could be argued that this important 
institution has been compromised through the King’s power to appoint all members 
constituting the JSC, After all, common sense dictates that such appointees may not execute 
their functions independently of the King. 
 
4.2.4 The State of the Judiciary since the adoption of the New 
Constitution in Swaziland 
The Swazi King is generally perceived as possessing “absolute power” over the organs of 
state, including the judiciary, irrespective of the Constitution which is, on paper, the supreme 
law of Swaziland. This perception is confirmed in the Constitution which shields the King 
from any legal proceedings by providing that: 
 
“The King and iNgwenyama shall be immune from – 
(a) suit or legal process in any cause in respect of all things done or omitted to be 
done by him; and 
(b) being summoned to appear as a witness in any civil or criminal proceedings.”459 
 
The question is whether section 11 represents a loophole in the Swazi Constitution that gives 
the King “ammunition” to disregard the rule of law and the Constitution? Or is it the case of 
some African leaders always being above the law? Or is it the fear or failure by the judiciary 
to interpret the Constitution? Or is it the combination of the three? 
 
Perhaps a lesson that Swaziland may learn is that by nature, and truly so, the office of the 
head of state must be respected, protected and afforded all the dignity that it deserves, but 
where the incumbent transgresses he must be brought to book. In a South African case, 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby Union and 
Others,
460
 the Constitutional Court advanced some interesting arguments on the question of 
whether the President can be called upon to testify in a court of law. 
 
                                                          
459
 Section 11 of the Constitution. 
460
 President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union and Others 
(CCT16/98) [1999] ZACC 11; 2000 (1) SA 1; 1999 (10) BCLR 1059 (10 September 1999). 
116 
 
The court held that “there is no doubt that courts are obliged to ensure that the status, dignity 
and efficiency of the office of the President is protected. At the same time, however, the 
administration of justice cannot and should not be impeded by a court’s desire to ensure that 
the dignity of the President is safeguarded”.461 Where specific conduct by the President 
clashes with the interest of justice, the President must be called to answer.
462
 However, such 
action must be taken with “appropriate restraint sensitive to the status of the head of state and 
the integrity of the executive arm of government”.463 
 
The Constitutional Court also indicated that: “in Germany for example, in terms of the Codes 
regulating Civil Procedure and Criminal Procedure the state president need not attend court in 
person; instead he gives his testimony in his residence”.464 This approach brings a balance 
between the interest of justice and the respect that comes with the office of the head of state 
against any form of transgression that might be committed by him/her and surely this is a 
good lesson for every state that no one should be above the law. 
 
The focus in this section is on various issues, or rather concerns, about the judiciary and the 
criticism leveled against the government of Swaziland’s failure to uphold democratic 
processes and promote human rights since the adoption of a new Constitution in 2005. 
 
In his article “Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Swaziland”, Gumedze raises some 
crucial questions about governance in Swaziland, the powers of the King, and certain 
provisions in the Constitution.
465
 He points out that human rights and the rule of law are 





In terms of general standards accepted by the members of the international community of 
states of which Swaziland is a part, courts are custodians of human rights and the rule of law. 
They are inherently tasked to protect these. With Swaziland accused of disrespecting these, 
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the question that arises is whether that country’s judiciary and courts are effective and 
efficient in upholding the rule of law or are they also “footstools” of the King who seems to 
enjoy supremacy over the Constitution.  
 
Gumedze argues that: “the Constitution does not insulate the judiciary from interference by 





 and section 228(2)
471
 of the Constitution as proble-
matic.
472
 Indeed, the way in which these sections identified by Gumedze are structured, gives 
more power to the King to control every sphere of government in Swaziland, thereby 
rendering the provisions of section 2(1) of the Constitution subordinate to the power of the 
King.  
 
He also argues that: “in the event that the King interferes with judges or judicial officers, as 
has been the case during his reign (and his predecessor’s reign), the Constitution does not 
provide any effective safeguards for the insulation of the judiciary from such unscrupulous 
interferences as the King’s authority cannot be challenged in a court of law”.473 Again, 
Gumedze declares that the situation causes Swazi law and custom to be in competition with 




These issues raised by Gumedze take us back to the importance of the doctrine of separation 
of powers in terms of which Montesquieu argued that: “constant experience shows that every 
man invested with power is apt to abuse it and to carry his authority as far as it will go, but to 
prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the very nature of things that power should be a check 
to power”.475 The current problems in Swaziland could be attributed to the sections in the 
Constitution which vest both executive and legislative powers in the King, while declaring 
him immune from any civil or criminal proceedings. Limitation of power is of vital 
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importance in ensuring that those vested with authority always act within their limits as 
prescribed by the law. 
 
There are many countries in Africa and around the world with constitutions declared as the 
supreme law of the land, yet the leaders of such countries continue to disregard their 
constitutions.
476
 It appears from what we have seen above, that Swaziland is no exception. 
Section 2(1) of the Constitution clearly provides that the Constitution is the supreme law in 
Swaziland and invalidates any law that shall be in conflict with the Constitution, while 
subsection (2) places a duty on the King and iNgwenyama, as well as all the people of 
Swaziland to uphold and defend the Constitution. However, this has so far not prevented the 
King from overriding the Constitution. 
  
With the latest developments (the judicial crisis – discussed below), it could be argued that 
Swaziland’s judiciary is not effective in upholding the rule of law and protecting human 
rights and the Constitution. Such ineffectiveness could be linked to the argument raised above 
about the composition of the JSC which has all its members appointed by the King.
477
 
Another factor is that, although the Constitution declares Swaziland a democratic Kingdom, 
in practice democracy is compromised by the country’s history of denial of political party 




The gap left by the absence of political parties is visible in Swaziland.
479
 Political parties are 
generally perceived as strong pillars in support of democracy in the modern state. According 
to Matlosa: 
 
“Democracy is unthinkable without political parties and, conversely, political parties 
cannot add value to a political system under conditions of authoritarianism. Political 
parties play a role in the democratization process. It is also incontrovertible that political 
parties are key to the institutionalization and consolidation of democracy. Thus 
sustainable democracy is dependent upon well-functioning and effective political 
parties.”480 
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As it stands, the maxim nemo debet esse iudex in propria causa
481
 hardly finds expression in 
the Kingdom of Swaziland, as it is clear that the King is answerable only to himself as his 
authority cannot be challenged in court. 
 
4.2.5 Judicial Crisis 
By the year 2011 the judicial crisis had deepened in Swaziland. Various scandals involving 
the judiciary were reported both in and outside of Swaziland.
482
 In September 2011 over one 
hundred Swaziland lawyers under the umbrella of Swaziland Law Society, marched to hand 
over a memorandum concerning the judicial crisis in the country to the Justice Department.
483
 
The lawyers raised concerns about corruption, nepotism, mismanagement and poor 




The Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA)
485
 brought a complaint against the 
Government of Swaziland at the 50
th
 Session of the African Commission on Human and 
People’s Rights held in October 2011 in Banjul, Gambia. In the formal statement presented to 
the Commission, OSISA raised several issues which prove the dysfunctionality of the judicial 
branch in the Kingdom of Swaziland.
486
 Among other things, a principal concern in 
Swaziland according to OSISA, is a lack of access to justice, erosion of the respect of the rule 
of law, and abuse of human rights which are an affront to the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights.487 The statement further affirmed the boycott by the Law Society of 
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Swaziland of the courts which they alleged highlighted the subversion of the principle of 
judicial independence and the rule of law in Swaziland.
488
 
Singled out in the statement, are the Government of Swaziland, the JSC, and the Chief Justice 
who are accused of deviating from democratic principles aimed at promoting an effective, 
impartial and independent judiciary to protect and promote the rule of law in Swaziland.
489
 
The root of the crisis as OSISA puts it, “lies in a number of actions by the Government, the 
Judicial Service Commission and the Chief Justice of Swaziland the effect of which is the 
denial of citizen’s constitutional right to approach the courts, and the introduction of 
institutional bias in the allocation and determination of matters before the courts”.490 This 
crisis proves that the judiciary is submissive to the will of the King and this has resulted in 
the collapse of the rule of law and abuse of human rights in that country. 
 
The judicial crisis of Swaziland has a very negative impact on the advancement of democracy 
and good governance in the country. This, together with the banning of political parties from 
contesting elections and forming part of government, has exacerbated the situation and 
minimized the chances of making any progress. Section 159(2) of the Constitution is flawed 
because it affords the King excessive influence over the JSC by virtue of his powers to 
appoint all its members. There is no doubt that the King’s power and influence has weakened 
the objectivity of the JSC and led to the massive criticism and questioning of the integrity of 
the judiciary of the country by its own people. 
 
In July 2011, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and Southern African Development 
Community Lawyers Association (SADCLA) jointly issued a “General Briefing on Judge 
Thomas Masuku’s Case”491 – a senior judge in the High Court of Swaziland, who was 
suspended by the JSC pending the resolution of the case against him. The allegations against 
Justice Masuku included, among other things, “disrespecting the Chief Justice and insulting 
His Majesty the King by using the words ‘forked tongue’ with reference to him”.492 
According to the ICJ and SADCLA, the charges against Justice Masuku and the conduct of 













the Chief Justice “raised a few issues about independence, impartiality and accountability of 
the judiciary and the general rule of law situation in Swaziland”.493 
 
At the United Nations Human Rights Council’s 19th Regular Session 2012, Clement 
Mavungu of the ICJ Africa Regional Programme submitted a statement on “ICJ Oral 
Intervention on the Adoption of the Outcome Document of the Universal Periodical Review 
of Swaziland”.494 This statement also confirmed the continuous interference by the King in 
the affairs of the judiciary, and the controversial action by the Chief Justice who issued a 
practice directive exempting the King who “exercises enormous political power and 
authority” from the jurisdiction of the Swazi courts.495 It is clear that the Chief Justice is in 
cahoots with the King to undermine the principles of separation of powers and judicial 
independence Swaziland. 
 
4.3 The Judiciary and the Selection Process Of Judicial Officers in 
Kenya 
4.3.1 The Judiciary in Kenya 
As discussed above in chapter 3, since gaining independence in 1963 Kenya’s democracy has 
suffered at the hands of the KANU-led government. For many years Kenya’s judiciary has 
been perceived (both domestically and internationally) as “weak and too submissive” to the 
executive.
496
 In fact, the violation of the Constitution by former President Moi is attributed to 
the judiciary’s failure to uphold its independence and impartiality.497 The judiciary in Kenya 
has been known for its corrupt activities and sympathy for the KANU-led executive.
498
 It has 
subjected itself to the executive for personal gain.
499
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 refers to the period 1963 to 2003 as the “lost decades of the 
Kenyan’s judiciary”501 and argues that “corruption and the ritual of selling of justice as an 
economic commodity to the highest bidder has in the process became a defining feature of 
the Kenyan judiciary”.502 In his article, “Justice under Siege”, Makau argues that the judiciary 
in Kenya “has shown no ability or inclination to uphold the rule of law against the express or 
perceived whims and interests of the executive and individual senior government officials, 
their business associates and cronies”.503 
 
The government had, either directly or indirectly, put itself in charge of the judiciary, making 
sure that it dealt severely with any judicial officer who failed to carry out its wishes.
504
 Those 
judicial officers who ruled against the government could either be disciplined or dismissed by 
the government.
505
 The public has lost confidence in the judiciary because it has become 
general knowledge that in cases involving KANU-elite and its supporters the judiciary would 




This executive domination of the judiciary meant that judicial officers could no longer 
dispense justice impartially because finding against the wishes of government came with 
negative consequences for their careers and professions. In a move seen as an attempt to take 
full control of the judiciary, in 1988 President Moi and his KANU-led parliament made 
certain constitutional amendments and repealed some sections of article 62 of the 
Constitution.
507
 This article addresses the tenure of office of judges of the High Court of 
Kenya and conditions under which judges can vacate office or be removed from the bench. 
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Although in 1990 Moi finally succumbed to a strong domestic and international pressure and 
restored the judicial security of tenure
508
 in the Constitution, the damage had already been 
done to the reputation and dignity of the judiciary. The executive had in place a “winning 
strategy” of manipulating the judiciary. Most judicial officers had come to realize that the 
only way to survive in their career was to “dance to the tune of the executive”. The situation 
had become the saying – “if you can’t beat them join them”. 
 
The only hope was a new constitutional order that would restore the separation of powers and 
ensure judicial independence; respect for the rule of law and democratic processes; and the 
protection of human rights. 
 
The Ringera Committee and the Justice Amraphael Mbogholi Msagha v Chief Justice of 
the Republic of Kenya and 7 Others Case 
In 2003 the Chief Justice of Kenya appointed the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Committee of 
the Judiciary (Ringera Committee) “to investigate allegations of corruption in the judiciary 
and recommend disciplinary or other curative measures”.509 Several judicial officers were 
implicated in corruption, misbehavior and unethical behaviour.
510
 The Chief Justice then 
presented the findings of the report to the President in terms of article 62(5) of the 
Constitution (now repealed).
511
 The judges were suspended and a Tribunal was appointed by 
the President to investigate their conduct. 
 
One of the judges implicated was Justice AMRaphael Mbogholi Msagha who challenged the 
action in court and contended among other things that: “some of his Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms under the Kenya Constitution were infringed; and that the action of the Chief 
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Justice was in breach of the principles of the independence of the judiciary and separation of 
powers”.512 The AMRaphael case is very important as it dealt, among other things, with the 
question of removal of a judge from office in line with the provisions of article 62 of the 
Constitution of Kenya. 
 
On the issue of the separation of powers and independence of the judiciary, counsel for the 
applicant submitted that:  
 
“by making representations to the President to set up a tribunal to investigate the 
question of the removal of the Applicant, the Chief Justice as head of the Judiciary was 
playing into the hands and control of the Executive, in violation of the principles of the 
separation of powers between the Legislature (said to be supreme), the Executive, and 
the Judiciary a division clearly established under the Constitution”.513 
 
The court held that the Chief Justice in Kenya is “technically a first among equal, primus inter pares, 
and in the exercise of his ministerial powers is careful and maintains a cool aloofness in adherence to 
the doctrine not merely of the separation of powers between the three arms of government but also of 
the independence of the judiciary and of each judge”.514 The court further held that the “doctrine of 
the independence of the judiciary entails that no one judge may interrogate the other of either his 
decision or conduct as each judge is strictly independent of the other in his or her decisions and 
judicial conduct”.515 
 
4.3.2 The Judiciary under the new Constitution of Kenya, 2010  
The year 2010 was a turning point in Kenya’s constitutional history as the country moved to 
adopt a new constitution symbolizing “a move from the old legal order to the new socio-legal 
order as embodied in the new constitutional dispensation”.516 A “healthy” constitutional order 
accompanied by an independent judiciary is the only remedy for all political ills and the 
violation of human rights in the modern democratic state. 
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 See “The manifesto of a modern judiciary” a paper presented by Justice Nancy Baraza, Deputy Chief 
Justice and Vice-President of the Supreme Court of Kenya at the 7
th
Annual Judges Colloquium, Kenya, 
August 2011at 2.   




The new constitutional order represents a new era of transformation from previous sufferings 
to restore order and strengthen the rule of law in Kenya. It bestows upon the judiciary a 
responsibility to arbitrate fairly on legal disputes between the state and its citizens and “other 
legal issues of political nature such as elections, legality of governmental power, 
constitutional review and interpretation and enforcement of human rights”.517 
 
State violation of human rights and the issue of elections (conflict, intolerance and rigging) 
has long bedeviled and thwarted peace and good governance in Kenya, hence the importance 
of a description of an accessible, accountable, efficient, effective, fair, impartial and 
independent judiciary in order to protect democratic processes and uphold the rule of law 




For the first time in the history of Kenya, the 2010 Constitution exclusively vested judicial 
power in the judiciary.
519
 Article 159(1) of the Constitution of Kenya provides that – “judicial 
authority is derived from the people and vests in, and shall be exercised by, the courts and 
tribunals established by or under this Constitution”.520 The Constitution reigns supreme and 
protects the exercise of judicial authority against any interference by any person or 
authority.
521
 Previously the President had extensive powers and in some instances could 
disregard the rule of law and the judiciary as he pleased.
522
 The process of appointment is the 
first step towards securing judicial independence. 
 
In an effort to strengthen the constitutional provisions, the Judicial Service Act (JSA) was 
enacted in 2011 in order to further contribute to the idea of securing judicial independence.
523
 
Section 3 of the Act indicates that the object and purpose of the JSA is, among other things, 
to ensure that the JSC and the judiciary shall: 
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“(a)  be the organs of management of judicial services and, in that behalf, shall uphold, 
sustain and facilitate a judiciary that is independent, impartial and subject only to 
the provisions of the Constitution and the law; 
(a) … 
(b) be accountable to the people of Kenya; 
(c) … 
(d) facilitate a judicial process that is committed to the just resolution of disputes; 
(e) support and sustain a judicial process that is committed to the protection of the 
people and of their human rights;” 
 
 
4.3.3 Appointment of Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice and other 
Judges in Kenya 
The appointment of judicial officers is governed by article 166 of the Constitution which 
provides that: 
 
“(1)  The President shall appoint – 
(a) the Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice, in accordance with the 
recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission, and subject to the 
approval of the National Assembly; and 
(b) all other judges, in accordance with the recommendation of the Judicial 
Service Commission.” 
 
Unlike the Swazi provision on the appointment of judges discussed above,
524
 it could be 
argued here that the wording of article 166(1) of the Kenyan Constitution represents a 
milestone in the democratization of the process of appointment of judges in Kenya in that it 
directly and explicitly directs the President to appoint the Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief 
Justice “in accordance with the recommendation” of the JSC and “subject to the approval” of 
the National Assembly. This is a very important provision towards neutralizing the traditional 
manipulation of the judicial process in Kenya, and a lesson to other countries. This new 
dispensation essentially removes the power of appointment from the President and places it in 
the hands of the JSC which is composed of different independent individuals over whom the 
President has no influence. It goes even further, by subjecting the appointment to approval by 
the National Assembly. 
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The Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice are the Head and Deputy Head of the 
Judiciary respectively.
525
 Together with five other judges, the Chief Justice and Deputy Chief 
Justice sit in the Supreme Court which is the highest ranked court in Kenya on constitutional 
issues.
526
 The provisions of article 166 are a wise move to guarantee the independence of the 
judiciary and minimize any possible executive interference in, or control of the judicial arm. 
In order to be appointed as a judicial officer in Kenya, the Constitution sets certain 
requirements that a person must meet. These requirements are set out in article 166 as 
follows: 
 
“(1)  Each judge of a superior court shall be appointed from among persons –  
(a) hold a law degree from a recognised university, or are advocates of the High 
Court of Kenya, or possess an equivalent qualification in common-law 
jurisdiction; 
(b) possess (3) to (6) as applicable, irrespective of whether that experience was 
gained in Kenya or in another Commonwealth common-law jurisdiction; 
and 
(c) have a high moral character, integrity and impartiality. 
(2) The Chief Justice and other judges of the Supreme Court shall be appointed from 
among persons who have –  
(a) at least fifteen years’ experience as a superior court judge; or 
(b) at least fifteen years’ experience as a distinguished academic, judicial 
officer, legal practitioner or such experience in other relevant legal field; or 
(c) held qualifications mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b) for a period 
amounting, in aggregate, to fifteen years; 
(3) Each judge of the Court of Appeal shall be appointed from among persons who 
have –  
(a) at least ten years’ experience as a superior court judge; or 
(b) at least ten years’ experience as a distinguished academic or legal 
practitioner or such experience in other relevant legal field; or 
(c) held the qualifications mentioned above in paragraphs (a) and (b) for a 
period amounting, in the aggregate, to ten years. 
(4) Each judge of the High Court shall be appointed from among persons who have –  
(a) at least ten years’ experience as a superior court judge or professionally 
qualified magistrate; or 
(b) at least ten years’ experience as a distinguished academic or legal 
practitioner or such experience in other relevant field; or 
(c) held the qualifications specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) for a period 
amounting, in the aggregate, to ten years.” 
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The position of Chief Justice is a very important and strategic position as the person who 
occupies it is the head of the judicial branch of government,
527
 a body tasked with reviewing 
laws and policies formulated and implemented by the other branches. The reason why the 
Kenyan situation on the appointment of judges could serve as an example is because the new 
Constitution indicates a paradigm shift from the provision of the old Constitution. For 
example, when one look at the provision of article 61
528
 and the way in which the JSC was 
composed in terms of article 68
529
 of the previous Constitution, in contrast with the 
provisions of articles 166 and 171 of the current Constitution, the crafters of the latter have 
taken a radical approach to protect the independence of the judiciary to guard against the 
loopholes which previously allowed the executive to meddle in the affairs of the judiciary. 
 
4.3.4 The Role of the Judicial Service Commission in Kenya 
The Constitution provides an interesting role for the Judicial Service Commission in the 
appointment of judges in Kenya. The JSC of Kenya is established in terms of article 171 of 
the Constitution and is chaired by the Chief Justice who is also the head of the judiciary.
530
 
The JSC is composed of the Chief Justice; one Supreme Court judge elected by other judges 
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of the Supreme Court; one judge of the Appeal Court elected by other judges in the Court of 
Appeal; a judge from the High Court; a Magistrate elected by the association of judges and 
magistrates; the Attorney-General; two advocates elected by the members of the statutory 
body responsible for the professional regulation of advocates; one person nominated by the 
Public Service Commission; and two other persons to represent the public, not being lawyers, 




Article 172 provides that: 
“(1)  The Judicial Service Commission shall promote and facilitate the independence 
and accountability of the judiciary and the efficient, effective and transparent 
administration of justice and shall –  
(a) recommend to the President persons for appointment as judges 
(b) … 
(c) … 
(d) prepare and implement programmes for the continuing education and 
training of judges and judicial officers; and 
(e) advise the national government on improving the efficiency of the 
administration of justice 
(2) In the performance of its functions, the Commission shall be guided by the 
following – 
(a)  competitiveness and transparent processes of appointment of judicial 
officers and other staff of the judiciary;” 
 
Unlike in the previous Constitution, the current Constitution enables the JSC to play an active role in 
the appointment of the Chief Justice, the Deputy Chief Justice, and the other judges and this could be 






The Kenyans have taken a bold step under the new constitutional order and seem to have 
learnt from the previous flaws. Their model of appointment of judicial officers as provided 
for in the new Constitution presents a well-crafted plan to guard against executive 
interference (which has tormented the country for so long) in the affairs of the judiciary. This 
is evident through the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution which oblige the President 
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to act in accordance with the recommendations of the JSC, and subject him to the approval of 
the National Assembly when appointing the Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice who 
are also the Head and Deputy Head of the Judiciary respectively. 
 
With these provisions in place, the chances of executive manipulation of the process, as in the 
past, have been effectively excluded.
533
 What is further encouraging is the composition of the 
JSC which is tasked in terms of Article 172(1)(a) with recommending to the President 
persons for appointment as judges. The JSC consist of eleven members plus the Chief 
Registrar of the Judiciary who acts as the Secretary to the JSC.
534
 However, the majority of 
JSC members are lawyers who are elected to the Commission by their peers. Presidential 
appointees to the Commission, both direct or indirectly, form a minority and are also subject 
to approval from the National Assembly so further tying the President’s hands. This can be 
seen as a clear and major step towards restoring and guaranteeing judicial independence in 
Kenya. 
 
4.4 The Judiciary and the Selection Process of Judicial Officers in 
Zimbabwe 
4.4.1 A Brief Description of the Crisis in Zimbabwe since 2000 
Zimbabwe has since independence been ruled and dominated by President Robert Mugabe 
and his ZANU-PF party who have been at the helm of government for more than thirty 
years.
535
 The formation of a major opposition party, the MDC, presented a considerable threat 
to President Mugabe and the ZANU-PF.
536
 In February 2000 Mugabe’s government proposed 
a new constitution for Zimbabwe. This was rejected in a national referendum, a move that left 
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This may be regarded as a turning point in Zimbabwe’s politics and arguably could have 
triggered the “farm invasions” by war veterans. Matyszak points out that within two weeks of 
the failed referendum, the government launched its so-called “agrarian reform” in an effort to 
reclaim control of society.
538
 What followed the “agrarian reforms” was disastrous.539 One 
problem led to another. The economy collapsed. The elections that followed were 
accompanied by violence and allegations of rigging.
540
 Twelve years down the line, peace has 
not been restored. The government is an unstable Government of National Unity (GNU) 
between ZANU-PF and the MDC brokered by SADC under the 2008 Global Political 
Agreement.
541
 Efforts to draft a new constitution continued amid allegations of an 




This crisis affected not only the executive and legislative arms in Zimbabwe. Matyszak 
argues that in order to ensure protection against its actions (land invasions and the draconian 
legislation), the ZANU-PF-led government had to create a “compliant judiciary”.543 A 
“compliant judiciary” meant the removal of judges seen as opposed to government actions 
and appointing those who were believed to be sympathetic to government.
544
 This was a clear 
violation to the principles of judicial independence, democracy and the rule of law. 
 
4.4.2 The Judiciary and the Constitution in Zimbabwe 
As indicated above and in chapter 3, Zimbabwe has experienced many problems since 2000 
and was in the process of developing a new constitution in a bid to restore order to the 
country. However, in this section reference will be made to the existing Constitution, ie the 
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The Constitution indicates that the judicial authority of Zimbabwe vests in the courts.
546
 The 
judiciary is headed by the Chief Justice
547
 who also presides over the highest court in the 
country, the Supreme Court.
548
 The notion of judicial independence is recognized and 
protected by the Constitution which provides that – “in the exercise of his judicial authority, a 
member of the judiciary shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or 
authority, except to the extent that a written law may place him under the direction or control 
of another member of the judiciary”.549 
 
However, the very same Constitution continues in section 79(2) to introduce a controversial 
provision by purporting to vest judicial power in a person or authority other than a court of 
law, through an Act of Parliament.
550
 Saller rightly argues that the provisions of section 
79(2)(a) “cast some doubt on the integrity of the separation of powers provided for in the 
constitutional text”.551 
 
For instance, the Privileges, Immunities and Powers of Parliament Act
552
 allows the 
legislative branch to encroach on the functions of the judicial branch of government. Section 
16(2) and (4) of the Act grants Parliament powers to assume court functions and punish any 
conduct that might be regarded as an offence in the eyes of Parliament.
553
 In 2004 an MDC 
MP, Roy Bennet, was convicted and sentenced through the judicial authority of Parliament in 
terms of this Act.
554
 During a very heated argument in Parliament between the Minister for 
Justice, Parliamentary and Legal Affairs, Patrick Chinamasa, and MDC MP, Roy Bennet, 
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Bennet allegedly pushed Chinamasa to the floor.
555
 This was after Chinamasa allegedly 
verbally abused Bennet.
556




The Parliament of Zimbabwe then invoked the provisions of the Privileges, Immunities and 
Powers of Parliament Act and appointed a five person Parliamentary Committee to review 
the conduct of Bennet and make a recommendation to Parliament.
558
 After conducting the 
proceedings, the Committee found Bennet guilty and recommended that he be sentenced to 
fifteen months’ imprisonment with hard labour – three months to be suspended subject to 
good behaviour.
559
 The Parliament voted to accept the recommendation of the Committee and 
Bennet was taken to prison.
560
 The decision of the Parliament is final as the Act does not 
make any provision for appeal against sentences passed by parliament. 
In Mutasa v Makombe NO Gubbay
561
 CJ held that: 
“A finding of guilty by Parliament on a contempt offence is not a crime in the 
conventional sense. When dealing with these contempt offences Parliament though 
sitting as a court does not sit as a court of law. Its proceedings are not in the nature of a 
public criminal trial as envisaged in section 18(2) of the Constitution, for Parliament is 
not ‘an independent and impartial court established by law’. It exercises its own 
jurisdiction and powers conferred upon it by the Privileges, Immunities and Powers of 
Parliament Act.”562 
 
The trias politica doctrine promotes the separation of powers but also emphasizes 
cooperation and a good relationship between the three branches of government. In Paradza v 
Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs and Others
563
 the Zimbabwean Supreme 
Court held that:  
“the Constitution is the supreme law of the land and that it creates a fundamental 
framework within which the respective ambits of the legislative, executive and judicial 
arms of the state are defined. It not exhaustive in its own terms, and consequently, a 
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generous and purposive interpretation of the Constitution has to be adopted in order to 
give effect to its underlying values”.564 
 
The court further reiterated the notion of judicial independence as a fundamental principle of 
a democratic system of government.
565
 The independence of the judiciary in Zimbabwe is 
protected by the Constitution which provides that “In the exercise of his judicial authority, a 
member of the judiciary shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or 
authority, except to the extent that a written law may place him under the direction or control 
of another member of the judiciary”.566 
 
In Paradza the court argued, rightfully so, that section 79B is very important for ensuring the 
independence of the judiciary as well as ensuring that “the judiciary, which plays a pivotal 
role in the protection and enforcement of the Constitution, continues to function 
effectively”.567 The above cases indicate the courts’ efforts to uphold judicial independence 
and the protection of the Constitution in Zimbabwe. However, the executive has developed a 
tendency of disregarding the rule of law thereby rendering the judiciary weak. 
 
4.4.3 Appointment of Judges 
The appointment of judges in Zimbabwe is provided for by section 84 of the Constitution 
which establishes that –  
 
“(1)  The Chief Justice and other judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court shall 
be appointed by the President after consultation with the Judicial Service 
Commission. 
(1) If the appointment of a Chief Justice or a Judge of the Supreme Court or the High 
Court is not consistent with any recommendation made by the Judicial Service 
Commission in terms of subsection (1), the President shall cause the House of 
Assembly to be informed as soon as practicable. 
(2) The appointment of a judge in terms of this section, whether made before, on or 
after the date of commencement of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment 
(no4) Act, 1984, may be for a fixed period and any judge so appointed may, 
notwithstanding that the period of his appointment has expired, sit as a judge for 
the purpose of giving judgment or otherwise in relation to any proceedings 
commenced or heard by him while he was in office.” 
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Before anyone can qualify to be appointed as judge in the Supreme Court or in the High 
Court of Zimbabwe, the Constitution sets out certain requirements.
568
 It dictates that a person 
must have been a judge of a court having unlimited jurisdiction in civil or criminal matters, or 
have been practicing as a legal practitioner for more than seven years, whether continuously 
or not.
569
 Such person does not necessarily have to be a citizen of Zimbabwe or to have 
practised law in Zimbabwe only.
570
 The experience may have been acquired in any country in 
which the common law is Roman-Dutch and English is an official language, or if he is a 





4.4.4 The Judicial Service Commission in Zimbabwe 
The JSC is established by section 90 of the Constitution. It is composed of six members, 
namely, the Chief Justice, the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, the Attorney-




As for the functions of the JSC, section 91 provides that: 
 
“(1)  The functions of the Judicial Service Commission shall be to tender such advice 
and do such things in relation to the judiciary as are provided for by this 
Constitution or by or under an Act of Parliament. 
(2) An Act of Parliament referred to in Subsection (1) may confer on the Judicial 
Service Commission functions in connection with the employment, discipline and 
conditions of service of such officers and persons employed in- 
(a) the Supreme Court, the High Court and other courts subordinate to the 
Supreme Court and the High Court;”  
 
The Judicial Service Act (hereafter the Act) makes further provisions for the JSC.
573
 Section 
3 of the Act identifies the JSC and describes it as composed of, among other people, the 
Chief Justice; judges of the Supreme Court; the Judge President and the other judges of the 
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High Court; persons presiding over other courts subordinate to the Supreme Court and the 
High Court. 
 
The Act further provides in section 5 that – 
“(1)  Subject to the Constitution, this Act or any other enactment, the Commission shall 
have the following functions – 
(b) appointing persons to the Judicial Service, whether as permanent members 
on 
pensionable conditions of service or on contract or otherwise, assigning and 
promoting them to offices, posts and grades in the Judicial Service, and 




Matyszak classifies the appointment process of judges in Zimbabwe as weak.
574
 Although the 
Constitution provides that the President appoints judicial officers after consultation with the 
JSC, together with the Judicial Service Act, it fails to articulate the role of the JSC. Section 
84(2) of the Constitution appears to be ambiguous. It only declares that the House of 
Assembly must soon be informed of any appointment of a judge of the Supreme Court or the 
High Court by the President which was not consistent with the recommendation of the JSC. It 
does not indicate what remedies the House of Assembly may invoke in such cases. This 





The composition of the JSC itself is a cause for concern. In practical terms, the President 
appoints all members of the JSC in that, other than the three people he appoints directly to the 
JSC, the other three, ie the Chief Justice, the Attorney-General and the Chairman of the PSC, 
are all appointed to their positions by the President.
576
 The current constitutional provisions 
allow too much room for interference and control by the executive in the affairs of the 
judicial arm. In the words of Saller “the direct and indirect role played by the president, 
especially in the appointment but also in the removal of judges in the higher courts structures, 
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allows for considerable political influence over the judicial institution”.577 Hopefully, the new 
constitution will address this. 
 
4.5 The Judiciary and the Selection Process of Judicial Officers in 
South Africa 
Part of chapter 3 above dealt with the notion of judicial independence, the history of the 
judiciary under the apartheid government, and the state of the judiciary in South Africa under 
the 1996 Constitution. Hence, suffice it to only reiterate here that the judicial authority in 
South Africa is vested in courts which are independent and subject only to the Constitution 




4.5.1 The Judicial Service Commission in South Africa 
The JSC is established in terms of section 178 of the Constitution. It is the official body 
vested with powers to deal with the appointment, disciplining and removal of judges. Unlike 
most JSC’s in most countries across the globe, the South African JSC is composed of a large 
number of people from different backgrounds, namely the judiciary, executive, legislature, 
the legal profession, and academia. It consists of 23 members and/or an additional two 
members in certain defined instances.
579
 These include the Chief Justice; the President of the 
SCA; one Judge President designated by the Judges President; the Cabinet member 
responsible for justice; two practicing advocates; two practicing attorneys; one law teacher at 
a South African university; six persons designated by the National Assembly; four permanent 
delegates to the National Council of Provinces; four persons designated by the President after 
consulting the leaders of all parties in the National Assembly; and, when dealing with matters 
relating to a specific High Court, the Judge President of that Court and the Premier of the 




In contrast to other countries like Swaziland and Zimbabwe as discussed above, in South 
Africa, although the President appoints some members, he does not have absolute influence 
on the majority of appointees in the JSC. Some members are nominated within the bodies 
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which they represent and are then appointed to the JSC. Accordingly, some members serve at 
the pleasure of the bodies who nominated them. 
 
It could be argued that the South African model of constituting the JSC creates a better 
chance for curbing executive influence in the affairs of the judiciary as compared to 
constitutional provisions of other countries.
581
 Although the composition of the South African 
JSC appears to be “inclusive and fair”, it should be noted that it is not immune from criticism 
and suspicion of manipulation as shall be discussed below. 
 
As per the constitutional provision,
582
 the Judicial Service Commission Act
583
 was enacted to 
clearly articulate the role, powers and functions of the JSC in a bid to enhance judicial 
independence. The Act emphasizes the role of the JSC as the official and responsible body 




There are different perceptions with regard to the composition of the JSC, with some 
claiming it has too many members, and others welcoming it and arguing that it enhances 
accountability and allows for the accommodation of various relevant players in the JSC.
585
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 See Fessha YT “Constitutional Court appointment: The South African process” (2010) SC Working Paper 
2010-06 Institute of Intergovernmental Relations School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University at 2. 
 In March 2012 the DA’s(the official opposition party in South Africa) shadow Deputy Minister of Justice 
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Other views are that there are more politicians than lawyers on the JSC,
586
 which robs the 
JSC of lawyers with sufficient knowledge to assess the expertise of candidates to be 
appointed to the bench. 
 
The Constitutional Court’s ruling in the Certification of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa
587
on the JSC – 
  
The CC reiterated that “the JSC has a pivotal role in the appointment of and removal of 
judges”.588 The issue of many politicians or political appointees to the JSC was also dealt 
with by the CC in this case.
589
 The court emphasized the importance of the separation of 
powers and argued that “an essential part of the separation of powers is that there be an 
independent judiciary”.590 It continued to argue that “the mere fact, however, that the 
executive makes or participates in the appointment of judges is not inconsistent with the 
doctrine of separation of powers or with the judicial independence required by CP VII”.591 592 
The court reasoned that “what is crucial to the separation of powers and the independence of 
the judiciary is that the judiciary should enforce the law impartially and that it should 
function independently of the legislature and the executive”.593 
 
In his article in the Business Day, Paul Hoffman of the Institute for Accountability in 
Southern Africa argued that: 
 
“There are flaws in the composition of the JSC that lead to the perpetration of errors and 
injustices. The problem, stated more bluntly than it was possibly implied by O’Regan (a 
former justice of the Constitutional Court), is that there are too many politicians on the 
JSC and not enough lawyers. Some of the lawyers on the JSC are also there as 
politicians- this serves to bedevil the deliberations that are supposed to be aimed at 
finding appropriately qualified lawyers who are fit and proper to grace the bench and 
legitimately dispense justice in a manner that inspires the confidence of the public.”594 
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 CP VII provides that – “the judiciary shall be appropriately qualified, independent and impartial and shall 
have the power and jurisdiction to safeguard and enforce the Constitution and all fundamental rights”. 
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He therefore suggests the use of retired judges to serve on the JSC and argues that “their 
wisdom, experience and intimate knowledge of the ‘expertise’ of the aspirant judges needs to 
be harnessed if the JSC is going to be able to do its job properly”.595 However it can be 
argued that, taking into account that most retired judges are white males, such a move might 
not satisfy the agenda of transforming the country’s judicial system. Although Hoffman’s 
view of staffing the JSC with retired judges appears attractive, it can be argued that the 
current position is also well-founded as it accommodates different players from across the 





4.5.2  The Appointment of Judicial Officers in terms of Section 174 of the 
Constitution  
The appointment of judicial officers in South Africa is governed by section 174 of the 
Constitution which provides as follows –  
 
“(1)  Any appropriately qualified woman or man who is a fit and proper person may be 
appointed as a judicial officer. Any person to be appointed to the Constitutional 
Court must also be a South African citizen. 
(2)  The need for the judiciary to reflect broadly the racial and gender composition of 
South Africa must be considered when judicial officers are appointed. 
(3) The President as head of the national executive, after consulting the Judicial 
Service Commission and the leaders of the parties represented in the National 
Assembly, appoints the Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice, after 
consulting the Judicial Service Commission, appoints the President and Deputy 
President of the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
(4) The other judges of the Constitutional Court are appointed by the President, as 
head of the national executive, after consulting the Chief Justice and the leaders of 
parties represented in the National Assembly, in accordance with the following 
procedure: 
(a) The Judicial Service Commission must prepare a list of nominees with three 
names more than the number of appointments to be made, and submit the 
list to the President. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    





  See footnote 582 above, at par 124, where the CC held that the JSC “as an institution provides a broadly 
based selection channel for appointments to the judiciary and provides a check and balance to the power of 
the executive to make such appointments”. 
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(b) The President may make appointments from the list, and must advice the 
Judicial Service Commission, with reasons if any of the nominees are 
unacceptable and any appointment remains to be made. 
(c) The Judicial Service Commission must supplement the list with further 
nominees and the President must make the remaining appointments from the 
supplemented list. 
(5) At all times, at least four members of the Constitutional Court must be persons 
who were judges at the time they were appointed to the Constitutional Court. 
(6) The President must appoint the judges of all other courts on the advice of the 
Judicial Service Commission. 
(7) Other judicial officers must be appointed in terms of an Act of Parliament which 
must ensure that the appointment, promotion, transfer or dismissal of, or 
disciplinary steps against, these judicial officers take place without fear or favour. 
(8) Before judicial officers begin to perform their functions, they must take an oath or 




4.5.3 The need for the judiciary to reflect broadly the racial and gender 
composition of South Africa when judicial officers are appointed 
(Section 174(2)) 
With the history of South Africa’s judiciary dominated by white male judges during 
apartheid, the crafters of the Constitution and lawmakers saw it proper to emphasize the 
issues of race and gender in the appointment of judges under the new constitutional 
dispensation in an effort to bring a balance within the judiciary. This provision has become 
another important requirement that the JSC must take into consideration when making 
judicial appointments. 
 
Fair as it may appear, the provision is not immune from criticism. Different views have been 
expressed about the provisions of section 174(2) of the Constitution. Gordon and Bruce 
contend that “balancing the need for racial and gender representivity with the need for a 
competent, well qualified judiciary poses a difficult challenge”.597 The JSC is accused of 
paying more attention to the issue of race and gender than to the competence of the 
candidates when making judicial appointments.
598
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The general feeling is that there is a need for a representative judiciary, but on the other hand 
there is fear that if the issues of race and gender are not carefully handled in the JSC, such 
efforts could end up hindering judicial independence.
599
 Although the JSC has always 
considered and prioritized the provisions of section 174(2), with, on the other side, the 
“reasonable” concern about fewer experienced blacks and women in the legal fraternity, one 
can safely argue that those who have been appointed have not disappointed. They have 
shown competence in dispensing justice and upholding the rule of law.  
 
Although there is confidence and hope in the judiciary of the Republic of South Africa from 
members of the public under the new constitutional supremacy, there are some incidences in 
which some members of the judiciary have behaved in a questionable manner. For example  
the Judge President of the Western Cape High Court, Judge John Hlophe, has long been 
embroiled in litigations to his fitness to hold office which has raised questions about his 
credibility as a judge and his ability to uphold the rule of law impartially and without fear, 
favour or prejudice. 
 
On 09 October 2007 Legalbrief Today published a letter from a number of senior counsel at 
the Cape Bar raising concerns about the unwarranted conduct of Hlophe JP and called for his 
resignation. Among other things raised in the letter was that: 
 
“the JSC had ‘unanimously found Judge Hlophe’s explanations for receiving money 
from Oasis Management Group ‘unsatisfactory in certain respects’ and that the JSC also 
considered his failure to disclose his relationship with Oasis at the time he gave it 
permission to sue another Cape judge ‘inappropriate’”.600 
 
Again in 2008 Hlophe was accused of “improper attempt to influence the Constitutional 
Court’s pending judgment” in a case involving Jacob Zuma, President of the ruling ANC and 
who was expected (as later happened) to become President of the country after the 2009 
general elections.
601
 The Cape Bar argued, and rightfully so, that the public cannot continue 
to have confidence in Judge Hlophe because of the way he had conducted himself. Indeed 
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judicial officers as custodians of the rule of law, are expected to behave in dignified manner 
and avoid situations where their personality is questioned by members of the public. 
 
Though relevant, the question of experience is not insurmountable as this can be remedied by 
comprehensive training courses or programs for the newly appointed judges on the bench. In 
China, for example, judges are not required to have years of employment or experience as 
lawyers in order to serve on the bench.
602
 Wang indicates that: 
 
“The qualification for Chinese judges is not limited to majoring in law at a university. In 
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 34 of the Organic Law of the 
People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China, judges who have not majored in law 
must be trained in the specifics of the law”.603 
 
 Carp et al, point out that in France “all prospective judges are trained for over two years and 
can become judges only after passing rigorous competitive examinations”.604 
 
4.5.4  The Appointment of the Chief Justice (CJ) and Deputy Chief 
Justice (DCJ) of the CC and the Appointment of the President and 
Deputy President of the SCA (Section 174(3) of the Constitution) 
The office of Chief Justice of South Africa is to become an important institution with defined 
powers in line with the Constitution. The Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Bill seeks, 
among other things, to define the role of the CJ as the head of the judiciary. Section 165 is 
amended to include subsection (6) which, if adopted, will read: 
 
“The Chief Justice is the head of the judiciary and exercises responsibility over the 
establishment and monitoring of norms and standards for the exercise of the judicial 
functions of all courts”. 
 
Without a doubt, the office of CJ is an important institution and position, which comes with a 
huge responsibility, hence the high expectations and the attention it always attracts from all 
spheres. Although the focus in this section is the appointment of all the judges mentioned 
under section 174 (3), the appointment of the CJ will dominate the discussion.  
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Since its establishment in 1994, the CC of South Africa has had five Chief Justices – Justice 
Ismail Mahomed (1998-2000)); Justice Arthur Chaskalson (2001-2005); Justice Pius Langa 
(2005-2009); Justice Sandile Ngcobo (2009-2011); and the current Chief Justice, Mogoeng 




Section 174 (3) indicates that the President, in his capacity as head of the national executive, 
appoints the CJ and the DCJ “after consulting” the JSC and the leaders of parties represented 
in the National Assembly. He also appoints the President and Deputy President of the SCA 
“after consulting” the JSC.  
 
The attempt by the President of the Republic to extend the term of office of the Chief Justice 
Ngcobo in 2011 by invoking the provisions of the Judges’s Remuneration and Conditions of 
Employment Act,
606
 drew much criticism and led to certain civil organisations in the legal 
fraternity taking the matter to the Constitutional Court.  
 
On 11 April 2011 the President wrote to the then CJ (whose term of office was to expire in 
four months) requesting him to remain in office for another period of five years relying on 
section 8(a) of the Judges’s Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act which 
provides that: 
“A Chief Justice who becomes eligible for discharge from active service in terms of section 
3(1)(a) or 4(1) or (2), may, at the request of the President, from the date on which he or she 
becomes so eligible for discharge from active service, continue to perform active service as 
Chief Justice of South Africa for a period determined by the President, which shall not 
extend beyond the date on which such Chief Justice attains the age of 75 years”. 
 




The application was brought to the CC by the Justice Alliance of South Africa (JASA), 
Freedom Under Law (FUL), the University of Witwatersrand’s Centre for Applied Legal 
                                                          
605
 http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/judges/formerjudges.htm(accessed 26/03/2012). 
606
 Act no 47 of 2001. 
607
 Justice Alliance of South Africa v President of Republic of South Africa and Others, Freedom Under Law v 
President of Republic of South Africa and Others, Centre for Applied Legal Studies and Another v 
President of Republic of South Africa and Others (CCT 53/11, CCT 54/11, CCT 62/11) [2011] ZACC 23; 
2011 (5) SA 388 (CC); 2011 (10) BCLR 1017 (CC) (29 July 2011). 
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Studies (CALS), and the Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution 
(CASAC).
608
 The National Association of Democratic Lawyers (NADEL) and the Black 
Lawyers Association (BLA) joined as amici curiae to make submissions on remedy only.
609
 
The respondents were the President of the Republic of South Africa, the Minister for Justice 
and Constitutional Development, who were opposing the applications, and the CJ who was 




As to the question of standing, direct access and urgency, the applicants had rightfully, and 
the court acceded, claimed standing in the public interest, in the interest of their members or 




The fundamental question was whether section 8(a) of the Judges’s Remuneration and 
Conditions of Employment Act was consistent with section 176(1) of the Constitution
612
. 
Section 176(1) provides that: 
“A Constitutional Court judge holds office for a non-renewable term of 12 years, or until 
he or she attains the age of 70, whichever occurs first, except where an Act of Parliament 
extends the term of office of a Constitutional Court judge”.  
 
The court then summarized the fundamental question as follows: 
“(a)  whether section 8(a) of the Act delegates the power to extend to the President; if 
so, whether delegation is permitted by section 176 of the Constitution; and, if so, 
whether the delegation was validly done; 
(b)  whether section 176(1) authorises a differentiation of terms of office of judges of 
the Constitutional Court 
(c)  if section 8(a) is constitutionally valid, whether the President is obliged to consult 
the JSC and political parties, before granting an extension; and 
(d)  The appropriate remedy and the costs order.”613 
 
                                                          
608
  Id at par 11. 
609
  Id at par 14. 
610
  Id at par 13. 
611
 Section 38 of the Constitution provides that – 
 Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights 
has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights. The 
person who may approach a court are – 
(a) anyone acting in their own interest; 
(b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name; 
(c) anyone acting as member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons; 
(d) anyone acting in the public interest; and 
(e) an association acting in the interest of its members. 
612
 At par 41. 
613
 At par 41. 
146 
 
The court held that the provisions of section 8(a) usurp the legislative power granted only to 
Parliament and therefore constitute an unlawful delegation, and accordingly violate the 
principle of judicial independence.
614
 The court therefore declared that “any step taken or 
decision made pursuant to the provisions of section 8(a) of the Act is inconsistent with the 
Constitution and equally invalid”.615 
 
Lessons from Justice Alliance of South Africa and Others v President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Others 
Arguably this is a landmark case relating to the process of appointment of judges in South 
Africa and the first of its kind that the Constitutional Court has dealt with since its establish-
ment in 1995. The process of appointment in a constitutional democratic state is a symbol of 
hope which, as argued by the applicants and accepted by the CC, represents among other 
things “the protection of the constitution; the protection and advancement of the understand-
ding of and respect for the rule of law and the principle of legality; the protection of the 
administration of justice and the independence of the judiciary; the promotion, protection and 
advancement of human rights; the strengthening of constitutional democracy; the promotion 
of social justice and equality; public accountability and open governance”.616 
 
The process of appointment of judicial officers must be respected by everyone including the 
executive in line with the doctrine of separation of powers. South Africa subscribes to the 
doctrine as per the structure of the Constitution which distinguishes between the legislature, 




In Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly,
618
 the CC outlined among other 
things – “a constitutional democracy based on the supremacy of the constitution protected by 
an independent judiciary; and, a separation of powers between the legislature, executive and 
judiciary with appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability, responsiveness and 
                                                          
614
 Paragraphs 62 and 68. 
615
 Paragraph 69. 
616
 Paragraph 17. 
617
 Chapter 4 provides for Parliament and section 43(a) vests the legislative authority of the Republic in 
Parliament; Chapter 5 provides for the executive and section 85(1) vests the executive authority of the 
Republic in the President; Chapter 8 provides for Courts and Administration of Justice and section 165(1) 
provides that the judicial authority of the Republic is vested in the courts. 
618
 Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (CCT 23/96) [1996] ZACC 26; 1996 
(4) SA 744 (CC); 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) (6 September 1996).  
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The principle of checks and balances, as well as the concepts of accountability, 
responsiveness and openness, contribute to the core of South Africa’s democracy. It is 
important always to keep in mind that the reason why many states, including South Africa, 
subscribe to the doctrine of separation of powers is to ensure good and peaceful governance 
by keeping the three branches of government separate and distinct, although interrelated and 
in cooperation with one another.  
 
In Justice Alliance of South Africa and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others
620
 the CC argued, at paragraph 20, that: “the determination of this case turns on the 
interpretation of section 176(1) of the Constitution and section 8(a) of the Act, against the 
background of the constitutional imperatives of the rule of law, the separation of powers and 
judicial independence”. The court emphasised the importance of the appointment process in 
relation to the protection and promotion of the rule of law, separation of powers and judicial 
independence under a constitutional democracy. Arguably, where the executive is afforded an 
opportunity to encroach on the affairs of the judiciary, the rule of law is susceptible to 
manipulation and the principles of checks and balances and judicial independence are 
compromised. 
 
 It is the duty of courts to interpret laws and give meaning to the object of any given law in a 
constitutional state like South Africa. I contend that as it stands, it appears as if the executive 
has long been confused about the meaning of section 174(3), while on the other side the 
courts have not so far given it meaning. 
 
The confusion of the executive was apparent in JASA and Others v President of the Republic 
and Others, by the manner in which the President and the Minister for Justice and 
Constitutional Development argued that section 174(3) of the Constitution vests the power to 
appoint the CJ in the President.
621
 
                                                          
619
 At par 45 Certification. 
620
 See footnote 607 above 
621
 See par 47. 
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By nature, politicians will do anything to consolidate power and they always endeavour to 
sway things in their favour. Section 174(3) is very clear. The words “after consulting” are 
very important. The words dictate to the President to make his appointments only after 
consulting with the other parties mentioned in that section. In JASA and Others v President of 
the Republic and Others the court indicated (after the President had sent a letter to the Chief 
Justice requesting him to remain in office for a further five years, and after the Chief Justice 
wrote back to the President acceding to his request) that: 
“On 03 June 2011 the President effected the extension of the term of office of the Chief 
Justice. Later that day, the President communicated this decision to the Judicial Service 
Commission (JSC) and to the leaders of political parties represented in the National 
Assembly before he announced his decision in an address to Parliament.”622 
 
Clearly, the President and the Minister proved the executive’s incorrect understanding of the 
provisions of section 174(3) and section 176(1) of the Constitution, especially the words 
“after consulting” and “except where an Act of Parliament extends the term of office of a 
Constitutional Court Judge”, respectively. The Constitution makes these provisions in order 
to protect and promote the separation of powers and judicial independence and the executive 
is bound to respect and support this. 
 
The process of appointment dictates that the President must first consult. The purpose of the 
words “after consulting” is to guard against any temptation or opportunity to control the 
judiciary by appointing people who may be manipulated by the executive. It is worth 
mentioning that section 84 of the Constitution clearly defines the powers and functions of the 
President and further mentions the people whom the President has sole power to appoint, 
such as ambassadors. It was not by accident that the crafters of the Constitution distinguished 
the appointment of judicial officers (which specifically designate the JSC in the appointment 
process) and the powers conferred to the President in terms of section 84, and this ought to be 
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 See par 10. 
623
 In the Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa the CC pointed out that as an 
institution the JSC provides a broadly based selection panel for appointments to the judiciary and provides 
a check and balance to the power of the executive to make such appointments” (see par 124). 
149 
 
4.5.5 Appointment to the Constitutional Court (Section 174(4)) 
The Constitution allows for every South African citizen irrespective of their gender, race, sex, 
disability, culture, sexual orientation, religion, or belief, so long as he or she is appropriately 
qualified and a fit and a proper person, to be appointed in the CC when there is a vacancy. 
The Constitution specifically mentions the requirement of holding South African citizenship 
for appointment in the CC, but is silent on this point with regard to the other courts implying 
that non-citizens may be appointed to the bench in other courts. 
 
As per the provisions of section 5 of the Judicial Service Commission Act,
624
 the Minister for 
Justice and Constitutional Development published in the Government Gazette
625
 in March 
2003, the particulars of the procedure for the appointment of judges which the JSC has 
determined in line with section 178(6)
626
 of the Constitution. The appointment process in the 
CC begins when a vacancy arises and the Chief Justice must inform the JSC which must 




A person who makes a nomination must write a letter identifying him/herself and the 
candidate, accompanied by the nominee’s written acceptance of the nomination and a 
detailed curriculum vitae disclosing his or her formal qualifications in line with section 
174(1) of the Constitution, together with a questionnaire prepared by the commission and 
completed by the candidate.
628
 There is a screening committee which is responsible (in its 
discretion) to receive and consider nominations after the specified closing date and which 
shall prepare a shortlist of all candidates who qualify for appointment to be interviewed.
629
 
After preparing the shortlist of candidates, the screening committee submits it to the members 
of the JSC.
630
 Finally the shortlist must be distributed to the “institutions”631 and publicly 
announced for comment by a specified closing date.
632
 
                                                          
624
 Section 5 of Act 9 of 1994 provides that “the Mister must by notice in the Gazette, make known the 
particulars of the procedure including subsequent amendments which the commission has determined in 
terms section 178(6) of the Constitution”.  
625
 Government Gazette 24596, 27 March 2003. Judicial Service Commission Act 9 of 1994: Procedure of 
Commission. 
626
 Section 178(6) of the Constitution provides that “the Judicial Service Commission may determine its own 
procedure, but decisions of the commission must be supported by a majority of its members”. 
627
 See footnote 620 above at section 2(a) and (b). 
628
 Id section 2(c)(i)-(iii). 
629
 Id at par (e). 
630
 Id at par (f). 
631
 The Government Gazette 24596, 27 March 2003.  defines “Institutions” to mean “the Law Society of South 
Africa, the Black Lawyers Association , the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, the 
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In 2010 the JSC reviewed the Guidelines it had adopted in 1998 and came up with a summary 
of the criteria to be used when considering candidates for judicial appointment. First is the 
primary criterion, in line with the constitutional provisions, 
“(1)  Whether the particular applicant is an appropriately qualified person 
(2)  Whether he or she is a fit and proper person; and  
(3)  Whether his or her appointment will help to reflect the racial and gender 
composition of South Africa? 
 
The supplementary criteria – 
(1) Is the proposed appointee a person of integrity? 
(2) Is the proposed appointee a person with the necessary energy and motivation? 
(3) Is the proposed appointee a competent person?  
(a) Technically experienced 
(b) Capacity to give expression to the values of the Constitution 
(4) Is the proposed appointee an experienced person?  
(a) Technically experienced 
(b) Experienced in regard to values and needs of the community 
(5) Does the proposed appointee possess appropriate potential? 
(6) Symbolism. What message is given to the community at large by a particular 
appointment?”633 
 
Taking into consideration the above criteria, the JSC interviews the shortlisted candidates in a 
process open to the public and the media but subject to set rules.
634
 Upon conclusion of the 
interviews, the JSC meets in private and after careful consideration selects the candidates to 
be recommended for appointment in line with the provision of section 174(4) of the 
Constitution, by consensus, or, if necessary, by majority vote.
635
 The JSC reserves the right 
not to recommend any of the candidates if it feels that none of them meets the set criteria. 
 
Thereupon the JSC is required to advise the President of the names of the candidates 
recommended for appointment together with reasons for their recommendation.
636
 The 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
General Council of the Bar of South Africa, the Magistrates Association of South Africa, the National 
Association of Democratic Lawyers, the Society of Teachers of Law and the Association of Regional 
Magistrates of South Africa and other institutions with an interest in the work of the commission as the 
commission may identify from time to time”. 
632
 Id section 2(g). 
633
 “Summary of the Criteria used by the Judicial Service Commission when considering candidates for 
judicial appointments” Issued by the JSC, 10 September 2010. 
634
 Government Gazette 24596, 27 March 2003. Judicial Service Commission Act 9 of 1994: Procedure of 
Commission, section 2(I) and (j). 
635
 Id at par (k). 
636
 Id at par (m). 
151 
 





Section 174(4)(b) of the Constitution provides that – “the President may make appointment 
from the list, and must advise the Judicial Service Commission, with reasons, if any of the 
nominees are unacceptable and any appointment remains to be made”. This provision creates 
an unnecessarily complex situation.  
 
The word “may” in paragraph (b) means that the President has discretion whether or not to 
accept the nominees recommended by the JSC. This renders the JSC ineffective and is in 
contrast with the finding of the Constitutional Court in the Certification of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa that the JSC provides a check and balance to the power of the 




The Constitution does not provide any guidance on what grounds or under what 
circumstances the President may decline to accept the candidates recommended by the JSC. 
This could create problems or a conflict of interest, for instance if for some reason the 
President happens not to like candidate X, he can reject him and simply advise the JSC of his 
reasons. The section only provides that the President must advise the JSC with reasons but is 
silent on what powers or action (other than to supplement the list in line with paragraph (c)) 
the JSC has or can take if the President’s reasons are not convincing). This section is 
ambiguous and needs to be amended to allow the JSC to challenge the President’s decision 
and prevent concentration of too much power to the President in the appointment of judges. 
 
4.5.6 Appointment in the Supreme Court of Appeal and the High Courts 
The process under this category begins when a vacancy occurs, whether in the SCA or any 
provincial or local division of the High Court. The President of the SCA or the responsible 
Judge President of the division must inform the JSC of such vacancy.
639
 Unlike for the CC 
positions where the JSC announces the vacancies publicly for nominations, here the 
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 Id at par (o). 
638
 See par 124. 
639
 See footnote 625 above section 3(a). 
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Generally the same processes and procedures of nomination for appointment in the CC are 
followed for the appointment of judges in the SCA or in the High Court in line with section 
3(c) of the Procedure of Commission. A list of nominated candidates is accordingly provided 
to all members of the JSC after the specified closing date with an invitation to make 
additional nominations where they so wish.
641
 The screening committee then prepares a 
shortlist of candidates whom in its opinion have a “real prospect of selection for 
appointment”, to be interviewed and submits the list to the JSC.642 
 
After receipt of the shortlist, if any member of the JSC feels strongly that a candidate who 
was duly nominated but not included in the shortlist should be added to the shortlist of 
candidates to be interviewed, she/he may request the Secretary of the JSC to add to the name 
of that candidate and it must thereupon be added to the shortlist.
643
 This must be done within 





The shortlist is disseminated to the “institutions” for comment by a specified closing date,645 
after which it is returned to the JSC which interviews all the shortlisted candidates.
646
 These 
interviews, like those for the Constitutional Court, are “open to the public and the media 
subject to the same rules as those ordinarily applicable in courts of law and shall not be 
subject to a set time limit”.647 
 
After all the interview process, the JSC meets privately and selects the candidates for 
appointment by consensus or by majority vote.
648
 The JSC must advise of the name or names 
                                                          
640
 Id at par 3(b). 
641
 Id at par 3(d). 
642






 Id at par 3(g). 
646
 Id at par 3(h) and (i). 
647
 Id at par 3(j). 
648
 Id at par 3(k). 
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of the successful candidate(s) for each vacancy.
649
 Successful candidates are therefore 




4.5.7 Term of Office, Remuneration and Removal of Judges in South 
Africa 
In a further step to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, South Africa’s Constitution 
protects the term of office, salaries and the way in which the removal of judges from office 
should be dealt with. The term of office and the issue of remuneration of judges are covered 
by section 176 which provides:  
“(1)  A Constitutional Court judge holds office for a non-renewable term of 12 years, or 
until he or she attains the age of 70, whichever occurs first, except where an Act of 
Parliament extends the term of Constitutional Court judge. 
(2)  Other judges hold office until they are discharged from active service in terms of 
an Act of Parliament 
(3)  The salaries, allowances and benefits of judges may not be reduced.” 
 
Section 177 provides that: 
 
“(1)  A judge may be removed from office only if –  
(a) The Judicial Service Commission finds that the judge suffers from an 
incapacity, is grossly incompetent or is guilty of misconduct; and 
(b) the National Assembly calls for that judge to be removed by a resolution 
adopted with a supporting vote of at least two thirds of its members. 
(2)  The President must remove a judge from office upon adoption of a resolution 
calling for that judge to be removed. 
(3)  The President, on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission, may suspend a 
judge who is the subject of a procedure in terms of subsection (1).” 
 
By including section 177, the framers of the Constitution wished to ensure that once judges 
have been appointed, the executive is unable to meddle in the execution of judicial duties by, 
for example, threatening to remove them from office.
651
 The Constitution protects the 
removal of judges by explicitly setting out incapacity, gross incompetency and misconduct as 
grounds for removal of judges after a thorough investigation by the JSC and the approval of 
                                                          
649
 Id at par 3(l). 
650
 Id at par 3(m). 
651
 It is general knowledge that where mechanisms for checks and balances are not clearly drawn the 
executive usually tries to manipulate the processes to their favour even if it means encroaching on the other 
branches of government. 
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the NA through a resolution adopted with a supporting vote of two thirds of the NA 
members. 
 
Further clarity on the removal of judges is provided in section 3 of Act 47 of 2001which 
provides as follows – 
“(1)  A Constitutional Court judge who holds office in terms of section 176 (1) of the 
Constitution –  
(a) must, subject to the provisions of section 4(1) or (2), be discharged from 
active service as a Constitutional Court judge, on the date on which he or 
she –  
(i)  attains the age of 70 years; or  
(ii)  has completed a 12-year term of office as a Constitutional Court 
judge, whichever occurs first; 
(b) may at any time be discharged by the President from active service as 
Constitutional Court judge if he or she becomes afflicted with a permanent 
infirmity of mind or body which renders him or her incapable of performing 
his or her official duties; or 
(c) may at any time on his or her request and with the approval of the President 
be discharged from active service as a Constitutional Court judge if there is 
any reason which the President deems sufficient. 
(2)  A judge who holds office in a permanent capacity –  
(a) shall, subject to the provisions of section 4(4),652 be discharged from active 
service as a judge on the date on which he or she attains the age of 70 years, 
if he or she has on that date completed a period of active service of not less 
than 10 years, or, if he or she has on that date not yet completed a period of 
10 years’ active service, on the date immediately following the day on 
which he or she completes a period of 10 years’ active service; 
(b) who has already attained the age of 65 years and has performed active 
service of 15 years, and who informs the Ministers in writing that he or she 
no longer wishes to perform active service, shall be discharged by the 
President from active service as a judge; 
(c) may at any time be discharged by the President from active service as a 
judge if he or she becomes afflicted with a permanent infirmity of mind or 
body which renders him or her incapable of performing his or her official 
duties; or 
(d) may at any time on his or her request and with the approval of the President 
be discharged from active service as a judge if there is any reason which the 
President deems sufficient. 
 
                                                          
652
  Section 4(4) of the Act provides that – “a Judge who on attaining the age of 70 years has not yet completed 
15 years’ active service, may continue to perform active service to the date on which he or she completes a 
period of 15 years’ active service or attains the age of 75 years, whichever occurs first, whereupon he or 
she must be discharged from active service as a judge”.  
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The Judge’s Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act of 2001 (hereafter the 
Remuneration Act) was enacted to support section 178 of the Constitution and to define 
judge’s conditions of employment in order further to protect the notion of judicial 
independence in South Africa. The Act provides, among other things, how judges are 
remunerated during active service
653
 and after discharge from active service. In an effort to 
ensure transparency and accountability of judges in active service, section 2(6) of the Act 
makes a crucial provision in that – 
“no Constitutional Court judge or judge may, without the consent of the Minister, accept, 
hold or perform any other office of profit or receive in respect of any service any fees, 
emoluments or other remuneration apart from his or her salary and any amount which 




This provision is an important step towards contributing in guard against any possible 
conflict of interest by members of the judiciary in active service, and it is important to note 





The appointment process is an important component of judicial independence. The 
Constitutions of the four countries discussed above make different provisions for the 
appointment of judicial officers and the administration of justice.  
 
In Swaziland the Constitution declares that the judiciary shall be independent and only be 
subject to the Constitution and not be subjected to the control or direction of any person or 
authority. Although the Constitution makes this provision, the judiciary in Swaziland has 
been in crisis because of the King who has been accused of interfering in the affairs of the 
                                                          
653
 Chapter 1 of the Act define ‘active service’ as –  
“Any service performed as a Constitutional Court judge or judge in a permanent capacity, irrespective of whether 
or not such service was performed prior to or after the date of commencement of this Act, and includes any 
continuous period – 
(a) of longer than 29 days of such service in an acting capacity prior to assuming office as a Constitutional Court 
judge or a judge in a permanent capacity if such service was performed before the date of commencement of 
this Act; and 
(b) of such service in an acting capacity prior to assuming office as a Constitutional Court judge or judge in a 
permanent capacity if such service was performed after the date of commencement of this Act.” 
654
 See paragraph 4.5.3 and footnote 600 above on Hlophe JP issue. 
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judiciary. This crisis has destabilized the judiciary and compromised the administration of 
justice in the country. 
 
It was pointed out that the provisions of section 153(1) of the Constitution which provide that 
the Chief Justice and other Justices of the superior courts shall be appointed by the King on 
the advice of the Judicial Service Commission, means that the King is not obliged to take the 
advice of the JSC and this diminishes the role of the JSC and purports to give the King 
control of the judiciary. 
 
In Kenya the judiciary has since the 1980s been accused of being staffed by corrupt judges 
who sympathized with the KANU-led executive. However, the new Constitution adopted in 
2010 has brought hope. The Constitution now declares that judicial authority shall be derived 
from the people and vests in, and shall be exercised by, the courts and tribunals established 
by the Constitution. More importantly, unlike in the past, the President is now, in terms of 
article 166(1), bound by the Constitution to appoint judges in accordance with the 
recommendation of the JSC and subject to the approval of the National Assembly.  
 
The Constitution further prevents any interference by the other branches of government or 
any person, including the President, in the functioning of the judiciary by pointing out that 
that the judiciary shall exercise judicial authority subject only to the Constitution and the law. 
 
We have also seen that the year 2000 marked the beginning of the demise of good 
governance in Zimbabwe. The political problems continued and affected all the branches of 
government. President Mugabe and his ZANU-PF increasingly disregarded the rule of law 
and the judiciary. Human rights violations have risen as a result of an ineffective judiciary 
and democracy is compromised. As it stands, Zimbabwe is governed under the Government 
of Political Unity based on the Global Political Agreement and busy finalizing a new 
Constitution with the hope of restoring the rule of law in the country. 
 
It was argued that the wording of section 84(1), especially the words “shall be appointed by 
the President ‘after consultation with’” in the Constitution, means that the President must 
consult, but after consulting he is at liberty to make his own decision and as a result there is a 
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need to review this section in a manner that will see the President and the JSC “working 
together” in the process of appointing judicial officers. 
South Africa’s Constitution vests judicial authority in the courts and also declares that they 
(the courts) are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law. The JSC in 
South Africa is composed of a large number of members from different spectrums as 
compared to the other countries discussed. Its role in the appointment of judges is considered 
important. However, there is a difference of opinion as regards its composition in that it 
includes more politicians than lawyers. 
  
The appointment of judicial officers is governed by section 174 of the Constitution and other 
supporting legislation. It was contended that the wording of some clauses such as ‘after 
consulting’ in section 174(3), gives the President considerable influence in the appointment 




























This research has sought to examine the role of constitutionalism, democracy, and judicial 
independence in Africa. To this end, four states, all of which have emerged from colonial 
pasts, were selected for examination: South Africa, Kenya, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. 
However, where relevant, reference has been made to other states in Africa and to countries 
beyond the continent. The study is formulated on two major concepts i.e. constitutionalism as 
a form of good governance, which is addressed in chapter two and; judicial independence as 
an, if not the, essential element of good governance addressed in chapters three and four. 
 
In Chapter one the background of the study was given and the research questions and aim of 
the study identified. The key concepts of this research were outlined (i.e. constitutionalism 
democracy, separation of powers, judicial independence and the rule of law), with a 
description of the planned research methods followed.  
 
In Chapter two the study looked at the “new wave” of new constitutions and new political 
developments in some African countries from 1990 to date. A major concern which emerged 
is failing constitutionalism in certain African states. Although written constitutions have 
proven most effective in terms of limiting and balancing government powers in the modern 
state, it can be argued that the success of constitutionalism does not only lie in a written 
constitution. This has been evident in some African states, as discussed above, which have 
experienced political disorder amid well-crafted constitutions.  
 
Some lay the failure of constitutionalism at the door of the inadequate foundation laid or 
legacy left by colonialism in Africa. Others point to the indirect interference or influence that 
Western countries continue to exert over Africa. True as this may be, continuing to blame 
colonialism and the continued influence of Western countries on Africa will never solve 
Africa’s problems.  
 
I contend that the major cause of failure in Africa lies with the ineffective African Union, 




The importance of the concept of constitutionalism was discussed in detail. In its purest form, 
it stands for a government of the people by the people. However, it also reflects limited 
government power, and public confidence in the government. Constitutionalism complements 
democracy, and in turn democracy seeks to promote and protect good governance and human 
rights in the modern state. 
 
Although there is undoubtedly a nexus between the concept of constitutionalism and a 
constitution, it was argued that a constitution alone does not guarantee constitutionalism. 
Africa abounds with examples where leaders rate themselves above the law (for example in 
Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Libya, Mali, DRC, and many others). 
This seems to be an ongoing challenge for most African states. What needs to be done is to 
introduce institutions in the AU where African leaders will undergo training in good 
governance, peace and cooperation, as well as the importance of constitutionalism, what the 
doctrine of separation of powers seek to achieve, and respect for the rule of law. 
 
Another important issue which needs to be considered in Africa, is the continent-wide 
approach to state sovereignty. Although the sovereignty of every state must be respected, the 
time has come to rethink the meaning of sovereignty in the light of the protection of human 
rights and good governance, and the role that can or must be played by the AU on the 
continent to prevent the abuse of power by recalcitrant leaders. The AU needs to create 
platforms or mechanisms in the form of regulations or conventions, and ensure their 
implementation and enforcement, which will bind member states and enable the AU to 
intervene where conflict erupts as a result of leaders or rebels who disregard the rule of law 
and violate human rights. 
 
It was further argued that the doctrine of separation of powers was introduced to Africa only 
after the advent of colonialism. Long before colonialism, traditional leaders in the persons of 
kings and chiefs, ruled communities. When colonizers were in charge they did not follow 
“inclusive” democratic practices. The indigenous populations were, in the main, excluded and 
denied participation in the governing of their countries by colonizers. Upon obtaining 
independence, the constitutions adopted lacked principles of constitutionalism. This opened 
the door for those who took over to consolidate power to protect their personal interests 
thereby compromising the public interest. 
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The philosophy of Montesquieu in terms of which “every man invested with power is apt to 
abuse it and carry his authority as far as it will go”,655 has found full expression in most 
African states, most strikingly exemplified by the situation of Zimbabwe where Mugabe has 
been President for over thirty years and good governance has collapsed as a result of his 
abuse of power. Furthermore, in Swaziland the judiciary has been thrown into disarray by a 
King who seeks to control all the branches of government. In Kenya, the country experienced 
extreme hardship as the result of the KANU-dominated executive which encroached on the 
affairs of the other branches of government. 
 
We also saw that although South Africa has been moving in a positive direction in terms of 
political tolerance and separation of powers when compared to other countries in Africa, it is 
not immune from the challenges that have befallen other nations. However, it is submitted 
that other African states could profitably “take a leaf” from South Africa’s civil society 
groups and NGOs who have approached the courts to challenge questionable actions by the 
government, and also from the South African courts who have justly, fearlessly and 
impartially found against the government where it violated human rights or acted ultra vires 
its powers.
656
  Further, other African governments may learn from the South African 
government to respect court findings and orders in order to promote peace and good 
governance.   
 
It was also established that one of the main aims of the doctrine of the separation of powers is 
to ensure checks and balances on government power.
657
 Constitutional Principle IV in South 
Africa provided that – “there shall be a separation of powers between the legislature, 
executive and judiciary, with appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability, 
responsiveness and openness”.658 Accountability, responsiveness and openness are essential 
components for a healthy democracy and governments should be urged to promote these. 
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 Montesquieu B The spirit of laws (1949) at 150. 
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   See Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) BCLR 
1169 where the Constitutional Court held that the socioeconomic rights must be enforced in line with the 
Constitution. See also Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 
Democratic Alliance v President of South Africa and Others (CCT 122/11) [2012] ZACC 24 where the 
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Director of Public Prosecutions was inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid. 
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 See United Nations African Governance Report Ii: 2009 (Dec 2009) United Nations Publications at 118-
120. 
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 See Schedule 4 to the South African Interim Constitution, 1993. 
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The study further deliberated on the rule of law in Africa. It points out that most leaders in 
Africa disregard the rule of law. Although the AU Constitutive Act and the African Charter 
on Democracy, Elections and Governance emphasize the rule of law, it is in the main ignored 
by self-serving leaders. This is one of the many challenges surrounding the AU which 
emerges as strong on theory but, when it comes to implementation, appears unable or 
unwilling to execute its functions effectively when compared to similar institutions such as 
the European Union (EU) which is generally active, effective and involved.
659
 The AU needs 
to develop a strategy that will enable it to function effectively and to be actively involved in 
the promotion of good governance and the rule of law in member states. 
 
The study agrees that the African Peer Review Mechanism can be an effective tool in 
improving good governance in Africa, only if it can be enforced and promoted among 
member states. The AU must create platforms to ensure continuity of good work or initiatives 




Chapter three of the study looked at various mechanisms that protect the principle of 
judicial independence as an element of good governance. This principle has developed 
progressively and fits well with the concept of constitutionalism and the principle of 
separation of powers.
661
 Among others, the mechanisms identified included the constitution 
and legislation; Judicial Service Commissions, courts or tribunals; international law/ 
conventions or practices; and personal and functional independence of the judges. Each of the 
mentioned mechanisms play a very important role in protecting the independence of the 
judiciary and ensuring that the administration of justice is carried out diligently and 
effectively. 
 
We have learnt that the UN, through its adopted “Basic Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary” seeks to promote and protect judicial independence by providing that “the 
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independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the 
Constitution or the law of the country”. The study also shows that an independent judiciary is 
a symbol of democracy. This notion was elaborated at length using South Africa as an 
example, in an effort to show the nexus between the principle of judicial independence and 
human rights in a constitutional and democratic state. It was argued that “judicial 
independence bestows upon judicial officers a responsibility to protect the balance of powers 
and human rights in a given state”.662 
 
This was evident in our discussion of RSA v Grootboom.
663
 We learnt in Grootboom that an 
effective and independent judiciary is necessary to ensure a just intervention between the 
government and its people to preserve law and order in a state. The CC made an important 
argument when it raised that –  
“The issue here remind us of the intolerable conditions under which many of our people 
are still living … It is also a reminder that unless the plight of these communities is 
alleviated, people may be tempted to take the law into their own hands in order to escape 
these conditions”.664 
 
This is indeed a very important finding and proves the commitment, effectiveness and 
independence of the Constitutional Court of South Africa to adjudicate cases impartially and 
without fear or favour could be a lesson to other African countries. Socio-economic rights are 
very important because if neglected and not legally defended those who are suffering may be 
forced to resort to conflict in order to improve their lives. Economic freedom is a very 
sensitive and important issue and it takes a bold independent judiciary to guarantee it.
665
 We 
learnt that courts form an important part of good governance and they need to be protected 
and respected in order to function effectively. 
 
We have also established the importance of the personal and functional independence of 
judges and how it enhances judicial independence. The study agrees that it is important to 
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 According to La Porta R et al “it is perhaps not entirely surprising that judicial independence is especially 
important for economic freedom...”. (See La Porta Rafael et al “The guarantees of freedom”(2002) NBER 
Working Paper Series at 4 available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8759.pdf?new_window=1(accessed 
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create a free environment for judicial officers to be able to execute their duties without fear, 
for instance of being removed from office, demoted, or have their salaries reduced for 
delivering judgments that are unfavourable to the executive or legislature. Judges must decide 




Chapter four looked at the appointment process of judicial officers in Swaziland, Kenya, 
Zimbabwe and South Africa. The manner in which judges are appointed forms an important 
component of judicial independence. It is essential to ensure an open and transparent process 
when judicial officers are appointed, if democracy and the principle of judicial independence 
are to be safeguarded. It was seen that throughout the world the process of appointing judges 
has lately attracted considerable attention in an effort to secure the independence of the 
judiciary in a quest to protect democracy and human rights in the modern state. 
 
The four countries considered in the study have all opted for a JSC to assist in the process of 
appointing judicial officers. The role of the JSC in good governance is dependent on the 
wording of the appointment clause, namely “after consultation with” / “in consultation” / “in 
accordance with” / “on the advice of”, etc. 
 
The Effect of the Terms “after consultation with”, “in consultation”, “in accordance 
with”, “on the advice of” in Constitutions with regard to the Appointment Process 
Terms such as “after consultation with”, “in consultation”, “in accordance with”, or “on the 
advice of” have different meanings with regard to the process of appointment of judges. All 
the four countries have adopted different provisions for the appointment of judicial officers in 
their constitutions –  
 
Swaziland 
Section 153 of the Constitution provides as follows –  
“(1)  The Chief Justice and the other Justices of the superior courts ‒ shall be appointed 
by the King on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission”.  
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164 
 
Kenya   
Article 166 of the Constitution provides that – 
(1)  The President shall appoint – 
(c) the Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice, in accordance with the 
recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission, and subject to the 
approval of the National Assembly; and 




Section 84 of the Constitution which establishes that –  
“(1)  The Chief Justice and other judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court shall 
be appointed by the President after consultation with the Judicial Service 
Commission”. 
South Africa  
Section 174 of the Constitution provides as follows –  
“(3)  The President as head of the national executive, after consulting the Judicial 
Service Commission and the leaders of the parties represented in the National 
Assembly, appoints the Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice, after 
consulting the Judicial Service Commission, appoints the President and Deputy 
President of the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
(6)  The President must appoint the judges of all other courts on the advice of the 
Judicial Service Commission.” 
 
The framing of these terms and its effect is crucial for purposes of interpreting those clauses 
and giving a clear meaning in line with the principles of separation of powers and judicial 
independence in modern constitutional and democratic states.
667
 The notion of judicial 
independence finds expression in the doctrine of separation of powers.
668
 The doctrine is 
important for the well-being of a state. In South African Association of Personal Injury 
Lawyers v Heath and Others
669
 the Constitutional Court held that “the separation of the 
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judiciary from the other branches of government is an important aspect of the separation of 





It is not intended for a complete separation or to provide a platform for encroachment by one 
branch in the functions of the other branch(es). There must be co-operation between the three 
branches of government in order to enable checks and balances. In South Africa the 
Constitution protects the judiciary and encourage co-operation between the branches of 
government by making a provision that: “organs of state, through legislative and other 
measures, must assist and: protect the courts to ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity, 
accessibility and effectiveness of the courts”.671 
 
Rautenbach and Malherbe explain the effects of the terms “with the advice”, “on the advice”, 
“in consultation with”, and “after consulting”.672 They point out that in the case of South 
Africa that the term “after consulting” means that “the President must consult another 
functionary or institution, but that, after consultation, the President is not bound by the 
recommendation”.673 The issue that the President is not bound by the recommendation of the 





The appointment of judicial officers is a crucial issue that requires fairness and transparency. 
I contend that the wording of section 173(4) “… after consulting …” is vague and purports to 
give the President greater influence in the appointment of the mentioned judicial officers. The 
best thing would be to amend the wording in a manner that will clearly bind the President to 
consider the recommendations of the JSC and the leaders of parties represented in the 
National Assembly.  
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In the case of Swaziland attention was paid to the judicial authority and the Constitution, as 
well as how judges are appointed. It was established that the current judicial crisis as 
discussed is partly caused by the King’s excessive interference in the affairs of the judiciary. 
Although the Constitution seeks to protect the independence of the judiciary in terms of 
section 141 the King has on several occasions overridden it. This has compromised the 
independence of the judiciary and consequently democracy in Swaziland.  
  
Section 153 of the Constitution which makes provision for the appointment of the Chief 
Justice and other justices of the superior courts on the advice of the JSC was found not to 
have been structured in a way that seeks to promote the principle of separation of powers in 
Swaziland. This is so because the King is not bound to consider the advice of the JSC or 
anyone else when making judicial appointments in the superior courts.  
 
It was also argued that the King technically appoints all members constituting the JSC and 
this could be perceived as a threat to the independence of the judiciary. This fear has already 
manifested as the judicial crisis looms in Swaziland with the government, the JSC and the 
Chief Justice being accused of subverting the rule of law in the country.
675
 The Chief Justice 
appears to be more loyal to the King than the law. This was evident in his controversial action 
of issuing a practice directive exempting the King from the jurisdiction of courts in 
Swaziland. 
 
Based on the findings of the study, I contend that the problem lies with the Constitution. It 
needs to be amended. Political parties must be allowed to participate in the politics of 
Swaziland. The powers of the King need to be reduced to allow for checks and balances on 
power. In order to avoid the current situation where the Chief Justice has to protect the King 
rather than uphold the law because he knows that the King “butters his bread”, section 153 
must be amended in such a way that the appointment of judges would require consultation 
and approval of the JSC and Parliament. Further, section 159 needs to be reviewed so that the 
JSC is not made up of the King’s appointees only as it is currently the case. 
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In Kenya things seem to be moving in the right direction away from the era of KANU-
dominated government and a corrupt judiciary. The 2010 Constitution came with hope. The 
most important provision with regard to the judiciary is article 166(1) which is seen as a 
milestone towards upholding the principle of judicial independence and curbing executive 
influence in the appointment of judicial officers. The role of the JSC is placed centre at stage 
and the National Assembly must approve the appointment of the judges.  
 
In the case of Zimbabwe the study indicated that the year 2000 represents a turning point in 
the history of Zimbabwe which affected not only the politics of the country, but also the 
judiciary. It is no secret that President Mugabe has scant respect for the judiciary. This was 
evident in 1999 in his response to some four judges of the Supreme Court who wrote to him 
seeking clarity on torture charges, that: 
“The judiciary has no right to give instructions to the President on any matter as the four 
judges have purported to do. In those circumstances, the one and only honourable course 
open to [the judges] is quitting the Bench”.676 
 
It was argued that the wording of section 84(1) and (2) of the Constitution gives the President 
exclusive powers to appoint senior judges thereby defeating the object of the principle of the 
separation of powers. This section (84) needs to be amended to allow the JSC to “work 
together with” the President in the process of appointing judicial officers which should, 
further, be subject to the approval of the House of Assembly. 
 
Although the country is currently working on a new Constitution, there is little hope that it 
will bring about the radical changes needed to transform the country. Among the reasons 
which cast doubt are the allegations of intolerance during the public consultation process of 
drafting the new Constitution. 
 
In the case of South Africa the study focused on section 174 of the Constitution which makes 
provision for the appointment of judicial officers and the composition of the Judicial Service 
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Commission. It was indicated that South Africa’s JSC is composed of members from 
different spheres and has many members as compared to the JSC’s in other countries. On the 
one hand, the 23 members’ number is criticized as unnecessary while on the other hand, some 
welcome it and argue that it enhances transparency in the appointment process. 
 
The study also pointed to the criticism leveled at the South African JSC that it is 
“overstocked” with politicians at the cost of lawyers. It was further argued that section 174(3) 
and (4) of the Constitution is structured in a vague and ambiguous manner. Taking into 
account Rautenbach and Malherbe’s interpretation of the words “after consulting”, to mean 
that “the President must consult another functionary or institution, but that, after consultation 
the President is not bound by the recommendation” of the functionary or institution that he 
must consult. 
 
It could be contended that the crafters of the Constitution had a purpose when they put the 
words “after consulting the leaders of the Judicial Service Commission and the leaders of 
parties represented in the National Assembly” (section 174(3)) and “after consulting the 
Chief Justice and the leaders of the parties represented in the National Assembly” (section 
174(4)), the President appoints certain judicial officers. It could be argued that the purpose 
was to ensure that the process of appointment does not become a decision of the President 
alone, otherwise there was never going to be the word “consultation”, but this would have  
been included under section 84 of the Constitution which makes provision for the powers and 
functions of the President.  
 
In June 2012 the leader of the main opposition party (Democratic Alliance), Helen Zille 
wrote to the President, Jacob Zuma, and advanced some constructive arguments regarding the 
consultation on the appointment process in the Constitutional Court. She pointed out that:  
“I have today written to President Zuma to re-state that the Constitution requires proper 
and meaningful consultation before he decides on an appointment. In the past, the 
President has ‘consulted’ at the very last moment, as a formality, when his mind was 
clearly already made up. He has always sought consultation only on his preferred 
candidate, which has suggested that his mind has not been open to the possibility of 
changing his appointment based on the consultation process. This meant that the leaders 
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of opposition parties did not have fair chance to respond or engage with the President 
about his choice. 
All in all, the consultation between the President and leaders of political parties about the 
appointment of senior judicial vacancies has been a mere fig leaf for doing what the 
President intended to do from the start, and cannot be regarded as meaningful. My letter 
to President Zuma today suggests ways in which substantive and proper consultations 
can take place. 
The DA urges President Zuma to accept the value inherent in real consultation. This 
mechanism seeks to legitimise the appointment process by reaching consensus with the 
opposition in the decision made. It aims to protect all South Africans from political 
influence in the highest court in the land by incorporating a measure of oversight and 
democratic participation. A superficial acknowledgement of consultation does damage to 
the legitimacy of the appointment process, without which his choice of judges will 
remain questionable.”677  
 
Political parties must work together in Parliament for the good of the country. They need to 
engage in robust debate to benefit the country. This initiative by a leader of an opposition 
party is crucial and seeks to compel transparency in the workings of one of the most 
important pillars of democracy, i.e. an independent judiciary. She further argued, and 
rightfully so, that: 
“Judicial appointments are one of the most important functions of the President. If he 
wants the appointments to have credibility, he must consult meaningfully, and with an 
open mind, as we believe the spirit of the Constitution requires”.678 
 
Another challenge is that the Constitution does not say who can nominate the judicial officers 
mentioned in section 174(3).
679
 Whether this is a sole privilege of the President or it should 
be the JSC or anyone is not clear. Section 174 needs to be revised in order to clarify the some 
of these questions and to explicitly bind the President to consider the advice or 
recommendations of the JSC and the leaders of parties represented in the National Assembly. 
From the above summation of both the practice and the pitfalls inherent in judicial 
appointment in the African countries considered in this study, it is submitted that the Kenyan 
model is, in theory at least, the most effective and could be recommended as “best practice” 
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for African countries. However, a note of caution must be sounded in that the Kenyan model 
has not yet proven itself in the hard school of political expedience.  
 
Furthermore, it must be noted that in countries where there is a single dominant party, taking 
a certain issue to Parliament for approval could be largely meaningless in that the general 
practice is for members to vote along party lines.
680
 Under such situations, once the senior 
leaders of the dominant party push for a certain bill or the nomination of a particular person 
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